Karen Nelson Moore
How Judge Moore rules, drawn from 63 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Moore decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
The reviewed products-liability appeal distinguished pleading from proof: causation needed to be plausibly alleged at dismissal, while evidentiary proof of a genuine dispute belonged at summary judgment.
“At the pleading stage, Jackson need only allege causation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At the summary judgment stage, she must show that there is a genuine material dispute regarding causation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).”
A plaintiff unable to identify which officer committed each act could still survive summary judgment by placing each defendant within a small team that allegedly used force in one another’s presence.
“Binay, Burley, and Pershell therefore stand for the proposition that where a plaintiff who was unable to identify clearly which officers committed specific acts during the incident produces evidence that places an individual defendant in a small group of officers that committed allegedly unconstitutional acts within each other’s presence, the plaintiff’s claim against that defendant may survive summary judgment.”
For compassionate release, the reviewed opinion required an individualized assessment that could consider a First Step Act sentencing disparity together with rehabilitation and other case-specific factors.
“In accordance with our holding that, in making an individualized determination about whether extraordinary and compelling reasons merit compassionate release, a district court may include, along with other factors, the disparity between a defendant’s actual sentence and the sentence that he would receive if the First Step Act applied, we remand to the district court for further proceedings.”
At dismissal, she assesses officials' statements and actions in their full sequence rather than isolating each allegation. In the Benton Harbor water litigation, repeated assurances amid prolonged inaction could plausibly reinforce a false impression that lead-contaminated water was safe.
“Considering the City officials’ actions and statements together is not imposing liability on some for the actions of others, but rather recognizing that these statements were made in succession amid the context of inaction as to the lead-water crisis, and that it does violence to the complaint to consider each remark in isolation.”
For municipal-liability patterns, she requires similar violations of the same right but not carbon copies of the plaintiff's incident. Eleven prior cellmate assaults could support a persistent custom of housing known violent detainees without adequate classification.
“The incidents, however, need not be ‘identical, or even “almost identical.”’”
She applies ordinary pleading rules to workplace harassment without demanding an incident-by-incident evidentiary catalogue. Once a claim plausibly alleges a sexual-harassment dispute, she reads the federal arbitration exemption to cover every claim in the same case.
“In sum, we hold that a where a plaintiff brings multiple claims in a single suit against a party with whom she has an otherwise-valid arbitration agreement, and one of those claims alleges a ‘sexual assault dispute’ or a ‘sexual harassment dispute,’ the EFAA renders the arbitration agreement unenforceable with respect to each of the claims that comprise her case.”
Procedural preferences
An interlocutory appeal could not rely on the special review available for a qualified-immunity denial where the appellant had not obtained a predicate denial of qualified immunity below.
“Here, there is no predicate denial of qualified immunity, and thus, Fitzgerald’s argument fails.”
Participation without objection can waive a known defect in an arbitration caption. She rejects the tactic of waiting for an adverse merits award before invoking a procedural mistake that never obscured the real party's identity.
“To the extent that the caption—as adapted from the arbitration demand—does amount to a defect in the proceedings, Holtec waived any objection to it.”
Early termination of supervised release requires an individualized assessment of the statutory factors. A judge cannot use a blanket practice requiring completion of half the term or rely on later deterrence findings that contradict earlier findings without explanation.
“Doing so here, we conclude that district courts cannot employ a blanket rule requiring defendants to complete a certain proportion of their supervised-release term without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”
Cautions
A genuine factual dispute over whether an officer violated a clearly established right to be free from excessive force defeated qualified-immunity summary judgment in the reviewed handcuffing case.
“Because Hughey has created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Easlick violated her clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.”
When challengers allege that a facially secular law masks a religious objective, Moore looks for record evidence tied to the official act and rejects expert speculation about legislators' inner motives.
“His report, in other words, is an impermissible invitation for us to engage in ‘judicial psychoanalysis.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because a reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that each Defendant officer either committed or observed and failed to stop the allegedly unconstitutional acts, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of summary judgment.”
“we affirm the district court's conditional grant of O'Neal's application for a writ of habeas corpus providing that unless a new trial is scheduled within 120 days, O'Neal must be unconditionally released.”
“the state court's application of law with regard to whether Williams is intellectually disabled under Atkins was contrary to clearly established Federal law. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND so that the district court may grant a CONDITIONAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS prohibiting Williams's execution unless the State reassesses Williams's Atkins petition consistent with this opinion.”
“We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board violated the Establishment Clause. In addition, we hold that the Board did not violate the teachers' procedural and substantive due-process rights, and that the individual Board members are entitled to legislative immunity. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board”
A notable separate writing (not a panel disposition, so it is excluded from the appellate-disposition counts and the per-ruling outcome coding). Moore (joined by Stranch) dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, adhering to her earlier dissent (United States v. Esteras, 88 F.4th 1170, 1171-76 (2023) (Moore, J., dissenting)). Grounding quote: 'KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc. ... I would grant the current petition for rehearing because United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007), and the amended panel order in this case contravene the statutory text, disregard Supreme Court precedent, and place the Sixth Circuit at the extreme of a circuit split, allowing our district courts expressly to punish defendants for violations of supervised release.' The statutory-text question Moore pressed — that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) omits the § 3553(a)(2)(A) retribution factor and so bars punishing supervised-release violators — reached the Supreme Court, decided as Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025). It illustrates Moore's textualist method and influence and captures reasoning, not an outcome attributable to her as a panel author.
“Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint and REMAND the case for further proceedings.”
“Easlick is not entitled to summary judgment because Hughey has created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Easlick violated her clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. We thus REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.”
“We DISMISS Fitzgerald's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal concerns neither a final order nor a non-final order entitled to review under the collateral order doctrine.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's order and REMAND for reconsideration consistent with this opinion of Owens's motion for compassionate release.”
“For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying Middlebrooks's habeas petition.”
“For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
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