Richard F. Suhrheinrich
How Judge Suhrheinrich decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reads regulatory and statutory terms for their ordinary physical/geographic or plain meaning rather than deferring to an agency's functional or purpose-driven gloss, even under Chevron-adjacent deference -- an EPA determination that facilities miles apart were 'adjacent' because functionally interrelated was vacated as inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of 'adjacent.'
“Petitioner Summit Petroleum...argues that the EPA's determination that the physical requirement of adjacency can be established through mere functional relatedness is unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term 'adjacent.' We agree.”
In Establishment Clause cases, rejects a categorical or exclusively-content-focused analysis of a religious display in favor of a fact-bound, history-and-context inquiry into purpose and endorsement -- and is openly skeptical of 'separation of church and state' as a governing legal standard.
“The First Amendment does not demand a wall of separation between church and state. ... The Constitution requires an analysis beyond the four-corners of the Ten Commandments. In short, 'proving' that the Ten Commandments themselves are religious does not prove an Establishment Clause violation.”
Procedural preferences
Treats subject-matter jurisdiction as a threshold the court must police on its own motion, vacating judgments below (without reaching the merits) when neither party raised the jurisdictional defect -- seen twice, a decade apart, in Michigan-arbitration/foreclosure appeals.
“Although no one has specifically addressed subject matter jurisdiction to this point, we have an independent obligation to consider it and may do so sua sponte.”
Enforces appellate-waiver and exhaustion procedural bars strictly against criminal defendants and prisoners, but will just as readily flag a district court's own procedural or logical inconsistency (e.g., finding a genuine factual dispute over excessiveness while also finding the same force reasonable as a matter of law) as reversible error.
“There cannot be a finding that the arrest involved excessive force and a finding that the Officers' actions were reasonable. By definition, that which is excessive is unreasonable.”
Cautions
Do not assume his rulings track a fixed pro-government or pro-agency valence -- he has reversed the government/agency outright (Summit Petroleum v. EPA, Evans v. Zych's BOP classification, FirstEnergy's subcontracting holding) as readily as he has affirmed it, and reversed a grant of qualified immunity to police officers (Minchella) just as he has affirmed the denial of prisoner and habeas claims.
“We conclude that the crimes of possession and transfer under Section 5861 are not crimes of violence with[in] the meaning of Section 924(c)(3). Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and ORDER the removal of Evans's classification.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Like the Second Circuit, we think that inadequate notices should be treated as voidable, not void, and that the proper remedy is simply to restore the right which a timely Rule 41(e) notice would have conferred on the claimant ... We therefore reject the Ninth and Tenth Circuits' approach, as articulated in Marolf and Clymore. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“Because it is an open question, it is not a 'right' that 'has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court' let alone one that was 'made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.' ... For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.”
“simply espousing sovereign citizen and other fringe views does not necessarily demonstrate lack of competence, and nothing else in this record suggests that the experienced district judge should have questioned Defendant's competency to stand trial. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's judgment.”
“The display is therefore constitutional as a matter of law. There being no genuine issue of material fact, the district court properly granted Mercer County's motion for summary judgment. ... For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“Summit ... argues that the EPA's determination that the physical requirement of adjacency can be established through mere functional relatedness is unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term 'adjacent.' We agree. ... we VACATE the EPA's final determination and REMAND this case to the EPA to determine whether Summit's sweetening plant and sour gas wells are sufficiently physically proximate to be considered 'adjacent' within the ordinary, i.e., physical and geographical, meaning of that requirement.”
“we (1) AFFIRM the Board's application to enforce its findings that the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) when, after impasse, it selectively implemented certain pre-impasse bargaining proposals that were inextricably linked to other proposals not imposed; (2) REVERSE to enforce the Board's ruling that the Company violated the Act by subcontracting the turbine/generator outage work without first bargaining with the Union and by extension, GRANT the Company's petition for review on this issue; and (3) REVERSE the Board's order requiring the Company to supply requested information regarding subcontracting.”
“In this ERISA action ... Defendants-Appellants, Chrysler Group, LLC, et al. ... appeal the judgment of the district court ordering them to pay Plaintiff-Appellee ... pension and surviving spousal benefits. We reverse, finding Plaintiff's claim barred by the statute of limitations. ... The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiff's claim as time-barred.”
“Because we conclude that the district court properly ruled that the requirements for a preliminary injunction were not met, we AFFIRM.”
“Because a class action is not warranted under Rule 23(b)(3) or Rule (b)(1)(A) we REVERSE the class certification with prejudice and REMAND to the district court for an order of final judgment in the Fund's individual action.”
“With respect to Smith, we affirm the injunction. With respect to Jones, we find no basis for injunctive relief and vacate the district court's decision and remand.”
“We affirm, but for reasons different than those articulated by the district court. ... We conclude that McNamara did not establish a prima facie case because she has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she engaged in protected activity.”
“this Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute and, therefore, VACATES the judgment of the district court and REMANDS this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Put Judge Suhrheinrich's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Suhrheinrich actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Suhrheinrich's own signed orders and cites them.