J. Michelle Childs
How Judge Childs rules, drawn from 31 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Childs
Julianna Michelle Childs is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Childs received a commission on July 25, 2022. Judge Childs previously served on the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, commissioned there on August 20, 2010.
Judge Childs's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Childs's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Childs decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Noble v. National Association of Letter Carriers, Childs read the union election statute’s “by mail or otherwise” language as extending beyond mail distribution and reversed a premature dismissal of the candidate’s publication request.
“‘otherwise’ indicates that the statutory provision reaches beyond the specific examples listed in the statutory text, making the provision a catch-all provision.”
In GMS Mine Repair v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Childs deferred to the Secretary's longstanding interpretation of when a safety violation enters a mine operator's penalty history and denied the petition.
“the Secretary's interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator's history as of the date the violation becomes final ... In presenting us with a policy followed for over four decades, the Secretary certainly does not offer a post-hoc rationalization or 'convenient litigating position.'”
In Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Kennedy, Childs held that the Inflation Reduction Act’s review bar covered CMS’s drug specific determinations but left its generally applicable legal standards open to judicial review.
“We conclude that the review bar covers CMS’s drug-specific determinations, not the generally applicable legal standards that govern them.”
In Basin Electric, Childs read section 9 of the wholesale power agreement as allowing Tri-State to transfer an asset without Basin’s approval, and she denied Basin’s petitions challenging the agency’s interpretation.
“Section 9 unambiguously supplies Tri-State a mechanism to transfer assets without Basin’s approval.”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Glover, Childs vacated denial of a suppression motion because the district court had not adequately considered whether an officer’s reference to warrants made a resident’s assent to a search mere acquiescence.
“Bumper's holding is not limited to situations in which a police officer misrepresents the existence of a warrant. ... The critical fact in Bumper was not that a law enforcement officer misrepresented that he had a warrant; it was that 'a law enforcement officer claim[ed] authority to search a home under a warrant.'”
In an air pollution rule challenge, she found the agency’s interpolation method adequately supported and rejected the claim that the modeling was arbitrary.
“MOG has not established that EPA’s linear interpolation method is oversimplified or that the agency has produced unreasonable results.”
A challenger pressing a factual distinction in administrative review should establish it in the agency record; vague comments and an unsupported distinction raised later do not make the agency's analysis arbitrary or capricious.
“But that is because Appellants did not demonstrate before the agency the existence of this distinction that it now presses. At most, comments before the agency discuss the possible distinction only in vague terms and provide no supporting evidence.”
Cautions
In Amaplat’s suit to enforce a Zambian court judgment confirming an arbitral award, she held that the award-related immunity exception did not extend to this distinct foreign-judgment action.
“In light of the scope of the New York Convention, asking only whether foreign court judgments are ‘closely related’ to arbitral awards is too insubstantial a connection to establish strong evidence of a sovereign's intent to waive its immunity.”
In Doc Society v. Rubio, Childs's opinion held that organizations challenging a visa social-media disclosure policy had not adequately alleged redressability for Article III standing. Even if the policy were vacated, consular officers could still examine applicants' social-media activity individually, so relief would not necessarily address the asserted injuries.
“redressability cannot always be logically inferred from traceability. ... Since a consular officer may still scrutinize a visa applicant's social media activities even if the social media policy were vacated, it cannot be logically inferred that Plaintiffs' injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision in this case.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Instead, we hold that the Revised Rule is an appropriate exercise of EPA's statutory authority under the ‘Good Neighbor Provision,’ and deny the petition on the merits.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we deny this petition.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Wilson's motion for compassionate release.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Fairless Energy fails to demonstrate that either the Commission's exercise of primary jurisdiction over the Transco-Fairless Energy natural gas transportation rate dispute or its decision regarding the appropriate rate was arbitrary and capricious. The court therefore denies Fairless Energy's consolidated petitions.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the Commission's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”
“Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Michael W. Langeman's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”
“We affirm the judgments of the district court.”
“We agree and accordingly affirm the district court's summary judgment order.”
“We affirm the district court because the record supports the enhancements.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's order granting summary judgment to the SBA and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Schilling's petition.”
“We reverse and remand for further consideration of Noble's complaint.”
Draft for Judge Childs with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Childs, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Childs's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace