Stephanie Dawkins Davis

How Judge Davis rules, drawn from 40 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Appointed by
Joe Biden (Democratic)
Commissioned
June 14, 2022
Education
Wichita State University, B.S. (1989); Washington University School of Law, J.D. (1992)
Signed orders read
40

About Judge Davis

Stephanie Dawkins Davis is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Davis received a commission on June 14, 2022. Judge Davis previously served on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, commissioned there on December 31, 2019.

Judge Davis's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Davis's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Davis decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In United States v. Wilkes, she gave effect to “geometric isomers” in the federal drug statute when comparing it with Michigan’s cocaine schedule.

“Our analysis begins, as it must, with the text of the statutes. ... the district court appropriately concluded that 'geometric isomers' must mean something and accurately observed that adopting Wilkes's position would render the statutory term a nullity.”

In Williams v. Addison Community Schools, she vacated a federal ruling on a novel Michigan constitutional claim so the state courts could address it.

“concerns around federal-state comity counsel that we abstain from needlessly intruding into significant state matters, such as the interpretation in the first instance of unique provisions of the state's constitution.”

In Risner, Davis rejected a facial Second Amendment challenge to the prohibition on possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, holding that the statute lawfully applied to Risner’s admitted conduct and therefore was not unconstitutional in every application.

“Risner, therefore, cannot demonstrate that § 924(c)(1)(A) is unconstitutional in every application—a requirement to mount a successful facial challenge to the statute.”

In McKee Foods v. BFP, she held Tennessee’s pharmacy benefit manager laws preempted for a self-funded ERISA plan under the deemer clause without deciding whether they regulated insurance.

“We need not decide whether the PBM laws regulate insurance, because even if they do, the deemer clause steps in and prevents the PBM laws from deeming McKee, its Plan, or its PBM to be insurance companies.”

Procedural preferences

In Williams v. Addison Community Schools, she emphasized that the supplemental-jurisdiction ruling followed that case’s unusual facts and left district courts’ broader discretion intact.

“As such, district courts should not read this opinion to restrict their broad discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as our holding here is narrowly tailored given the specific factual circumstances of this case.”

In Franke v. Janes, she found genuine disputes about threat and resistance that prevented summary judgment on parts of the officer’s immunity defense.

“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Franke, there are genuine disputes of material fact on the threat-to-safety and active-resistance factors.”

In Smith’s revocation appeal, she found no impermissible double counting when separate courts considered his detention conduct in sentencing distinct offenses.

“Smith’s case does not involve impermissible double counting.”

Cautions

In Williams v. Addison Community Schools, she declined to consider state-law claims the appellant had expressly abandoned.

“But Williams expressly abandoned his other state claims on appeal, so we will not consider them now.”

In Heiney v. Moore, she found the petitioner’s objections to a report insufficient to contest the state court’s factual account.

“Heiney attempts to characterize his objections to the R&R as implicit disputes with the OCOA's factual account. But his objections fall short.”

In Porter v. Bondi, Davis held that Porter forfeited his chemical-isomers challenge by failing to raise it before the Board of Immigration Appeals and, on judicial review, by presenting it only in a conclusory sentence; the panel denied his petition.

“Even without his forfeiture at the administrative level, before us Porter has failed to develop this argument beyond the conclusory statement that his conviction is not an aggravated felony because ‘the definition of methamphetamine under Virginia law includes chemical isomers not covered under federal law.’”

In Herrera, Davis held that repeal of a municipal ordinance did not erase a prior misdemeanor conviction for temporary protected status eligibility.

“That an ordinance he was convicted under has since been repealed does not change this.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Idris Quintell Wilkes
22-1436 · 2023-08-11
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's decision to the extent (1) it found that federal law covers the same isomers of cocaine as Michigan law and (2) it overruled Wilkes's objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information. We retain jurisdiction over Wilkes's challenge to his ACCA enhancement based on [123I] ioflupane.”

Scott Williams v. Addison Community Schools
25-1205 · 2026-03-02
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“For the reasons stated, we VACATE and REMAND with instructions for the district court to dismiss without prejudice Williams's Fair and Just Treatment claim and related assertion of respondeat superior liability.”

Eszter Pryor v. The Ohio State University
24-3812 · 2025-06-02
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We AFFIRM.”

United States v. Idris Quintell Wilkes (successive opinion)
22-1436 · 2025-04-01
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We affirm the district court's ruling.”

United States v. Irene Michelle Fike
24-5857 · 2025-06-10
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We AFFIRM.”

Javi Porter v. Pamela Bondi
24-3125 · 2025-01-24
Petition for review (petitioner) Denied

“We DENY Porter's petition for review.”

United States v. Raymon Doug Risner
24-5394 · 2025-02-21
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We AFFIRM.”

International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 6 v. Warren T. Smith
24-3282 · 2025-07-31
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.”

Jake Paul Heiney v. Donna Moore
24-3135 · 2025-08-13
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order denying the motion to expand the record.”

Debra Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security
24-5873 · 2025-05-07
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Because the district court acted within its discretion in decreasing the fee, we AFFIRM.”

United States v. Fred D. Golson, Jr.
23-3078 · 2024-03-11
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.”

United States v. Malcolm L. Hoyle
23-3977/3978 · 2025-08-06
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“We AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND to the district court for resentencing on the revocation sentence consistent with Esteras.”

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