Sri Srinivasan
How Judge Srinivasan rules, drawn from 37 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Srinivasan
Srikanth Srinivasan is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Srinivasan received a commission on May 24, 2013.
Judge Srinivasan's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Srinivasan's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Srinivasan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Missouri River Energy Services v. FERC, Srinivasan denied review after finding FERC had given a rational, record-based explanation for charges under a transmission agreement.
“We affirm the Commission's orders so long as FERC examined the relevant data and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”
In Labow v. DOJ, Srinivasan held that the pen-register statute sealed the order itself, not every reference to information contained in that order in other records.
“By its terms, the statute provides for sealing of a pen register order itself, not sealing of any and all information the order may contain even if appearing in other documents.”
In Walker, Srinivasan required actual or constructive notice before treating a guest rider’s conduct as assent to an arbitration agreement sent by unsolicited text.
“Uber cannot show that Carroll ever saw its unsolicited message, and contract law imposes no duty to read a contract that one does not know exists.”
In Ortega-Hernandez, he used statutory history and context to conclude that maliciously injuring a dwelling concerns another person’s property and categorically requires force against property of another.
“One cannot willfully and maliciously injure another person’s dwelling without using physical force against that property.”
In Center for Biological Diversity, he accepted the agency’s causal baseline: ongoing harms that would occur without the challenged rule were not effects of that rule requiring consultation.
“Because any ongoing and accumulating harms would occur even if EPA had promulgated no rule at all, such harms cannot be considered ‘effects of’ EPA’s rule.”
Procedural preferences
In D.C. Association of Chartered Public Schools v. District of Columbia, Srinivasan vacated the district court's judgment and directed dismissal because a statutory jurisdictional bar foreclosed the association's claims.
“We do not reach the merits of the Association's claims because we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them.”
In Blassingame v. Trump, Srinivasan held that a sitting president’s campaign for reelection was not an official presidential act for purposes of official-act immunity.
“When a first-term President opts to seek a second term, his campaign to win re-election is not an official presidential act.”
In Fishman, Srinivasan framed qualified immunity at the specific level of the officers’ fact-bound judgment call and required authority placing the detention’s unlawfulness beyond debate.
“For qualified-immunity purposes, the question is whether the officers’ actions were so manifestly unreasonable as to violate clearly established Fourth Amendment principles.”
In Almonte, he approved targeted, on-the-record individual juror questioning that was detailed enough to assess impartiality without unnecessarily magnifying the incident.
“The district court here followed that guidance to a tee.”
Cautions
In GHG Management v. NLRB, Srinivasan remanded for the Board to explain why it used one test rather than another to assess the company's objections to a union election.
“The General Counsel's explanation in that regard falls short.”
In Liquid Energy Pipeline Association v. FERC, Srinivasan vacated a rehearing order that changed an effective rate index without the notice and comment required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
“We grant the petitions based on one of the grounds Carriers assert: that the Commission failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when it modified the Index in the Rehearing Order without adhering to notice-and-comment procedures.”
In World Shipping Council v. FMC, Srinivasan set aside a billing rule because the agency had not reasonably explained its bar on charging a contracting motor carrier.
“The seeming discrepancy was pointed out to the Commission, and the Commission gave no reasonable explanation for it.”
In National Council of Nonprofits, he confined mootness to the directive actually challenged and distinguished separate agency conduct that might support a different action.
“As to the action we have before us, there is likely no point in enjoining OMB to cease implementing a Memorandum it has already rescinded.”
In Slash Creek, he treated a prior decision as controlling when it rejected a functionally indistinguishable statutory claim, even though the earlier discussion was brief.
“The result and reasoning of A.P. Bell leave no room to rule in favor of appellants here.”
In the royalty-allocation appeal, he required the agency to explain how it combined two valuation methods into final shares; explaining the strengths of each method did not supply the missing calculation.
“into quantitative allocations. Did they average the results?”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment to NIH in connection with PETA's second FOIA request and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to NIH as to PETA's third FOIA request.”
“We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.”
“We find inadequate justification, however, for the Commission's blanket requirement of at least two such studies as a precondition to any disease-related claim. In all other respects, we deny the petition for review.”
“We conclude that no unlawful seizure occurred, and we therefore affirm.”
“We agree with the district court and affirm its judgment.”
“We agree with the district court and affirm its entry of judgment for Record Press.”
“Because the district court made no relevant findings or conclusions under Rule 52(a) concerning its rejection of a fee award under the False Claims Act's fee-shifting provision, we vacate the denial of fees and remand for the court to make the relevant findings and conclusions.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government on the claims under Exemption 7(D) and under the exclusion set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1). We reverse the grant of summary judgment on both challenges to withholdings under Exemption 3 and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Finally, we vacate the district court’s opinion with regard to Exemption 7(A).”
“we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Stein’s claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.”
“We therefore affirm the denial of NSC’s request for a public-interest fee waiver.”
“We reject Fry's arguments and affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.”
“The district court held that Getma failed to satisfy that stringent standard, and we agree.”
“We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“We conclude that FERC's determination was not arbitrary and capricious and thus deny Missouri River's petition for review.”
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