Jonathan Eugene Hawley
How Judge Hawley rules, drawn from 12 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Hawley
Jonathan Eugene Hawley is a judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Hawley received a commission on November 15, 2024.
Judge Hawley's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Hawley, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
- Permanent Standing Order ↗
- Sample Change of Plea Colloquy ↗
- Sample Potential Pre-Trial Release Conditions ↗
Key rules
Contacting chambers
Do not contact chambers staff directly except for court-initiated scheduling communications copied to every party.
“Counsel should ordinarily not communicate directly with chambers staff by email or telephone except when contacted by the Court regarding scheduling issues where all parties are copied on the communication.”
Motions
Disclose documents supporting or opposing summary judgment before the discovery cutoff.
“Any document referenced in support or in response to a motion for summary judgment must have been provided to and disclosed to an opposing party prior to the date for the close of the discovery as set by the Court in its scheduling orders.”
Motions
Combine motions in limine into one filing with each issue numbered.
“Counsel shall file a single motion in limine instead of multiple, separately filed motions, with each separate issue numbered within the single motion”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Hawley decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, Hawley read the TCPA’s private right of action for repeated telephone calls as excluding text messages because the provision did not mention them. He dismissed the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim.
“Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA includes ‘telephone call’ and does not mention text messages or SMS messages, and nowhere does the TCPA define ‘telephone call’ to include text and/or SMS messages.”
In Wayland v. OSF Healthcare System, Hawley granted the employer summary judgment because he found no evidence connecting the plaintiff’s FMLA leave to her termination. The Seventh Circuit later vacated that judgment.
“Fatally, the Plaintiff does not point to evidence of a nexus between her FMLA leave and her termination that would permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor.”
In Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Hawley treated a Seventh Circuit statement about corporate wealth and punitive damages as dictum, then granted discovery of the defendant’s financial condition subject to the usual discovery limits.
“Zazu’s discussion of punitive damages was unnecessary given its reversal on the question of liability and was, therefore, dictum which this court is not bound to follow.”
In Woods v. Club Cabaret, Hawley conditionally certified an FLSA collective action involving dancers who worked at one location under the same compensation rules. He deferred questions about arbitration clauses and counterclaims to a later stage.
“If these class members are not similarly situated, it is hard to imagine that a class could ever be conditionally certified, which may also explain why classes were conditionally certified in twenty-five of the twenty-seven cases cited, supra.”
In one trade-secrets pleading dispute, allegations of restricted access and a contractual return requirement were enough to defeat dismissal; the court did not require every possible security measure at that stage.
“Plaintiff need not deploy all the security measures Defendant supposes Plaintiff should have, just reasonable ones.”
Procedural preferences
In Doe v. Musselman, Hawley postponed summary judgment and allowed discovery after the plaintiffs identified evidence they needed to answer a declaration from an undeposed witness supporting the city’s motion.
“The nonmovant Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing they cannot at this time present facts essential to justify their opposition to Defendant Toulon’s Motion for Summary Judgment”
In Ryan v. Cargill, Hawley denied broad discovery into an ERISA administrator’s structural conflict but allowed limited interrogatories about the administrator’s unsupported claim that it had consistently interpreted the plan the same way.
“It is fundamentally unfair to allow Cargill to inject this question into the administrative record, while being shielded from providing any evidence to support the claim.”
In Wayland he quoted Pagel's distinction between standards for time on the job and penalties for protected absences. He then found the plaintiff's one FMLA day in 2019, nearly a month before the PIP, did not support an inference that the employer penalized her for that absence.
“The FMLA does not require an employer to adjust its performance standards for the time an employee is actually on the job, but it can require that performance standards be adjusted to avoid penalizing an employee for being absent during FMLA-protected leave.”
In Aase v. East Peoria Community School District 309, Hawley dismissed claims against the school district because Illinois law made the school board the proper defendant. He allowed an amended complaint.
