Gregory G. Katsas
How Judge Katsas rules, drawn from 37 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Katsas
Gregory George Katsas is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Katsas received a commission on December 8, 2017.
Judge Katsas's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Katsas's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Katsas decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Arizona v. EPA, Katsas used a briefing deadline analogy to explain why an extension of a compliance deadline did not itself injure the petitioners, then dismissed for lack of Article III standing.
“Suppose this Court were to extend a briefing deadline. The affected litigant would gain the option of taking more time to file its brief, but still could file on the original schedule. This litigant surely would raise an eyebrow in claiming that the extension caused it an injury.”
In City of Salisbury v. FERC, Katsas applied the rule of the last antecedent to the disputed water quality certification language and denied the petitions for review.
“Under the rule of the last antecedent, ‘a limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.’”
In United States v. Richardson, Katsas resolved the Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on the narrower ground that a historical tradition supported disarming felons still serving their sentences.
“We decline to engage with the broadest arguments pressed by both sides. Instead, we assume that Medina does not resolve this case as a matter of precedent. And we assume that section 922(g)(1) restricts conduct within the literal terms of the Second Amendment.”
Procedural preferences
In Mowrer v. DOT, Katsas addressed whether the federal government had waived sovereign immunity from FCRA damages before reaching the merits of the claim.
“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. ... Therefore, we must first decide it.”
In Emuwa v. DHS, Katsas affirmed withholding asylum officer assessments under FOIA after finding that the agency had adequately explained how disclosure would chill internal deliberations.
“what is needed is a focused and concrete demonstration of why disclosure of the particular type of material at issue will, in the specific context of the agency action at issue, actually impede those same agency deliberations going forward.”
Cautions
In Sierra Club's challenge to export orders, he found no Article III standing because its opening brief offered no argument or evidence that the orders were substantially likely to increase export volumes.
“Sierra Club failed to offer any argument or evidence in its opening brief showing that the orders under review are substantially likely to increase export volumes, which is an essential element of its case for Article III standing.”
In United States v. Jenkins, Katsas held that a nonretroactive change to mandatory sentencing law did not itself qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.
“what the Supreme Court views as the 'ordinary practice' cannot also be an 'extraordinary ... reason' to deviate from that practice.”
A collateral attack on a guilty plea needs contemporaneous support, not only a later assertion about what the defendant supposedly did not know; a long prison term and plea records can make an evidentiary hearing unnecessary.
“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because Riverkeeper's due-process claims lack merit, we affirm the district court's judgment.”
“Because FERC did not provide any reasonable justification for allowing DTE affiliates but not ANR to charge market-based rates, its decision is arbitrary and capricious.”
“The Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the tariff amendment and applying it to the Elmont-Cunningham and Cunningham-Dooms projects. We therefore grant the petitions for review, set aside the orders under review to the extent that they approved the amendment and applied it to the two projects, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“As in Building Industry Association, we must therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Because Johnson was not denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel, we affirm the district court's judgment.”
“We dismiss Preeminent's appeal of the arbitration and contempt orders”
“we affirm the fee award on the merits.”
“Because the terrorism exception to the FSIA does not apply to this case, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
“The district court properly dismissed the drivers' complaint and permissibly denied their July 2018 motion for leave to amend.”
“The district court correctly granted summary judgment to the FBI.”
“FERC correctly interpreted the water quality certification, and it reasonably approved Cube's flood protection plan. We therefore deny the petitions for review.”
“The Commission reasonably rejected Wabash's new contracts. We therefore deny the petitions for review.”
“The FLRA's guidance conflicts with the Statute, so we grant the petitions for review and set aside the guidance.”
Draft for Judge Katsas with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Katsas, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Katsas's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace