Richard Allen Griffin
How Judge Griffin rules, drawn from 99 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Griffin
Richard Allen Griffin is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Griffin received a commission on June 10, 2005.
Judge Griffin's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Griffin's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Griffin decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Robinson, Griffin conditionally granted habeas relief on the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment sentencing claim because the state court permitted judge-found facts to increase a mandatory minimum sentence contrary to Alleyne.
“we reverse the judgment of the district court and conditionally grant Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as it pertains to his Sixth Amendment sentencing claim.”
In North Fork Coal, Griffin reversed a Mine Safety and Health Review Commission order because temporary reinstatement ended once the Secretary of Labor determined that the underlying discrimination claim lacked merit.
“Accordingly, we hold that upon the Secretary’s determination that discrimination in violation of the Mine Act has not occurred, a miner is no longer entitled to temporary reinstatement.”
In the Flint water litigation, Griffin found that the absence of an earlier public-health disaster with identical facts did not itself establish qualified immunity. Allegations that officials knowingly distributed unsafe water and assured residents it was safe implicated an obvious bodily-integrity violation.
“The lack of a comparable government-created public health disaster precedent does not grant defendants a qualified immunity shield.”
At summary judgment in a detainee-death case, Griffin treated repeated breathing complaints during prolonged prone restraint as evidence for a jury. The acknowledged presence of medical personnel did not automatically absolve officers who perceived a need for care.
“reasonable minds could conclude that Richardson was suffering from an obvious serious medical need as he lay prone, handcuffed, and complaining he could not breathe for the better part of twenty-two minutes.”
In a school-board public-comment case, Griffin rejected speech restrictions justified by unconstitutional, inconsistent, or plainly unreasonable explanations. A decorum rule may address actual disruption, but it cannot be applied to suppress a speaker's viewpoint.
“The district court erred when it credited Grech’s proffered reasons for limiting the speech when Grech’s reasons were unconstitutional, inconsistent, or plainly unreasonable.”
Procedural preferences
In Giesse v. HHS Secretary, he affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without reaching the underlying claim.
“For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
In Zagorski v. Mays, he granted a stay of execution to preserve the pending appeal for consideration.
“We hereby GRANT petitioner's motion and ORDER a STAY of Zagorski's execution.”
In calculating statutory insurance interest, Griffin applied an express offset clause as written and declined construction once the language was clear. A party seeking a cumulative recovery must confront the precise interaction between the penalty-interest and prejudgment-interest provisions.
“Because this language ‘is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted[.]’”
In Augustin, Griffin treated a corrected sentence and amended judgment following a successful § 2255 motion as a new judgment that the movant could challenge without prior authorization for a second or successive motion.
“the intervening judgment, which may be challenged as of right under § 2255 without implicating the second or successive bar.”
In Abdullah, Griffin affirmed denial of a First Step Act sentence reduction despite the district court’s mistaken treatment of the motion as a request for compassionate release. The statutory eligibility analysis made that error harmless because the same mandatory minimum still applied.
“Notwithstanding, as explained above, the district court’s errors were harmless because Abdullah is not entitled to relief under the First Step Act.”
Cautions
In Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, he affirmed part of the judgment, reversed part, and remanded the remaining issues.
“Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Griffin held that a named life-insurance beneficiary stands in the insured's shoes when the policy is rescinded for the insured's material misrepresentations. The beneficiary's own innocence did not create a separate right to equitable balancing.
“The fact that Ferguson did not make the material misrepresentations herself is irrelevant—she stands in the shoes of Ewanda, with no greater rights than Ewanda would have had, i.e., no right to equitable balancing before Brighthouse could rescind the policy, as a matter of law.”
In Bailey, Griffin held that allegations of prison mold supported claims against officials tied to direct grievances or inspections, but allegations grouping five supervisors together lacked the individual factual context needed to overcome qualified immunity.
“No factual context—e.g., that they directly received grievances or covered over mold after inspection walkthroughs—is provided to allow the reasonable inference that they plausibly knew about facts from which they could infer that a substantial risk existed, drew that inference, and disregarded the risk.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we affirm the district court's order denying the motions to dismiss based upon qualified immunity regarding defendants Howard Croft, Darnell Earley, Gerald Ambrose, Liane Shekter-Smith, Stephen Busch, Michael Prysby, and Bradley Wurfel. However, we reverse the denial of the motions to dismiss regarding defendants Daniel Wyant, Nick Lyon, Eden Wells, Nancy Peeler, and Robert Scott because plaintiffs' complaint alleges mere negligence, and not a constitutional violation against them.”
“Under the facts of this case, we answer that question 'no' and therefore hold that the jail official who conducted the group searches, defendant Terri Graham, is entitled to qualified immunity. In addition, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Wayne County and the Wayne County Sheriff on plaintiffs Monell claims and requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.”
“We affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims because she has not identified a service, program, or activity of a public entity from which she was excluded or denied a benefit. ... For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
A notable separate writing (not a panel disposition, so it is excluded from the disposition counts and the per-ruling outcome coding). Grounding quote: 'GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. ... In my view, Jackson was wrongly decided, and this case involves a question of exceptional importance. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.' Griffin (joined by Moore and Stranch) argues the Sixth Circuit's United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 522, rule — which denies First Step Act § 403(b) benefits to defendants whose pre-Act sentences were later vacated — contravenes the statute's present-perfect text ('has not been imposed'), the common-law 'void ab initio' meaning of a vacated sentence, and splits from the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, with the government itself agreeing Jackson was wrong (for Carpenter, the Act would cut his § 924(c) mandatory minimum from 105 to 25 years). This is the same Timothy Carpenter as the Supreme Court CSLI case, here on First Step Act resentencing. It captures Griffin's textualist method and is not an outcome attributable to him as a panel author.
“We hereby GRANT petitioner's motion and ORDER a STAY of Zagorski's execution.”
“we reverse the judgment of the district court and conditionally grant Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as it pertains to his Sixth Amendment sentencing claim.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any of his claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“We agree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“Finding each of Baylor's arguments to be devoid of merit, we affirm his convictions.”
“For these reasons, we dismiss Griffin's appeal.”
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