“the school board, not the school district, as the proper defendant under similar circumstances.”
Cautions
In Wayland, a divided Seventh Circuit panel vacated Hawley’s FMLA summary judgment and remanded for trial because it found a genuine factual dispute about the amount of approved leave Wayland took. The dissent agreed with Hawley’s causation analysis.
“we vacate the judgment and remand for trial.”
In Boyce’s prisoner dental-care case, Hawley granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed that ruling because Boyce’s grievance gave notice of an ongoing denial of dental care.
“the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that Boyce failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.”
In Washington v. EYM Group Inc., Hawley rejected the defendants’ attempt to apply Title VII charge-naming rules to claims under the Illinois Human Rights Act. The employer entities remained in eight counts; a separate whistleblower count was dismissed.
“the Court does not find the Defendants’ reliance on Title VII authority persuasive in the context of an action arising under the IHRA such as this one;”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Ryan's Motion for Discovery Authorization (D. 9) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“Defendant OSF Healthcare System’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to terminate this case.”
“the district court ... granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust Boyce's Eighth Amendment claim.”
“The district court denied, however, Boyce's motion to file a class action lawsuit, reasoning that ‘a prisoner bringing a pro se action cannot represent a class of plaintiffs.’”
“Plaintiffs Jane Does 1-7, 8, and 9's Rule 56(d) Motions to Postpone Summary Judgment Decision Pending Discovery (D. 93, D. 86, D. 86) are GRANTED.”
“Defendant City of Toulon, Illinois' Motion for Summary Judgment (D. 90, D. 83, D. 83) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as premature.”
“Defendant Blackstone Medical Services, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Counts I-IV of the Consolidated Class Action Complaint (D. 32) is GRANTED. The entirety of the Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action Complaint (D. 29) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If the Plaintiffs choose to file an amended consolidated class action complaint, they must do so within 21 days of the date of this Order.”
“The Wexford Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 181 is GRANTED. Defendants Andrea Moss, Kelly Haag, Todd Nelson, Linda Duckworth, Stephan Lanterman, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The IDOC Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 183 is GRANTED. Defendants Michael Melvin, Daidra Marano, Teri Kennedy, and Rob Jeffreys are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
After a bench trial supplementing the administrative record in an IDEA placement dispute, Hawley reversed the hearing officer and found that the student could receive a satisfactory education in the local behavioral-disabilities classroom with additional interventions, including a one-on-one aide. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that he properly weighed significant new evidence and did not clearly err.
“For the reasons stated, supra, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (D. 14) is DENIED.”
“The Court hereby reconsiders the previous Order made by the former presiding judge denying consolidation and GRANTS the Motion to Transfer the Case (D. 6).”
“For the reasons stated, infra, the Motion is GRANTED. The Plaintiff shall have leave to amend her Complaint within twenty-one days if she believes she can state a claim in accordance with this Order.”
“the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts One through Eight and grants the Motion to Dismiss as to Count Nine.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 464.5 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 48 days (N = 11).
The reviewed matters span consent-jurisdiction cases filed from 2013 through 2023 and district-court assignments filed from late 2024 onward. This is a descriptive sample rather than an exhaustive census, and administrative case-ending data are unavailable for most consent-era matters.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 13 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 13 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 16 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 15 |
| Sep 2024 | 4 | 13 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 15 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 10 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 11 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 8 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 10 |
| Sep 2021 | 5 | 12 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 13 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 12 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, not for Judge Hawley: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 760 | 7.3 months |
| Closed with no court action | 315 | 6.2 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 438 | 8.4 months |
| Closed during trial | 7 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 760 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2024 | 704 | 8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 625 | 10.8 months |
| Sep 2022 | 637 | 11.7 months |
| Sep 2021 | 684 | 9.9 months |
| Sep 2020 | 629 | 10.4 months |
| Sep 2019 | 653 | 10.1 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Hawley with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Hawley, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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