Karen E. Scott
How Judge Scott rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Scott decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On an insured's motion for summary adjudication of an insurer's duty to defend, she applies California's potentiality rule with explicit burden-shifting: the insured need only show the underlying claim MAY fall within coverage, after which the insurer must prove no possibility of coverage exists. A plausible causal theory linking the additional insured's conduct to the injury is enough to trigger the duty.
“In other words, the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot.”
In post-removal detention cases, she requires the government to address the petitioner's actual statutory theory with case-specific evidence. In Safaryan, an answer that did not confront the cited authority or explain why a new arrest was authorized years after the removal period supported immediate release.
“Based on this lack of opposition, and the logic of the district court cases cited above, including Diallo, the Court finds that Petitioner's current detention is not authorized under § 1231(a)(6).”
Procedural preferences
She will not resolve genuinely disputed material facts at summary judgment and refuses invitations to make credibility determinations between conflicting deposition accounts; where one theory turns on a disputed fact she denies adjudication on that theory while granting on an independently sufficient one.
“Mt. Hawley, as the moving party, had the initial burden of establishing a potential for coverage based on undisputed material facts. Here, the material fact of whether there was, in fact, a late delivery is disputed. Thus, the Court cannot grant Mt. Hawley summary adjudication as to this theory.”
She distinguishes between expedited final adjudication and separate emergency relief. In Pineda Sevilla, she denied a temporary-restraint request because the existing expedited habeas schedule could address the alleged harm, then granted the petition and ordered release after full briefing.
“Applications for temporary restraining orders should be reserved for cases where the petitioner alleges imminent, irreparable harm that cannot be addressed by the standard scheduling order or by expediting the briefing schedule.”
Cautions
Where a petitioner was previously at liberty without incident, she treats a post-detention hearing as an inadequate cure for the absence of required pre-deprivation process. Her remedy can include immediate release and an injunction requiring a neutral hearing before any renewed detention.
“Releasing Petitioner is narrowly tailored to the specific wrong, because it restores the status quo that was in effect before Respondents violated Petitioner's due process rights.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed below, Mt. Hawley's motion is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dt. 42) is GRANTED. The Court shall separately enter judgment against Plaintiff and for Defendants on all claims.”
“IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Motion for Remand (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED; and (2) Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the portion of the Commissioner's decision denying benefits and REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent with this decision, including development of the record.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered denying the First Amended Petition.”
“For these reasons, the Court summarily dismisses the Petition with prejudice.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. The TRO Application (Dkt. 3 ) is granted. 2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Judgment shall be entered granting the Petition. 2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.”
“As discussed further below, the Petition is denied because Petitioner has not demonstrated that his arrest was illegal or that the immigration court's denial of bond was an abuse of discretion.”
“Based on the facts and law stated in the Petition, and in light of Respondents' lack of opposition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered, as follows: 1. Granting the Petition; 2. Ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody and to return to her all documents, identification cards, and other items confiscated by Respondents upon Petitioner's arrest”
“Based on the facts and law stated in the Petition, and in light of Respondents' lack of opposition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment will be entered granting the relief requested in the Petition, as follows: 1. Respondents shall immediately release Francisco Javier Obregon Cajina (A# 246421735) from custody.”
“The Court issued an Order to Show Cause Why Petition Should Not Be Dismissed as Moot. (Dkt. 15.) Petitioner did not respond. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Petition as moot.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition is GRANTED IN PART, as follows: 1. Claim Two is granted. 2. Claim One is denied. 3. Claim Three is denied as moot.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 538 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 84 days (N = 3).
The reviewed recent assignments are dominated by pending alien-detainee habeas petitions filed in late May and June 2026. Her consent docket also includes Social Security disability appeals, insurance and diversity-contract disputes, consumer-protection suits, and civil-rights cases, while other matters reach her through civil referrals from district judges.
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