Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard
How Judge Pillard rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Pillard
Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Pillard received a commission on December 17, 2013.
Judge Pillard's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Pillard's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Standing Order No. 20-2: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Standing Order No. 20-3: Paper Copies of Electronic Filings in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic ↗
- Notice: Preferred Typefaces for Briefs ↗
- Notice: Specifications for Binding Briefs and Appendices ↗
- Notice Regarding Electronic Filing of Appendices ↗
- Notice: Mandatory Notification of Settlement Proceedings ↗
- Notice: Standard Briefing Schedules for Intervenors and Amici Curiae ↗
- Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms ↗
- Notice: Procedures for Handling Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Pillard decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Peabody Midwest Mining, Pillard read the mine safety rule’s no-other-work provision alongside its separate command to disconnect electrical power, concluding that drilling at the elevated methane level was barred.
“Given the separate requirement for operators to ‘deenergize[]’ equipment and ‘disconnect[]’ electric power when methane levels exceed 1.5%, the no-other-work provision must at minimum bar work with an electrically powered drill.”
When an agency adopts a substantive categorical policy without notice-and-comment rulemaking and then applies it to deny an individual, she holds the agency to a heightened duty to actually explain its reasoning and evidence, not merely assert a rule: informality of process raises rather than lowers the bar for justification.
“when an agency adopts a substantive policy without rulemaking or public comment and applies it in a particular case, it is especially important that it meet ‘its responsibility to present evidence and reasoning supporting’ that policy.”
Procedural preferences
In Khine’s records case, she held that the requester had to appeal within the agency before suing because the agency’s initial response explained its asserted exemptions and appeal rights.
“The parties here do not dispute that Khine filed no administrative appeal before she sought judicial review.”
In Musgrave v. Warner, Pillard affirmed on the Speech or Debate Clause’s nondisclosure privilege as a threshold ground without deciding the jurisdictional issue first.
“Because the Speech or Debate Clause's nondisclosure privilege bars the relief Musgrave seeks, it is a ‘threshold ground[] for denying audience to a case on the merits’ that we have the ‘leeway’ of deciding before jurisdictional issues.”
Cautions
In Human Rights Defense Center v. Park Police, Pillard rejected the agency’s Exemption 6 showing because its Vaughn index and declarations gave only conclusory assertions about the officers’ privacy interests.
“The privacy assertions contained in the Park Police's Vaughn index and declarations are wholly conclusory, lacking even minimal substantiation of the officers' privacy interest or the potential harm from disclosing their names.”
In Banner Health v. NLRB, Pillard rejected the Board’s inference that the employer categorically requested confidentiality during investigations because the cited testimony did not support that inference.
“Even under our deferential standard of review, the Board made unwarranted logical leaps that the evidence cannot fairly support.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In sum, we reject all of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the regulations.”
“We therefore reverse the district court's holding that NSC is ineligible for fees under FOIA, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Seeing no reason to disturb the district court's judgment that the Lumpkin Memo was a privileged deliberative document, we affirm.”
“For these reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part the decision below and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's decision granting the Bureau's motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.”
“We accordingly affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Park Service.”
“For all these reasons, we deny the petition for review.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Tax Court's decision.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we deny Peabody and Butler's petition for review.”
Draft for Judge Pillard with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Pillard, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Pillard's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace