Karen E. Scott

How Judge Scott rules, drawn from 43 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
United States District Court for the Central District of California
Position
Magistrate judge
Commissioned
July 28, 2015
Education
Stanford University, B.A. (University President's Award for Academic Excellence); Stanford University Law School, J.D. (1996)
Signed orders read
43

About Judge Scott

Karen E. Scott has served as a United States magistrate judge for the Central District of California since July 2015. She earned a bachelor’s degree from Stanford University and a law degree from Stanford Law School in 1996.

Judge Scott's practices and standing orders

Rules for cases before Judge Scott, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.

Key rules

Filing

Parties need not deliver chambers copies of electronically filed documents until further order of the court.

“**ALL PARTIES ARE EXCUSED FROM DELIVERING CHAMBERS COPIES OF E-FILED DOCUMENTS TO THE COURTHOUSE AS DIRECTED BY PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 24 BELOW UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT.***”

Discovery

If the parties agree, the court may hold an informal telephone conference to resolve a discovery dispute without formal motion practice.

“TELEPHONIC INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC) Procedures: With the agreement of the parties, the Court will conduct informal telephonic conferences to resolve discovery disputes outside the formal Local Rule 37 procedures.”

Conferences

File a request for a telephonic appearance at least two business days before the hearing.

“TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES: Any party who wishes to appear at a hearing by telephone must file such a request at least two business days before the hearing.”

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Scott decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On an insured's motion for summary adjudication of an insurer's duty to defend, she applies California's potentiality rule with explicit burden-shifting: the insured need only show the underlying claim MAY fall within coverage, after which the insurer must prove no possibility of coverage exists. A plausible causal theory linking the additional insured's conduct to the injury is enough to trigger the duty.

“In other words, the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot.”

In Safaryan’s detention case, she found that the government’s lack of opposition and the cited district-court reasoning left the current detention unauthorized under Section 1231(a)(6).

“Based on this lack of opposition, and the logic of the district court cases cited above, including Diallo, the Court finds that Petitioner's current detention is not authorized under § 1231(a)(6).”

Procedural preferences

In Mt. Hawley’s insurance dispute, she declined summary adjudication on a coverage theory that depended on the disputed fact of late delivery.

“Mt. Hawley, as the moving party, had the initial burden of establishing a potential for coverage based on undisputed material facts. Here, the material fact of whether there was, in fact, a late delivery is disputed. Thus, the Court cannot grant Mt. Hawley summary adjudication as to this theory.”

She distinguishes between expedited final adjudication and separate emergency relief. In Pineda Sevilla, she denied a temporary-restraint request because the existing expedited habeas schedule could address the alleged harm, then granted the petition and ordered release after full briefing.

“Applications for temporary restraining orders should be reserved for cases where the petitioner alleges imminent, irreparable harm that cannot be addressed by the standard scheduling order or by expediting the briefing schedule.”

In Flores Arroyo’s habeas case, Scott dismissed the petition as moot after a change in removal status shifted detention to a different statutory provision, leaving the original challenge to a bond hearing no longer live.

“This change moots the claims raised in the initial Petition, which challenged the IJ’s findings under § 1226(a).”

Cautions

In Pineda Sevilla’s habeas case, she ordered release to restore the status quo that preceded the due process violation.

“Releasing Petitioner is narrowly tailored to the specific wrong, because it restores the status quo that was in effect before Respondents violated Petitioner's due process rights.”

In Ankit’s detention case, Scott denied the petition for another bond hearing. She found that roughly four months since the prior hearing alone did not establish a due process violation, and that he could seek a new hearing upon changed circumstances.

“the mere passage of time alone does not demonstrate a due process violation.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Mt. Hawley Insurance Company v. Associated Industries Insurance Company
5:18-cv-00576 · 2018-10-01
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“For the reasons discussed below, Mt. Hawley's motion is GRANTED.”

Professional Towing, LLC v. The City of Orange
8:22-cv-00333 · 2023-08-22
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dt. 42) is GRANTED. The Court shall separately enter judgment against Plaintiff and for Defendants on all claims.”

