Whitney Downs Hermandorfer

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit circuit Appointed by Donald Trump (Republican) 7 signed orders read

How Judge Hermandorfer decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Resolves unsettled standard-of-review questions by asking whether the underlying determination is fact-bound and credibility-driven (warranting deferential clear-error review) rather than a pure legal question -- she traced this approach directly to the Supreme Court's mixed-question framework in U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge.

“As we see it, the clear-error standard likewise governs review of perjury-based obstruction enhancements. Our conclusion reflects the enhancement's settled application to perjury, the fact-bound nature of the perjury determination, and our approach in prior cases.”

In ERISA benefits-denial appeals, treats a plan administrator's silent or selective handling of treating-clinician opinions and unexplained reversal from a prior coverage approval as hallmarks of arbitrary-and-capricious decisionmaking, even without an outright misstatement of the record.

“Anthem (1) ignored the opinions of C.E.'s treating clinicians; (2) selectively reviewed the record by cherry-picking portions of C.E.'s medical records that supported its decision while ignoring adverse evidence in those same records; and (3) provided a deficient explanation for denying additional coverage.”

In First Amendment retaliatory-arrest cases under Nieves v. Bartlett, requires that comparator evidence involve people who engaged in the SAME conduct that created probable cause to arrest the plaintiff -- mere physical proximity or bystander status is not enough.

“To satisfy Nieves with comparator evidence, the Gradys needed to show that officers failed to arrest individuals 'not engaged in the same sort of protected speech' as the Gradys themselves ... examining officers' exercise of discretion in the way Nieves instructs requires assessing whether others were committing the same kind of conduct that led to the claimant's arrest.”

Procedural preferences

In ERISA benefits appeals where a plan administrator's process was flawed but the medical record does not clearly entitle the claimant to benefits, remands to the plan administrator for a full and fair review rather than awarding benefits outright.

“We are not medical specialists, and so the medical judgment necessary to determine whether T.E. is entitled to coverage are not ours to make ... The proper remedy in such a case is to vacate the district court's decision and remand with instructions that the district court remand to the plan administrator for a full and fair inquiry.”

Applies exhaustion and forfeiture rules strictly against petitioners and appellants -- an argument not specifically raised before the agency or the district court, even if related to a broader theory that was raised, will not be considered on appeal.

“Herrera's brief before the Board failed to specifically challenge the IJ's determination that the number bar applied ... Herrera's brief in this Court likewise fails to address -- and forfeits any challenge to -- the Board's waiver analysis.”

Cautions

In gang-racketeering and conspiracy appeals, treats a defendant's leadership role, direction of subordinates, and documented communications (texts, calls) as sufficient to sustain a conviction even where the defendant was not physically present at the crime.

“Gang bosses like Baskerville cannot 'buffer[] themselves' from criminal responsibility by routing their commands through others at 'lower tiers.'”

In sentencing appeals, will not adopt categorical rules limiting a district court's discretion to weigh a defendant's individual circumstances (including mental-health history) unless the rule is grounded in statutory text or structure, not just 'sound policy' arguments.

“Nor does Roper's view of 'sound policy' license us to override the statutes that Congress enacted with atextual limits on district courts' sentencing discretion.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Daniel Jackson
24-6105 · 2025-10-01
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We affirm.”

United States v. Gene Curtis Roper
24-5834 · 2025-12-04
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We affirm the judgment of the district court.”

Elizabeth Cristales-de Linares v. Pamela Bondi
25-3152 · 2025-12-01
Petition for review (petitioner) Denied

“We deny the petition for review.”

Dominga Sanik Herrera v. Pamela Bondi
25-3207 · 2025-12-15
Petition for review (petitioner) Denied

“We deny the petition in part and dismiss the petition in part.”

United States v. Tomarcus Baskerville, Courtland Springfield, and Thomas Earl Smith
24-5547/5574/5598 · 2026-01-08
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We affirm all of the defendants' convictions.”

Appeal (appellant) Granted

“But consistent with the Government's confession of sentencing error, we vacate Smith's sentence and remand for resentencing.”

T. E. v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield
25-5407 · 2026-01-22
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case with instructions that the district court remand to Anthem.”

Daniel Grady and Shatina Grady v. John Cratsenburg and Austin Pearson
25-1321 · 2026-03-23
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“We therefore reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to officers Cratsenburg and Pearson on the First Amendment retaliation claim and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Put Judge Hermandorfer's record to work

Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Hermandorfer actually rules, not a generic AI guess.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Hermandorfer's own signed orders and cites them.