Gregory G. Katsas
How Judge Katsas decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He tests an agency's or a challenger's causation theory with a vivid, everyday hypothetical before applying it to the record -- if a party would not seriously claim injury from an analogous, ordinary situation, he treats that as decisive against standing.
“Suppose this Court were to extend a briefing deadline. The affected litigant would gain the option of taking more time to file its brief, but still could file on the original schedule. This litigant surely would raise an eyebrow in claiming that the extension caused it an injury.”
In construing contested contract or regulatory language, he leans hard on grammatical canons -- the rule of the last antecedent, the series-qualifier canon -- to find the reading that a qualifying phrase's syntax actually supports, resisting a party's attempt to stretch a limiting clause across unrelated clauses.
“Under the rule of the last antecedent, "a limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows."”
Procedural preferences
He treats federal sovereign immunity as jurisdictional and resolves it before ever reaching the merits, even when doing so requires navigating conflicting circuit precedent -- a preference for deciding threshold jurisdictional questions first that recurs across his opinions.
“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. ... Therefore, we must first decide it.”
On agency deliberative-process withholdings under FOIA, he wants a declaration that focuses on the specific withheld material and explains concretely why disclosure would chill future deliberations -- a generic recitation of the privilege's purpose, without more, will not carry the agency's burden.
“what is needed is a focused and concrete demonstration of why disclosure of the particular type of material at issue will, in the specific context of the agency action at issue, actually impede those same agency deliberations going forward.”
Cautions
He holds petitioners to a demanding, evidence-based standard for Article III standing -- broad assertions about market dynamics or economic principles, offered without record data or expert support (and especially if raised for the first time in a reply brief), will not establish that a challenged order is likely to cause the claimed harm.
“Sierra Club failed to offer any argument or evidence in its opening brief showing that the orders under review are substantially likely to increase export volumes, which is an essential element of its case for Article III standing.”
He is skeptical of using generally worded, discretionary relief statutes to end-run more specific procedural regimes -- an intervening non-retroactive statute or a later-decided precedent correcting a sentencing error is not itself an 'extraordinary and compelling reason' for compassionate release, because habeas and direct appeal are the vehicles Congress built for those problems.
“what the Supreme Court views as the 'ordinary practice' cannot also be an 'extraordinary ... reason' to deviate from that practice.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because Riverkeeper's due-process claims lack merit, we affirm the district court's judgment.”
“Because FERC did not provide any reasonable justification for allowing DTE affiliates but not ANR to charge market-based rates, its decision is arbitrary and capricious.”
“The Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the tariff amendment and applying it to the Elmont-Cunningham and Cunningham-Dooms projects. We therefore grant the petitions for review, set aside the orders under review to the extent that they approved the amendment and applied it to the two projects, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“As in Building Industry Association, we must therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Because Johnson was not denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel, we affirm the district court's judgment.”
“We dismiss Preeminent's appeal of the arbitration and contempt orders”
“we affirm the fee award on the merits.”
“Because the terrorism exception to the FSIA does not apply to this case, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
“The district court properly dismissed the drivers' complaint and permissibly denied their July 2018 motion for leave to amend.”
“The district court correctly granted summary judgment to the FBI.”
“FERC correctly interpreted the water quality certification, and it reasonably approved Cube's flood protection plan. We therefore deny the petitions for review.”
“The Commission reasonably rejected Wabash's new contracts. We therefore deny the petitions for review.”
“The FLRA's guidance conflicts with the Statute, so we grant the petitions for review and set aside the guidance.”
Put Judge Katsas's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Katsas actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Katsas's own signed orders and cites them.