Harold Albert Baker
Judge Baker no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Baker decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Decides statutory and immunity questions on the controlling text, not on agency leniency or reliance: an ERISA plan could not rely on a superseded PBGC regulation over later statutes, and an FMLA claimant's estoppel argument failed for lack of reasonable reliance.
“Can competent lawyers and accountants engaged in the highly technical task of computing the present cash value of deferred annuities ignore seven year-old relevant amendments to the Code and ERISA and claim estoppel? The question is rhetorical; the answer is ‘No!’”
Construes pro se and civil-rights complaints liberally at the pleadings stage and will not require plaintiffs to plead which defendant did what; those particulars are for discovery.
“He need not allege precisely what each defendant did on each particular day on which he alleges a different instance of deliberate indifference. What any one officer did or didn't do, and when, will be fleshed out in discovery.”
Procedural preferences
Strictly enforces the Central District of Illinois local rules on summary-judgment fact statements: a non-movant's unsupported 'flat denials' of the movant's numbered undisputed facts are deemed admitted.
“Plaintiffs' flat denials, without reference to supporting materials, have no standing under the local rule. ... those facts must be deemed admitted.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (# 16) is denied, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment (# 20) is allowed.”
“the defendant's motion for summary judgment (# 20) is allowed. ... The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment and costs of suit in favor of the defendant-third party plaintiff, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation”
“the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss (# 15), as well as the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' reply (# 23). The plaintiff's complaint is therefore dismissed with prejudice. This case is terminated.”
“the court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, but grants the writ with respect to the death sentence subject to the conditions discussed below.”
“The defendant's motion for summary judgment [23] is granted. This case is terminated. The parties shall bear their own costs.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss [20] is denied in its entirety. The defendants shall file their answer within fourteen days of the date of this order.”
“For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 36) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Harmon's motion for summary judgement is granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. [d/e 38] The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant Harmon in accordance with this order.”
“Defendants Shaw, Stegal and Walker's motion for summary judgement is granted in part and denied in part, [d/e 40]. All claims against Defendant Walker are dismissed.”
“Since the verdict was a general verdict and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the three grounds for liability, the renewed motion under Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law [is granted].”
“Before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment [d/e 53], which is granted for the reasons below.”
“This case is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The court now holds as a matter of law that the defendants Days Inns of America, Inc. and its parent company, HFS, Inc., are liable for any violations of the ADA in the construction of the Champaign Days Inn hotel.”
“This case is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The court now holds as a matter of law that the defendants Days Inns of America, Inc. and its parent company, HFS, Inc., are liable for any violations of the ADA ...”
“The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Counts I and II, the federal law claims. The court now denies summary judgment.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Docket # 11) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket #20) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Docket # 20) is DENIED as moot.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1911 days (N = 18).
A historical record
Judge Baker no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.