A. Raymond Randolph

In Marin Audubon Society v. FAA, Randolph held that the Council on Environmental Quality’s binding NEPA regulations lacked authority because the agency traced its rulemaking power to a presidential executive order rather than a congressional delegation.

“For CEQ's regulations to be legally binding on agencies, courts, and the public, ‘it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress.’”

In Grynberg v. FERC, Randolph concluded that the Commission had not adequately supported its interpretation of a natural-gas contract, so the panel vacated its orders and remanded.

“We grant Grynberg's petition for review because the Commission's interpretation of the 1968 agreement is not reasonable.”

In Hospital Menonita’s successor-bar appeal, Randolph dissented because he read the prior panel decision as independent of Chevron and found no basis to reopen it after Loper Bright.

“Loper Bright provides no authority for my colleagues to revisit and overrule the original panel’s decision.”

In Johnson’s suppression appeal, Randolph concurred in the result and reasoned that the defendant lacked a privacy expectation in files Google could monitor and report.

“Johnson therefore lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files, and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.”

In Friends of the Earth’s Eximbank case, Randolph wrote separately that the claimed environmental information did not support NEPA standing because no cognizable domestic effect was tied to the agency action.

“Because plaintiffs identify no cognizable domestic effect attributable to the challenged agency action, the information they seek does not relate to an environmental interest that NEPA protects.”