Ralph Robert Erickson

Rule 59 could not be used after judgment to add evidence, theories, or arguments that could have been presented earlier.

“Rule 59 ‘cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.’”

A second settlement hearing was unnecessary when the record already contained the relevant exhibits and no factual dispute required live evidence.

“Schlecht has not demonstrated the existence of any factual dispute, which would require the presentation of evidence for resolution. Instead, the factual record was developed and included exhibits Schlecht submitted.”

When formation of an arbitration agreement was disputed, the arbitrability question had to be resolved before merits discovery proceeded.

“In this case, the Arbitration Act dictates that discovery on the underlying merits should not occur until after the proper venue, i.e. arbitration or federal court, is determined.”

Erickson applied claim preclusion by comparing the factual transactions underlying parallel insurance actions rather than the labels or elements of the pleaded theories. A party seeking separate declaratory relief should obtain express authorization to split claims arising from the same policy dispute.

“Even if a claim being pursued is a different cause of action with different elements, for the purposes of claim preclusion, courts are directed to look at the factual bases for the claims, not the legal theories.”

In a renewed pre-enforcement challenge, Erickson enforced the earlier appellate ruling when the challengers offered no materially different evidence of a threat to enforce the statute. A later-stage challenge must identify changed evidence or another recognized basis for departing from the law of the case.

“Because this Court previously resolved the legal question of Ex parte Young’s applicability and the parties have not presented evidence materially different from what was introduced during the preliminary injunction proceedings, the law of the case doctrine governs.”

In dissent, he emphasized that naming a federal statute does not itself create federal-question jurisdiction; the pleaded facts must plausibly establish a substantive federal claim.

“subject matter jurisdiction is not established merely because a plaintiff can point to a federal statute.”

In a challenge to Missouri’s registration law, Erickson rejected a vagueness claim about online identifiers after reading the disputed phrase alongside the listed identifiers and considering the standardized reporting form.

“The use of a standardized form ameliorates concerns pertaining to lack of notice of the law and arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.”

In his separate Baker dissent, Erickson would have ordered a new trial because disputed exhibits were placed in a red folder and repeatedly described as contraband without a clarifying jury instruction. He concluded that the presentation risked confusing jurors on the contested mental-state issue; the panel majority affirmed the conviction.

“I respectfully disagree with the Court’s view that the failure to clarify this unusual situation surrounding the exhibits was neither error nor plain error.”