Karen E. Scott
How Judge Scott decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On an insured's motion for summary adjudication of an insurer's duty to defend, she applies California's potentiality rule with explicit burden-shifting: the insured need only show the underlying claim MAY fall within coverage, after which the insurer must prove no possibility of coverage exists. A plausible causal theory linking the additional insured's conduct to the injury is enough to trigger the duty.
“In other words, the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot.”
Procedural preferences
She will not resolve genuinely disputed material facts at summary judgment and refuses invitations to make credibility determinations between conflicting deposition accounts; where one theory turns on a disputed fact she denies adjudication on that theory while granting on an independently sufficient one.
“Mt. Hawley, as the moving party, had the initial burden of establishing a potential for coverage based on undisputed material facts. Here, the material fact of whether there was, in fact, a late delivery is disputed. Thus, the Court cannot grant Mt. Hawley summary adjudication as to this theory.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Habeas petition N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Social security appeal N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed below, Mt. Hawley's motion is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dt. 42) is GRANTED. The Court shall separately enter judgment against Plaintiff and for Defendants on all claims.”
“IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Motion for Remand (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED; and (2) Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the portion of the Commissioner's decision denying benefits and REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent with this decision, including development of the record.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered denying the First Amended Petition.”
“For these reasons, the Court summarily dismisses the Petition with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 538 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 84 days (N = 3).
search_dockets(assigned_judge='Karen E. Scott') is currently DOMINATED by the 2026 alien-detainee 28:2241 habeas surge (nature_of_suit 463, Adelanto/Desert View ICE facilities, Riverside/San Bernardino) -- all filed late-May/June 2026 and mostly pending, so they give no latency or durations. Behind that surge her enumerable docket is a consent-magistrate mix: Social Security disability appeals, removed insurance/diversity contract disputes (e.g. Great American Insurance v. Peterson Chase; Mt. Hawley v. AIIC), TCPA consumer suits (Bronico v. ClearPath Lending; Niknam v. Saxton), and 42:1983 civil-rights cases (Professional Towing v. City of Orange). She also appears as a designated referral magistrate on district-judge dockets (e.g. LA Alliance for Human Rights v. City of Los Angeles, referred by D.J. David O. Carter).