John Emmett Carland

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit circuit Retired 1922 · served 1911–1922 Appointed by William Howard Taft (Republican) 25 signed orders read

Judge Carland no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Carland decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Carland read a tax statute in light of its purpose and declined to treat an ordinary, good-faith exchange as wholesale dealing.

“To. hold that the facts stated constitute Ewers a wholesale dealer in oleomargarine, and subjected him to payment of the special tax, is to belittle the object and purpose of the oleomargarine law.”

Procedural preferences

He treated statutory emergency questions as fact-specific rather than categorical.

“We do not decide that sudden illness in all cases or standing alone would constitute an emergency. Each case must depend upon its own facts.”

He described preservation of the status quo as the central purpose of temporary injunctive relief.

“The object and purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo.”

Cautions

He dismissed an appeal when the challenged ruling resolved only part of the issues and further proceedings remained below.

“We think it clearly appears that the decision appealed from, so far as it relates to appellants, was not a final decision.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Merchants'-Laclede Nat. Bank v. Schade
· 1912-02-27
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“The decree of the trial court is therefore reversed, with instruction to that court to allow the claim of the Merchants’-Laclede National Bank as a secured claim, and to proceed with reference thereto as law and justice may require; and it is so ordered.”

Weaver v. Ewers
· 1912-02-29
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Judgment affirmed.”

Sugg v. Eskew
· 1912-05-06
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“The judgment below is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted for the reasons stated in the opinion in that case.”

Charles E. Hires Co. v. Villepigue
· 1912-05-14
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Decree affirmed.”

American Steel Foundries v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron & Steel Co.
· 1912-05-15
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The decree of the trial court is therefore affirmed.”

Fountain Valley Land & Irrigation Co. v. Pearsons
· 1912-11-26
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“The decree appealed from must be reversed, and the case remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, with direction to enter a decree not inconsistent with the views herein expressed ; and it is so ordered.”

United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co.
· 1913-01-13
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“the decree herein must be reversed, and the case remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, with instruction to overrule the demurrer and allow appellees to answer the bill.”

Gate City Malt Co. v. Stewart
· 1913-06-30
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Decree affirmed.”

Jameson v. United States Farm Land Co.
· 1913-07-10
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Judgment affirmed.”

Baker Ice Mach. Co. v. Bailey
· 1913-11-05
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Judgment reversed, with direction to the trial court to cause the machinery in controversy to be delivered to the Baker Ice Company, unless the trustee in bankruptcy shall, within a time to be named, pay the balance due from Grant Bros, to the Baker Ice Company for the purchase price of the machinery.”

United States v. Southern Pac. Co.
· 1913-11-13
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Judgment affirmed.”

Denver & R. G. R. v. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co.
· 1913-11-17
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“the judgment below must.be affirmed. And it is so ordered.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Not applicable to this circuit-court record.

A historical record

Judge Carland no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.