Robert L. Wilkins
How Judge Wilkins rules, drawn from 49 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Wilkins
Robert Leon Wilkins is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Wilkins received a commission on January 15, 2014. Judge Wilkins previously served on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, commissioned there on December 27, 2010.
Judge Wilkins's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Wilkins's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Wilkins decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Pavement Coatings v. USGS, Wilkins reversed and remanded the Exemption 5 withholding of model runs because the agency showed only that disclosure would enable criticism, which did not establish the required deliberative process harm.
“We find only claims that releasing the model runs will enable criticism of USGS... But criticism is not a recognized harm against which the deliberative process privilege is intended to protect.”
An agency cannot invoke a new legal justification for withholding records for the first time on a second appeal; a robust timeliness rule that forces the government to make its best case the first time around serves FOIA's efficiency goals better than case-by-case leniency.
“A robust timeliness rule encourages the Government to present all its arguments the first time around. Weakening that rule lessens the incentive.”
When an agency changes a longstanding legal test, it must actually grapple with its own prior, contrary positions (including in recent rulemakings) before declining to apply the new rule retroactively: an unexplained inconsistency between what the agency now claims the old rule required and what it said in other recent proceedings is fatal.
“The Board's own precedent belies these assertions... in other words, contrary to the Board's declaration... the Board's precedent on the joint-employer standard was anything but static.”
In Friends of Animals v. Williams, Wilkins read the Endangered Species Act’s “any species” language with its “not listed” qualifier and rejected a similarity of appearance analysis for a species already listed.
“The plain meaning—and the best reading—of this sentence is thus that the Service can treat as endangered or threatened ‘any species’ that is ‘not listed.’”
Procedural preferences
A federally chartered institution's status alone does not create federal-question jurisdiction over a dispute; jurisdiction over a state-law claim exists only when a federal issue is actually, necessarily, and substantially disputed, not merely mentioned or raised as a defense.
“[I]nvoking federal law in a defense does not create federal jurisdiction.”
In Payne v. Biden, Wilkins held that the federal employee’s challenge to the vaccine mandate had to proceed through the Civil Service Reform Act’s exclusive review scheme and affirmed dismissal.
“[T]he CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review when a qualifying employee challenges an adverse employment action by arguing that a federal statute is unconstitutional.”
In Goodrich v. Bank of America, Wilkins held that Goodrich’s signed investment agreement showed assent under D.C. law despite his claim that he had not read its terms, and affirmed dismissal of the contract barred claims.
“Under D.C. law, a signature is almost always sufficient to show mutual assent... that is the case even if the signer was unaware of the terms.”
Cautions
In Iracks's sentencing appeal, he presumed the district court had not relied on an erroneous fact about probation's recommendation because the court never cited that fact when imposing its above-Guidelines sentence.
“In short, we presume that the District Court did not consider the erroneous fact because the District Court did not expressly mention that fact when imposing the sentence.”
In Miller's ineffective-assistance appeal, he ordered resentencing because counsel failed to tell the sentencing court that federal pretrial detention had cost Miller a year of state jail credits.
“The District Court would not have been permitted to disregard the fact that Miller's detention on a federal writ caused him to lose one year of Maryland state jail credits.”
A party invoking mandamus, the 'drastic' remedy of last resort, must show a clear and indisputable right to relief; where Supreme Court precedent leaves even plausible room for the government's reading of a statute, mandamus is unavailable no matter how sympathetic the underlying claim.
“Mandamus is a 'drastic' remedy, only available in 'extraordinary situations,' and thus 'is hardly ever granted.'”
An expert's specialty is not dispositive, but a causation opinion may still be excluded when limited relevant experience is combined with an incomplete record review and literature that does not support the proposed methodology.
“Ultimately, we find no error in the District Court’s determination that Dr. Elakil’s limited medical experience, deficient review of the medical records, and narrow set of literature failed to provide an adequate basis for his causation opinions.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For this and the other reasons we have explained, the petitions for review are denied.”
“We therefore grant the petition for review and remand to the NLRB for reconsideration. The NLRB's application for enforcement is consequently denied.”
“We therefore grant the Petition, vacate the decision, and remand the case to the NTSB to determine the appropriate amount of fees and expenses to award.”
“We therefore vacate the District Court's judgment and remand for reconsideration with adequate explanation.”
“We reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with instructions to award attorney fees consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus is GRANTED. The District Court’s orders of November 20, 2014 (Doc. 205), and December 17, 2014 (Docs. 227, 228) are VACATED.”
“The request to direct reassignment is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's judgment with respect to O'Neal's conviction and sentence.”
“For the reasons previously discussed, we affirm Appellants' convictions and remand the case to the District Court for resentencing Mr. Alvaran.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment is reversed and we remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
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