Neomi Jehangir Rao
How Judge Rao rules, drawn from 36 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Rao
Neomi Jehangir Rao is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Rao received a commission on March 18, 2019.
Judge Rao's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Rao's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Rao decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She holds agencies to a consistency principle: if an agency approved closely similar products or claims before, it must explain, not merely assert, why this case is different, or its denial is arbitrary and capricious.
“It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that agencies must treat like cases alike.”
In PayPal v. CFPB, Rao read EFTA’s undefined “model clause” in context to mean specific, copyable wording; she reversed the ruling that the prepaid account rule unlawfully mandated such a clause.
“'Model clause' is not defined in EFTA, so we look to the meaning of the term in its statutory context.”
In a False Claims Act case, Rao applied ordinary common-law causation to a fraudulent-inducement theory. The relator had to plead that the alleged misrepresentation actually caused the government to enter the contract, not merely that fraud and later claims occurred in sequence.
“Therefore, he must allege but-for causation as a necessary element of a claim for fraudulent inducement under the FCA.”
In a rate case, Rao required the agency to connect charges to the costs the customer imposed and to account for benefits its facilities provided other users. A departure from cost causation needed a reasoned justification grounded in actual system use.
“The two-tier rates are disconnected from the costs Antero imposes on Tennessee Gas’s pipeline, and they fail to reflect the reality that the expansion facilities for which Antero is responsible often benefit other shippers by reducing system-wide fuel costs.”
Rao set aside the rescission of a longstanding regulatory defense after the agency's stated legal premise was foreclosed and it supplied no independent policy rationale. An agency changing course should preserve alternative reasons in the rulemaking record and tie them to the governing statute.
“Because EPA offered no independent policy rationale, its rescission regulation was unreasonable and not in accordance with law.”
Procedural preferences
In Matson Navigation v. DOT, Rao dismissed two direct review petitions for lack of Hobbs Act jurisdiction because limited participation in the agency process did not make Matson a party, and sent its district court claims back for merits review.
“This case begins and ends with jurisdiction, which we lack under the Hobbs Act.”
In enforcing an arbitral award against a foreign sovereign, Rao required the trial court to determine sovereign-immunity facts independently rather than defer to the tribunal's view of its own jurisdiction. Issue preclusion from foreign judgments remained a separate question for first-instance analysis.
“The district court was required to independently determine the jurisdictional facts regarding Russia’s sovereign immunity and whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception applies to allow the Shareholders’ suit.”
In Mpoy v. Burst, Rao reversed dismissal of a Section 1983 claim because Mpoy did not have to exhaust District of Columbia administrative remedies before filing in federal court.
“Whether the CMPA’s procedures might satisfy due process goes to the merits of Mpoy’s section 1983 claim, not to the question of whether failure to exhaust closes the courthouse doors.”
In Mahoney, she required an actual, reasonable rule for demonstrations on the Capitol steps and rejected making access depend on a member of Congress sponsoring an event.
“What the Board cannot do, however, is make the public’s right to demonstrate at the seat of Congress contingent on securing the goodwill of a member of Congress.”
In her separate Mennonite Church dissent, Rao reasoned that reinstating earlier immigration-enforcement guidance would not redress the organizations’ claimed injuries because the guidance did not constrain the government’s enforcement authority or discretion. She would have upheld denial of a preliminary injunction for lack of a clear showing of standing.
“Because redressability requires more than conjecture, the district court correctly denied a preliminary injunction. I respectfully dissent.”
Cautions
In American Medical Response v. NLRB, Rao vacated the Board’s order because it failed to consider the employer’s contractual defense to an information request and remanded for the Board to address that defense.
“The Board … must enforce collective bargaining agreements, which here required determining whether the agreement directly or indirectly excused AMR from providing the information requested by the Union. We therefore hold the Board's failure to consider AMR's contractual defense was contrary to law.”
In the Trump mandamus case, she granted relief to stop further district-court factfinding into Executive Branch deliberations over implementation of a deportation directive.
“Mandamus is appropriate again to forestall unwarranted judicial intrusion into Executive Branch decisionmaking regarding matters of national security.”
In a public-records case, Rao treated agency control as a functional inquiry into official use, retention, access, and integration. Automatically generated browsing histories were not agency records where employees could delete them and the agencies neither relied on nor incorporated them into their record systems.
“The browsing histories were generated automatically and were not read or consulted by any agency employee—they were not integrated into the agency’s system of records.”
In Vertex, she held that an agency's need for extra review time could not extend the 60-day deadline Congress set for advisory opinions.
“HHS has no authority to circumvent this statutory deadline.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because the existing record leaves no doubt this failure to object was not ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the conviction.”
“We conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in dismissing appellants' lawsuits for forum non conveniens and affirm the decision in full.”
“Applying these standards, we grant Flynn's petition in part.”
“The district court held these browsing histories are not agency records, so they are not subject to disclosure under FOIA. We agree and thus affirm.”
“We hold that Cimino plausibly pleaded causation, as well as materiality, and therefore he may proceed with his fraudulent inducement claims on remand. We affirm, however, the dismissal of Cimino's presentment claims because he failed to plead them with the requisite particularity.”
“Therefore, we deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part for lack of jurisdiction.”
“We reject Davis' ineffective assistance claim as meritless since the enhancement can apply even when the victim is fictitious. We also reject Davis' remaining sentencing challenges as the right to appeal them was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived.”
“Because Orange has not demonstrated prejudice, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.”
“We therefore reverse the district court and remand for further consideration of PayPal's claims.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
“Finding no constitutional infirmity in the Act's jurisdiction-stripping provision, we affirm.”
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