Florence Y. Pan
How Judge Pan rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Pan
Florence Y. Pan is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Pan received a commission on September 26, 2022. Judge Pan previously served on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, commissioned there on September 23, 2021.
Judge Pan's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Pan's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Pan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an appeal over student loan collection fees, she held that the statute permitted only reasonable costs and upheld the rule limiting fees for borrowers who generated little collection work.
“The Act permits guarantors to charge borrowers only for ‘reasonable collection costs,’ 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(1), and the Department permissibly implemented that directive by ensuring that borrowers who create little or no collections work for a guarantor are not charged thousands of dollars in fees.”
In HMO Louisiana v. HHS, Pan held that Medicare Advantage regulations distinguished contract consolidation from termination, and affirmed the agency's inclusion of data from a consolidated contract in its star rating.
“Where, as here, the regulations distinguish between ‘consolidation’ and ‘termination,’ a dictionary definition cannot supplant the regulatory framework.”
Procedural preferences
In Rose v. Kennedy, Pan dismissed Indiana’s appeal from a district court order remanding the matter to the agency because the order was nonfinal and no exception to the finality rule applied.
“Because the remand order at issue is not a ‘final decision[]’ of the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and no exception to the finality rule is applicable here, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction.”
In Perry's mixed-case employment appeal, she reversed the district court's failure to review his discrimination claims de novo, while affirming the Board's jurisdictional dismissal.
“Because the district court did not allow Perry to litigate the merits of his discrimination claims, as required by statute, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings on the discrimination claims.”
Cautions
In Sierra Club v. DOT, Pan vacated PHMSA’s liquefied natural gas rule after holding that the agency’s decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement was arbitrary and capricious.
“PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was therefore arbitrary and capricious.”
In United States v. Thorne, Pan affirmed denial of suppression because officers had relied in good faith on the location warrant, regardless of whether it was lawfully issued.
“Because law enforcement officers relied in good faith on the warrant, regardless of whether it was lawfully issued, suppression is unwarranted and we affirm.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We affirm.”
“The district court dismissed the Complaint, holding that appellants failed to allege sufficient links between Hamas and USCPR to hold USCPR liable for any acts of terrorism. We agree and affirm.”
“Bahlul asks us to vacate his conspiracy conviction or, alternatively, to remand his case for resentencing by military-commission members. We deny the petitions.”
“Because several of the petitioner’s arguments are time-barred and the EPA otherwise acted within its broad discretion, we deny the petition for review.”
“For the reasons stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We hold that Ascendium has standing to challenge the entirety of the Rule; that the Department did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule; and that the Rule is not arbitrary or capricious. We thus uphold the Rule in its entirety.”
“Because the Commission breached notice-and-comment requirements, erroneously relied on certain data in its cost-benefit analysis, and selected an arbitrary effective date for the rule, we grant the WCMA’s petition for review and vacate the rule.”
“Because FERC properly interpreted the terms of AEP’s tariff and did not act arbitrarily and capriciously, we deny the petition for review.”
“Because FERC acted well within its discretion in both cases, we deny the petitions for review.”
“We hold that the SEA ratified the composition of the Covered List and leaves no room for Petitioners to challenge the placement of their products on that list under a predecessor statute. But we agree with Petitioners that the FCC’s definition of ‘critical infrastructure’ is overly broad. We therefore deny the petitions in part and grant them in part.”
“In our view, the plain language of the disputed 2020 letter permits DOJ to reopen its investigation. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.”
“Because the district court did not allow Perry to litigate the merits of his discrimination claims, as required by statute, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings on the discrimination claims. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Board properly dismissed Perry’s mixed case for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Robertson acted ‘corruptly,’ we affirm his conviction. But the district court’s application of the offense characteristics for obstructing the ‘administration of justice’ is plainly erroneous. We therefore vacate the district court’s sentence and remand for resentencing.”
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