Robert L. Wilkins
How Judge Wilkins decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He reads FOIA's exemptions narrowly and requires an agency to explain, in specific and non-conclusory terms, exactly how disclosure would harm its decision-making -- a generalized fear of public criticism of a published scientific study is not enough to justify withholding the underlying work.
“We find only claims that releasing the model runs will enable criticism of USGS... But criticism is not a recognized harm against which the deliberative process privilege is intended to protect.”
An agency cannot invoke a new legal justification for withholding records for the first time on a second appeal; a robust timeliness rule that forces the government to make its best case the first time around serves FOIA's efficiency goals better than case-by-case leniency.
“A robust timeliness rule encourages the Government to present all its arguments the first time around. Weakening that rule lessens the incentive.”
When an agency changes a longstanding legal test, it must actually grapple with its own prior, contrary positions (including in recent rulemakings) before declining to apply the new rule retroactively -- an unexplained inconsistency between what the agency now claims the old rule required and what it said in other recent proceedings is fatal.
“The Board's own precedent belies these assertions... in other words, contrary to the Board's declaration... the Board's precedent on the joint-employer standard was anything but static.”
Procedural preferences
A federally chartered institution's status alone does not create federal-question jurisdiction over a dispute; jurisdiction over a state-law claim exists only when a federal issue is actually, necessarily, and substantially disputed, not merely mentioned or raised as a defense.
“[I]nvoking federal law in a defense does not create federal jurisdiction.”
Where Congress creates a detailed administrative review scheme (like the Civil Service Reform Act), he holds litigants to that exclusive path even when they frame their claim as constitutional, so long as the claim is not truly collateral to the scheme and the agency has relevant expertise to bring to bear first.
“[T]he CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review when a qualifying employee challenges an adverse employment action by arguing that a federal statute is unconstitutional.”
Sophisticated commercial parties who sign an agreement disclaiming implied fiduciary duties and shielding an advisor from liability for actions taken on the client's own instruction will be held to that bargain; a signature is enough to show assent even if the signer never actually read the terms.
“Under D.C. law, a signature is almost always sufficient to show mutual assent... that is the case even if the signer was unaware of the terms.”
Cautions
In sentencing appeals, he insists the record show the district court's actual stated reasons for a variance or Guidelines calculation, and will not let the government paper over an error by pointing to considerations the judge could have relied on but never actually invoked.
“[T]he District Court did not consider the erroneous fact because the District Court did not expressly mention that fact when imposing the sentence.”
He treats ineffective-assistance-at-sentencing claims seriously where counsel's oversight cost the defendant something concrete and quantifiable (lost jail credit, a misapplied Guidelines range) -- a sentencing court cannot lawfully ignore that loss just because a case was 'crafted to be fair' overall.
“The District Court would not have been permitted to disregard the fact that Miller's detention on a federal writ caused him to lose one year of Maryland state jail credits.”
A party invoking mandamus -- the 'drastic' remedy of last resort -- must show a clear and indisputable right to relief; where Supreme Court precedent leaves even plausible room for the government's reading of a statute, mandamus is unavailable no matter how sympathetic the underlying claim.
“Mandamus is a 'drastic' remedy, only available in 'extraordinary situations,' and thus 'is hardly ever granted.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For this and the other reasons we have explained, the petitions for review are denied.”
“We therefore grant the petition for review and remand to the NLRB for reconsideration. The NLRB's application for enforcement is consequently denied.”
“We therefore grant the Petition, vacate the decision, and remand the case to the NTSB to determine the appropriate amount of fees and expenses to award.”
“We therefore vacate the District Court's judgment and remand for reconsideration with adequate explanation.”
“We reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with instructions to award attorney fees consistent with this opinion.”
“The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus is GRANTED. The District Court's orders of November 20, 2014 (Doc. 205), and December 17, 2014 (Docs. 227, 228) are VACATED.”
“The request to direct reassignment is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's judgment with respect to O'Neal's conviction and sentence.”
“For the reasons previously discussed, we affirm Appellants' convictions and remand the case to the District Court for resentencing Mr. Alvaran.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment is reversed and we remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Put Judge Wilkins's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Wilkins actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Wilkins's own signed orders and cites them.