Judith W. Rogers
How Judge Rogers decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She holds agencies to the plain text of the statutes they administer: where Congress has carefully defined a term or specified a limited set of exceptions, an agency may not manufacture ambiguity to expand its own authority, and the mere absence of an express prohibition does not license the agency to ignore a proscription implied by the statute's limiting language.
“Where Congress has taken care, given the benefits it would confer, to specify exceptions for usages otherwise prohibited, the court has no reason to assume ambiguity for the purpose of allowing the agency to improve, in its view, upon Congress' design.”
In the labor context she gives substantial deference to the Board's expert judgment about workplace realities, upholding its findings whenever a reasonable factfinder could reach them on the record as a whole, particularly on questions of anti-union motive that turn largely on circumstantial evidence.
“the Board is to be reversed only when the record is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to the contrary.”
Procedural preferences
In criminal sufficiency-of-the-evidence appeals she polices the line between reasonable inference and speculation: constructive possession of contraband in a jointly occupied home requires proof of knowing dominion and control, and a gun found in one room cannot by itself establish possession of drugs hidden in a separate, generally accessible area.
“Suspicion, much less speculation, is insufficient to demonstrate that the government has met its burden of proof.”
She enforces Article III standing rigorously against pre-enforcement and programmatic challenges: a plaintiff who lives in an area already meeting the governing standard, and who alleges only a speculative future risk resting on a chain of possibilities, has not shown the concrete, imminent injury the Constitution requires.
“Petitioners rely on vague generalities and make no attempt to tie EPA's alleged failure to implement the CAA's guarantees to a substantial probability that they will suffer diminished air quality.”
Cautions
Even under deferential review she will not rubber-stamp an agency that fails to reckon with the record: the Board must confront evidence that fairly detracts from its conclusion, explain any departure from an administrative law judge's findings, and engage a dissenting member's non-frivolous analysis, or its decision cannot stand for want of substantial evidence.
“the Board is obligated to confront evidence detracting from its conclusions, particularly where the dissenting Member has offered a non-frivolous analysis.”
She insists on genuine notice-and-comment: an agency that recharacterizes a substantive change to its own regulation as a mere 'clarification,' without ever signaling the change during rulemaking, has entirely failed to provide notice, and the resulting rule is vacated rather than merely remanded.
“If EPA wanted to revise its 'substantial work' regulation, then it had to provide adequate notice and opportunity for comment ... rather than making an unannounced change.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because the Commission's refusal to order Questar to provide a small customer discount rate during its Order No. 636 compliance proceedings was reasoned and supported by the record, we deny Nephi's petition for mitigation and dismiss the remainder of the petition.”
“Accordingly, because the 1996 and 1998 Orders rely on an interpretation of s 3(17) that is foreclosed by unambiguous statutory text, and, alternatively, by FERC's own regulation, we grant Edison's petition for review.”
“Accordingly, because the Board acted reasonably in overruling Saint-Gobain's objection to the election as an impermissible post-election challenge of Hotaling's eligibility, and Saint-Gobain presents no other challenge to the Board's unfair labor practice decision, we deny the petition for review.”
“Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.”
“Because the Commission's policy is not arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law, we deny the petition.”
“Accordingly, we grant the petition. Because the court typically vacates rules when an agency 'entirely fail[s]' to provide notice and comment ... we vacate the 2012 final rule.”
“Accordingly, we deny Monroe Energy's petition for review.”
“Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.”
“Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the Commission's Permit Order and Rehearing Order, and remand for further proceedings without reaching Western Minnesota's other challenges.”
“Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the cross-application for enforcement of the Board's order.”
“Because the Commission's reliance on section 2.4(a) of its regulations as applied in its precedent is inapposite, and its position that its section 205 error of law is irremediable beyond prospective relief under section 206 appears irreconcilable with the authority Congress granted it in section 309 ..., we grant the petition in part and remand the case to the Commission.”
Put Judge Rogers's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Rogers actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Rogers's own signed orders and cites them.