Ransey Guy Cole Jr.
How Judge Cole rules, drawn from 39 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Cole decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Scrutinizes ERISA plan administrators closely rather than rubber-stamping a file review: in reversing a long-term-disability denial, he faulted the plan's reviewing physicians for ignoring a treating physician's functional-capacity findings, mischaracterizing a positive nerve-compression test as evidence against disability, and making credibility judgments about the claimant's pain without ever examining him.
“A plan administrator acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it 'engages in a selective review of the administrative record to justify a decision to terminate coverage.'”
Applies the categorical approach with precision, parsing whether a state offense requires proof of a defendant's actual subjective intent versus a merely objective 'reasonably construed' inquiry, to hold a Tennessee sex offense broader than, and not comparable to, its federal SORNA tier counterpart.
“The Tennessee statute asks the jury to make an objective, rather than subjective, inquiry.”
Cole treated a resident's possessory interest in a condominium as continuing for Fourth Amendment purposes while the validity and effect of the asserted will remained disputed.
“We hold that Bender had a possessory interest in the condo at the time of the eviction.”
Cole reviewed cancellation-of-removal hardship findings under the statutory substantial-evidence standard rather than substituting the court's assessment of the record.
“Thus, we hold that cancellation-of-removal hardship determinations are to be reviewed under the IIRIRA substantial-evidence standard.”
Cole required cancellation applicants to prove that their own circumstances met the statutory hardship threshold, not merely compare favorably with cases in which relief was denied.
“Applicants for cancellation of removal cannot satisfy § 240A(b)(1)’s hardship standard by arguing only that their circumstances will result in more serious hardships than those cases in which relief was denied.”
Procedural preferences
In asylum 'unwilling or unable to control' analysis, insists on weighing BOTH the government's specific response to the applicant's own persecution AND general country-conditions evidence together, rejecting a narrower single-factor approach that looks only at how the government responded to the individual case.
“we must evaluate past persecution based on 'the overall context of the applicant's situation'”
Cole treated a bankruptcy remand as nonfinal for appellate jurisdiction unless the proceedings left to the bankruptcy court were merely ministerial.
“Further, for the purposes of § 158(d)(1), a district court order remanding a case to a bankruptcy court is not a final order unless the remand is one ‘of a ministerial character.’”
Cautions
Applies Younger abstention strictly in domestic-relations enforcement matters, foreclosing federal injunctive/declaratory relief even where a plaintiff alleges bad faith by state child-support officials, unless the plaintiff can show truly extraordinary circumstances: a disputed factual admission is not enough.
“if we declined to find the requisite 'extraordinary circumstances' to intervene in Sevier, where the plaintiff alleged injuries far more egregious than Tindall's, then a fortiori we are foreclosed also from reaching Tindall's claims.”
Cole required clearly established rights to be framed at a factually useful level rather than through general legal propositions alone.
“The right cannot be defined at too high a level of generality, so ‘general propositions of law are generally (though not always) insufficient to clearly establish a right.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“Accordingly, we reverse the district court's orders, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.”
“It failed, however, to correctly apply our decision in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., which governs FLSA claims in an educational setting. ... We therefore reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs and remand”
“For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for resentencing.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND this case with instructions to dismiss Tindall's complaint in its entirety.”
“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in denying Abela's § 2254 habeas petition because such petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations.”
“For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“we REVERSE the decision of the district court to deny Defendants Leek and George's motions to suppress and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, also for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Williams's motion to suppress.”
“For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“we hold that the district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment, and we accordingly REVERSE its decision... we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Conrail's motion for summary judgment on this ground.”
“For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's decision in its entirety.”
Draft for Judge Cole with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Cole, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Cole's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace