David Ryan Stras
How Judge Stras rules, drawn from 60 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Stras decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Differing excess-insurance clauses were not mutually repugnant when their wording established a workable sequence of coverage without circularity.
“Comparing the two, it becomes clear that there is no circularity problem in deciding that Hartford, with its differing language, comes next.”
A five-year work restriction based on a feared future seizure could allow a jury to find that the employer regarded the employee as disabled.
“It may have happened here when Union Pacific decided that David Meza’s traumatic brain injury presented an unacceptable risk of future seizures. For that reason, we vacate the grant of summary judgment to Union Pacific and remand for further proceedings.”
In a public-employee retaliation case, the government employer had to show workplace disruption or another adverse effect on operational efficiency before full interest balancing.
“Then the focus shifts to the government employer to establish that the speech ‘created workplace disharmony, impeded [Melton’s] performance, . . . impaired working relationships,’ or otherwise ‘had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the [fire department’s] operations.’”
Expressive services receive compelled-speech protection when the creator exercises editorial control over the message; the reviewed dismissal was reversed because the creators could choose when to speak and what to say.
“Because the First Amendment allows the Larsens to choose when to speak and what to say, we reverse the dismissal of two of their claims and remand with instructions to consider whether they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.”
A prison grievance process is not available for exhaustion purposes when officials’ misleading advice and denial of access to the governing procedure prevent an inmate from using it correctly.
“The denial of access to the library, which contained the only available copy of the administrative directive, magnified the impact of Sergeant Perry’s misstatements, which Townsend had no way to verify.”
Rooker-Feldman does not bar an independent federal claim against an adverse party merely because the dispute arose in state-court proceedings; the legal wrong and requested remedy cannot be the state judgment itself.
“An independent claim against an adverse party from a state-court proceeding is fair game, see Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir. 2008), even if it ‘denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached,’ Saudi Basic, 544 U.S. at 293 (citation omitted). But the legal wrong cannot be the state-court judgment itself, with its rejection being the remedy.”
A statute that lets officials stop speech before it occurs faces the strongest First Amendment obstacle; the court ordered interim protection for the plaintiffs' proposed election-related expression.
“to the extent the statute authorizes a prior restraint on speech, the First Amendment stands in the way.”
Procedural preferences
A novel and unsettled question of Minnesota products-liability law was certified to the state's highest court rather than predicted by the federal panel.
“The Minnesota Supreme Court ought to be the one to decide this novel legal issue, so we give it the right of first refusal.”
The reviewed Voting Rights Act decision treated statutory text and structure as dispositive of whether private plaintiffs may sue under Section 2.
“Did Congress give private plaintiffs the ability to sue under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act? Text and structure reveal that the answer is no”
An agency acts arbitrarily when it treats external time pressure as eliminating a statutory option and thereby misunderstands the scope of its own discretion.
“In doing so, however, it misread the statute and misunderstood the ‘scope of [its] discretion,’ Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1911, so we ‘set aside’ its decision as arbitrary and capricious, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).”
A clear insurance-appraisal award is enforced as written when the panel acted within its authority; courts do not reopen the amount merely because a party wants the panel's reasoning clarified.
“According to the policy, when the appraisal panel acts within the scope of its authority, any decision is ‘binding’ on the parties.”
Cautions
An insurer's reasonable coverage basis defeated a bad-faith claim even if its investigation could be characterized as flawed.
“Her bad-faith claim ends up in the same place, except the reason is that Unum had a ‘reasonable basis’ for denying coverage under the existing-loss provision. Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa 2005) (holding that having one is a defense to a bad-faith claim). Once it did, the lack of an investigation no longer mattered.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because the First Amendment allows the Larsens to choose when to speak and what to say, we reverse the dismissal of two of their claims and remand with instructions to consider whether they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.”
“Did Congress give private plaintiffs the ability to sue under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act? Text and structure reveal that the answer is no, so we affirm the district court's decision to dismiss.”
“We grant Missouri's motion to file a reply brief, reverse the judgment on Missouri's hoarding claim, otherwise affirm, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“It follows that first-degree robbery, which also has the element of ‘forcibly steal[ing] property,’ is a crime of violence... We affirm the district court's judgment.”
“Under these circumstances, the district court could have reasonably concluded that Kessler's mid-trial demand for exclusion was overkill... We affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“In short, despite its different physical appearance, a passport card is as much a ‘United States passport’ as its blue-covered counterpart... We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“Brabant-Scribner's ‘offer in compromise’ was not an alternative for collection but rather an alternative to collection... The government and the district court did what was required. We affirm.”
“Because neither determination was clearly erroneous, we affirm.”
“We conclude that, under the plain language of the insurance policy, the insurer is not responsible for the conference center's alleged negligence.”
“With the burden on Management Registry, it was not ‘error for the district court to require [more] evidence’ ... The district court declined to grant either, and we affirm.”
“The magistrate judge, acting by consent of the parties, dismissed Michaud's lawsuit on the theory that Minnesota does not recognize ‘secondhand service.’ ... We reverse.”
“The district court carried out the first step correctly... The court denied his motion, and we affirm.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated.
Draft for Judge Stras with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Stras, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Stras's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace