J. Skelly Wright

How Judge Wright rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Wright no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 1988
Served
1962–1988
Appointed by
John F. Kennedy (Democratic)
Commissioned
1962-03-30
Education
Loyola University New Orleans (Ph.B., 1931); Loyola University New Orleans College of Law (J.D., 1934)
Signed orders read
28

How Judge Wright decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Disputed motive generally belongs with the factfinder, especially when the record could support an unlawful retaliatory purpose. Summary judgment should not cut off the opportunity to prove that state of mind.

“But questions of motivation are particularly inappropriate for resolution on a motion for summary judgment.”

A product defect or mechanical failure need not be proved by identifying a broken component through direct physical evidence. Circumstantial evidence can establish the failure and its origin.

“The law does not require plaintiffs to prove the mechanical failure by specific physical evidence, nor does it require plaintiffs to prove exactly what part of the car was defective, as plaintiffs may prove the mechanical failure solely by circumstantial evidence.”

Procedural preferences

Agency action needs more than a policy conclusion. The record must show reasoned consideration and a rational connection between the agency’s analysis and its result.

“demonstrably has given reasoned consideration to the issues, and has reached a result which rationally flows from its conclusions.”

Cautions

Expert causation testimony loses evidentiary force when it rests on possibilities rather than probability. An opinion that amounts to conjecture does not bridge the causal gap.

“the cases citing Brownhill v. Kivlin adopt a test for expert opinion testimony which discredits such testimony where the expert cannot speak in terms of probability; where, in other words, his opinion is merely a guess based on possibilities.”

Commercial impracticability requires an unexpected contingency, a risk not allocated by agreement or custom, and performance made commercially impracticable by that event. Failure on any element defeats the defense.

“First, a contingency — something unexpected— must have occurred. Second, the risk of the unexpected occurrence must not have been allocated either by agreement or by custom. Finally, occurrence of the contingency must have rendered performance commercially impracticable.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Transatlantic Financing Corporation v. United States
· 1966-05-27
Appeal (appellant (Transatlantic Financing Corporation)) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Richard A. Barber v. United States
· 1968-03-08
Appeal (appellant (defendant Richard A. Barber)) Granted

“Reversed, for a new trial.”

Felicia Page Davis and Glenn W. Davis v. Phyllis O. Harrod and Dennette Harrod
· 1969-01-31
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Davis)) Granted in part

“Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.”

Jacob H. Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., Inc.
· 1969-02-10
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Gichner)) Granted

“Remanded for further proceedings.”

Javins v. First National Realty Corp.
· 1970-05-07
Appeal (appellant (tenants)) Granted

“The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

William T. Bell and Margie Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Company, James Coates v. Ruppert Real Estate, Inc.
24,141; 24,147-8 · 1970-06-18
Appeal (petitioner (tenant)) Moot / procedural

“These cases are remanded to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of this opinion.”

Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation
· 1972-04-03
Appeal (appellant (tenant Robinson)) Granted

“Reversed and remanded with instructions.”

United States v. Edward B. Williams, Jr.
· 1973-01-31
Appeal (appellant (defendant Edward B. Williams, Jr.)) Granted

“We find that it did.”

Amoco Oil Company et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency
Nos. 73-1117, 73-1118 and 73-1150 · 1974-05-01
Petition for review (petitioners (Amoco Oil Co. et al.)) Granted in part

“In all other respects, however, we find the Regulations to be valid.”

Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency
Nos. 74-2063, 74-2079, 75-1368 to 75-1372, 75-1575, 75-1663 to 75-1666, 75-1763 and 75-1764 · 1976-08-02
Petition for review (petitioners (Sierra Club et al. and industry petitioners)) Denied

“We therefore do not disturb the regulations as promulgated.”

Harriet Ann Phillippi v. Central Intelligence Agency and George H. Bush, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
· 1976-11-24
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff-appellant Harriet Ann Phillippi, journalist)) Granted

“The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.”

Sarah B. Stewart v. Ford Motor Company and Steuart Motor Company
75-1676 to 75-1678 · 1977-05-16
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff estates)) Granted

“Reversed and remanded.”

A historical record

Judge Wright no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.