Richard Allen Griffin
How Judge Griffin decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Applies AEDPA deference rigorously in habeas appeals -- affirming denial of relief in the large majority of cases -- but does reverse and grant relief once controlling Supreme Court precedent squarely covers the constitutional claim.
“we reverse the judgment of the district court and conditionally grant Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as it pertains to his Sixth Amendment sentencing claim.”
Reads regulatory and statutory text narrowly against the agency in petitions for review, not just against private litigants -- reversed a Mine Safety and Health Review Commission order because the statute's temporary-reinstatement mechanism ends once the Secretary of Labor declines to pursue the underlying discrimination complaint.
“For these reasons, we grant the petition for review and reverse the order of the Commission.”
Procedural preferences
Frequently resolves appeals on procedural or jurisdictional grounds -- appellate waiver, statutory standing, or exclusive administrative-review channels -- without reaching the merits of the underlying claim.
“For these reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Even in capital habeas cases, will grant a stay of execution to preserve an unbriefed appeal of right rather than let the appeal be mooted by the execution, while reserving the merits for full briefing.
“We hereby GRANT petitioner's motion and ORDER a STAY of Zagorski's execution.”
Cautions
In multi-issue appeals, routinely splits the disposition claim-by-claim rather than affirming or reversing wholesale -- readers should look at the per-claim breakdown, not just the headline outcome, since a 'mixed' result can still leave the appellant with little practical relief pending remand.
“we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we affirm the district court's order denying the motions to dismiss based upon qualified immunity regarding defendants Howard Croft, Darnell Earley, Gerald Ambrose, Liane Shekter-Smith, Stephen Busch, Michael Prysby, and Bradley Wurfel. However, we reverse the denial of the motions to dismiss regarding defendants Daniel Wyant, Nick Lyon, Eden Wells, Nancy Peeler, and Robert Scott because plaintiffs' complaint alleges mere negligence, and not a constitutional violation against them.”
“Under the facts of this case, we answer that question 'no' and therefore hold that the jail official who conducted the group searches, defendant Terri Graham, is entitled to qualified immunity. In addition, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Wayne County and the Wayne County Sheriff on plaintiffs Monell claims and requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.”
“We affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims because she has not identified a service, program, or activity of a public entity from which she was excluded or denied a benefit. ... For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
A notable separate writing (not a panel disposition, so it is excluded from the disposition counts and the per-ruling outcome coding). Grounding quote: 'GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. ... In my view, Jackson was wrongly decided, and this case involves a question of exceptional importance. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.' Griffin (joined by Moore and Stranch) argues the Sixth Circuit's United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 522, rule — which denies First Step Act § 403(b) benefits to defendants whose pre-Act sentences were later vacated — contravenes the statute's present-perfect text ('has not been imposed'), the common-law 'void ab initio' meaning of a vacated sentence, and splits from the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, with the government itself agreeing Jackson was wrong (for Carpenter, the Act would cut his § 924(c) mandatory minimum from 105 to 25 years). This is the same Timothy Carpenter as the Supreme Court CSLI case, here on First Step Act resentencing. It captures Griffin's textualist method and is not an outcome attributable to him as a panel author.
“We hereby GRANT petitioner's motion and ORDER a STAY of Zagorski's execution.”
“we reverse the judgment of the district court and conditionally grant Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as it pertains to his Sixth Amendment sentencing claim.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any of his claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“We agree and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“Finding each of Baylor's arguments to be devoid of merit, we affirm his convictions.”
“For these reasons, we dismiss Griffin's appeal.”
Put Judge Griffin's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Griffin actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Griffin's own signed orders and cites them.