Richard F. Suhrheinrich
How Judge Suhrheinrich rules, drawn from 32 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Suhrheinrich no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Suhrheinrich
Richard Fred Suhrheinrich served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit after President George H. W. Bush appointed him and he received his commission on July 10, 1990. He previously served on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where he received his commission on October 4, 1984. He assumed senior status on August 15, 2001. A Sixth Circuit opinion filed August 5, 2025 states that he retired during that appeal; the court still lists him among its senior judges.
How Judge Suhrheinrich decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Summit Petroleum v. EPA, he rejected the agency’s view that facilities were “adjacent” based on functional relatedness without physical proximity.
“Petitioner Summit Petroleum...argues that the EPA's determination that the physical requirement of adjacency can be established through mere functional relatedness is unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term 'adjacent.' We agree.”
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Mercer County, Suhrheinrich affirmed summary judgment for the county after finding that its courthouse display of the Ten Commandments among historical documents had a secular purpose and did not endorse religion in context.
“The First Amendment does not demand a wall of separation between church and state. ... The Constitution requires an analysis beyond the four-corners of the Ten Commandments. In short, 'proving' that the Ten Commandments themselves are religious does not prove an Establishment Clause violation.”
Constitutionally inadequate civil-forfeiture notice makes the forfeiture voidable rather than void; the remedy restores the claimant’s right to a merits hearing instead of automatically returning the property.
“Like the Second Circuit, we think that inadequate notices should be treated as voidable, not void, and that the proper remedy is simply to restore the right which a timely Rule 41(e) notice would have conferred on the claimant”
A defendant’s sovereign-citizen rhetoric and refusal to cooperate do not by themselves require a competency hearing when the record shows no inability to understand proceedings or assist counsel.
“simply espousing sovereign citizen and other fringe views does not necessarily demonstrate lack of competence”
A vehicle lien was not perfected under state law until it was actually noted on the certificate of title, so perfection outside the twenty-day window left the transfer avoidable in bankruptcy.
“perfection of BB&T's lien did not occur until March 7, 2005, when the security interest was actually noted on the certificate of title.”
Procedural preferences
In Estate of Cornell v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Suhrheinrich raised subject-matter jurisdiction on the court's own motion and vacated the judgment after finding no federal-question jurisdiction.
“Although no one has specifically addressed subject matter jurisdiction to this point, we have an independent obligation to consider it and may do so sua sponte.”
In Minchella, Suhrheinrich reversed qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim because the district court found a material factual dispute yet treated the officers’ force as reasonable as a matter of law.
“There cannot be a finding that the arrest involved excessive force and a finding that the Officers' actions were reasonable. By definition, that which is excessive is unreasonable.”
In Pipefitters, he reversed class certification because separate suits were not shown to create incompatible obligations under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), and a class action was not superior under Rule 23(b)(3).
“Because a class action is not warranted under Rule 23(b)(3) or Rule (b)(1)(A) we REVERSE the class certification with prejudice and REMAND to the district court for an order of final judgment in the Fund’s individual action.”
Cautions
In Evans v. Zych, Suhrheinrich reversed the district court’s ruling that Evans’s firearm possession and transfer convictions qualified as crimes of violence for the prison notification requirement, and ordered removal of that classification.
“Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and ORDER the removal of Evans’s classification.”
An unresolved question about extending a Supreme Court decision does not create a newly recognized, retroactive right that restarts the Section 2255 limitations period.
“Because it is an open question, it is not a 'right' that 'has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court' let alone one that was 'made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Like the Second Circuit, we think that inadequate notices should be treated as voidable, not void, and that the proper remedy is simply to restore the right which a timely Rule 41(e) notice would have conferred on the claimant ... We therefore reject the Ninth and Tenth Circuits' approach, as articulated in Marolf and Clymore. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“Because it is an open question, it is not a 'right' that 'has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court' let alone one that was 'made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.' ... For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.”
“simply espousing sovereign citizen and other fringe views does not necessarily demonstrate lack of competence, and nothing else in this record suggests that the experienced district judge should have questioned Defendant's competency to stand trial. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's judgment.”
“The display is therefore constitutional as a matter of law. There being no genuine issue of material fact, the district court properly granted Mercer County's motion for summary judgment. ... For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“Summit ... argues that the EPA's determination that the physical requirement of adjacency can be established through mere functional relatedness is unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term 'adjacent.' We agree. ... we VACATE the EPA's final determination and REMAND this case to the EPA to determine whether Summit's sweetening plant and sour gas wells are sufficiently physically proximate to be considered 'adjacent' within the ordinary, i.e., physical and geographical, meaning of that requirement.”
“we (1) AFFIRM the Board's application to enforce its findings that the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) when, after impasse, it selectively implemented certain pre-impasse bargaining proposals that were inextricably linked to other proposals not imposed; (2) REVERSE to enforce the Board's ruling that the Company violated the Act by subcontracting the turbine/generator outage work without first bargaining with the Union and by extension, GRANT the Company's petition for review on this issue; and (3) REVERSE the Board's order requiring the Company to supply requested information regarding subcontracting.”
“In this ERISA action ... Defendants-Appellants, Chrysler Group, LLC, et al. ... appeal the judgment of the district court ordering them to pay Plaintiff-Appellee ... pension and surviving spousal benefits. We reverse, finding Plaintiff's claim barred by the statute of limitations. ... The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiff's claim as time-barred.”
“Because we conclude that the district court properly ruled that the requirements for a preliminary injunction were not met, we AFFIRM.”
“Because a class action is not warranted under Rule 23(b)(3) or Rule (b)(1)(A) we REVERSE the class certification with prejudice and REMAND to the district court for an order of final judgment in the Fund’s individual action.”
“With respect to Smith, we affirm the injunction. With respect to Jones, we find no basis for injunctive relief and vacate the district court's decision and remand.”
“We affirm, but for reasons different than those articulated by the district court. ... We conclude that McNamara did not establish a prima facie case because she has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she engaged in protected activity.”
“this Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute and, therefore, VACATES the judgment of the district court and REMANDS this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
A historical record
Judge Suhrheinrich no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.