Rachel Sarah Bloomekatz
How Judge Bloomekatz rules, drawn from 52 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Bloomekatz
Rachel Sarah Bloomekatz is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Bloomekatz received a commission on July 20, 2023.
Judge Bloomekatz's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Bloomekatz's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Bloomekatz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Moshi v. Kia Motors, she distinguished cases about a vehicle owner’s liability for theft-related accidents from statutory product-liability claims against manufacturers.
“We hold that those cases do not control product liability claims against car manufacturers, and that the design defect claims therefore survive.”
In Schnatter v. 247 Group, she limited interlocutory review under the FAA to the ruling that actually denied arbitration, leaving a favorable contract-formation finding outside the appeal.
“Section 16(a) allows us to review an interlocutory ruling on contract formation only when that ruling supplied the basis for the district court's denying a motion to compel arbitration.”
In Schnatter v. 247 Group, she held that pursuing complete victory in court before invoking arbitration showed an intent to litigate rather than arbitrate.
“By seeking complete victory on the merits in the district court without invoking its arbitration rights even in the alternative, Laundry Service manifested its intent to litigate rather than arbitrate this dispute.”
In Ahmed, Bloomekatz held that the district court applied too demanding a standard when it denied leave to amend an FMLA retaliation claim. At that stage, Ahmed needed to plausibly allege retaliation, not establish a prima facie case.
“Ahmed need only plausibly allege that she was retaliated against because of her FMLA leave.”
In Gillman v. Green-Hernandez, she dismissed the qualified-immunity appeal because the defendant’s purported concession of the plaintiff’s factual account did not actually accept it.
“a concession in name only is no concession at all.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We affirm the district court's dismissal of Strench's and Moshi's manufacturing defect and nonconformance claims. We reverse the dismissal of their design defect and warning claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We dismiss Laundry Service's appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction; otherwise we affirm the district court's judgment and deny Schnatter's request for sanctions.”
“We affirm the district court's denial of compassionate release.”
“We therefore reject the Mukhdomis' contention that the fines were grossly disproportional under the Eighth Amendment, and we affirm the district court's imposition of $125,000 in fines for each defendant.”
“We accordingly reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers.”
“We affirm Blake's conviction and remand Blake's sentence to the district court for further actions consistent with this opinion as to the second and third challenged special conditions of supervised release.”
“We dismiss Oxlaj-Perez’s petition for review as untimely.”
“We vacate the district court's dismissal, reverse the district court's decision that allowing Ahmed leave to file her Fourth Amended Complaint would be futile, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment as to Plaintiffs 3-46 but reverse and remand for further proceedings as to Plaintiffs 1 and 2.”
“Because Gray can proceed on a theory of vicarious liability based on the supervisor's alleged bias, we reverse.”
“We affirm in part and reverse in part, remanding to the district court to consider several statutory claims it erroneously dismissed.”
“Given these errors, we reverse the grant of summary judgment, vacate the trial verdict, and remand the case to the district court.”
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