Scott Radinsky v. Leland Dudek (Commissioner of Social Security)
2:22-cv-05136 · 2025-06-24
Social security appeal (plaintiff) Granted

“IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Motion for Remand (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED; and (2) Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the portion of the Commissioner's decision denying benefits and REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent with this decision, including development of the record.”

Jose P. Mitchell v. Warden
2:23-cv-02516 · 2024
Habeas petition (petitioner) Denied

“IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered denying the First Amended Petition.”

Victor De La Cruz v. Dave Davey
2:16-cv-01190 · 2016
Habeas petition (petitioner) Denied

“For these reasons, the Court summarily dismisses the Petition with prejudice.”

Jose Pablo Trejo Guzman v. James Janecka
5:26-cv-01583 · 2026-04-07
Motion for temporary restraining order (Jose Pablo Trejo Guzman) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. The TRO Application (Dkt. 3 ) is granted. 2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.”

Mwanes Ghanem v. Jaime Rios
5:26-cv-01615 · 2026-04-20
Habeas 2241 petition (Mwanes Ghanem) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Judgment shall be entered granting the Petition. 2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.”

Alejo Martinez v. Todd M. Lyons
5:26-cv-01795 · 2026-05-07
Habeas 2241 petition (Alejo Martinez) Denied

“As discussed further below, the Petition is denied because Petitioner has not demonstrated that his arrest was illegal or that the immigration court's denial of bond was an abuse of discretion.”

Javielys Yulieth Cantillo Sierra v. Markwayne Mullin
5:26-cv-02297 · 2026-05-12
Habeas 2241 petition (Javielys Yulieth Cantillo Sierra) Granted

“Based on the facts and law stated in the Petition, and in light of Respondents' lack of opposition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered, as follows: 1. Granting the Petition; 2. Ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody and to return to her all documents, identification cards, and other items confiscated by Respondents upon Petitioner's arrest”

Francisco Javier Obregon Cajina v. Warden Desert View Facility
5:26-cv-02860 · 2026-06-04
Habeas 2241 petition (Francisco Javier Obregon Cajina) Granted

“Based on the facts and law stated in the Petition, and in light of Respondents' lack of opposition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment will be entered granting the relief requested in the Petition, as follows: 1. Respondents shall immediately release Francisco Javier Obregon Cajina (A# 246421735) from custody.”

Sheiny Elieth Perez Wheelock v. Markwayne Mullin
5:26-cv-01679 · 2026-05-14
Habeas 2241 petition (Sheiny Elieth Perez Wheelock) Moot / procedural

“The Court issued an Order to Show Cause Why Petition Should Not Be Dismissed as Moot. (Dkt. 15.) Petitioner did not respond. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Petition as moot.”

Fredy Waldemar Cortez Lugos v. Markwayne Mullin
5:26-cv-01880 · 2026-05-01
Habeas 2241 petition (Fredy Waldemar Cortez Lugos) Granted in part

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition is GRANTED IN PART, as follows: 1. Claim Two is granted. 2. Claim One is denied. 3. Claim Three is denied as moot.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 13.0 days (N = 12).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 13.5 days (N = 24).

The reviewed 2026 consent cases include recently decided immigration-detention habeas petitions alongside pending petitions. The broader sampled docket also includes Social Security appeals, insurance and contract disputes, consumer suits, and civil-rights cases.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years0
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 202600
Sep 202500
Mar 202521
Sep 202402
Mar 202401
Sep 202361
Mar 202301
Sep 202241
Mar 202200
Sep 202110
Mar 202100
Sep 202010

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of United States District Court for the Central District of California, not for Judge Scott: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed15,1903.9 months
Closed with no court action4,4143.1 months
Closed before pretrial10,5384.3 months
Closed during or after pretrial10317.9 months
Closed during trial13525.7 months
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 202515,1903.9 months
Sep 202415,3483.9 months
Sep 202313,5834.4 months
Sep 202212,8874.7 months
Sep 202114,2134.7 months
Sep 202014,2055 months
Sep 201913,4784.9 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

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