Karen Nelson Moore

“Because a reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that each Defendant officer either committed or observed and failed to stop the allegedly unconstitutional acts, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of summary judgment.”

“we affirm the district court's conditional grant of O'Neal's application for a writ of habeas corpus providing that unless a new trial is scheduled within 120 days, O'Neal must be unconditionally released.”

“the state court's application of law with regard to whether Williams is intellectually disabled under Atkins was contrary to clearly established Federal law. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND so that the district court may grant a CONDITIONAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS prohibiting Williams's execution unless the State reassesses Williams's Atkins petition consistent with this opinion.”

“We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board violated the Establishment Clause. In addition, we hold that the Board did not violate the teachers' procedural and substantive due-process rights, and that the individual Board members are entitled to legislative immunity. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board”

A notable separate writing (not a panel disposition, so it is excluded from the appellate-disposition counts and the per-ruling outcome coding). Moore (joined by Stranch) dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, adhering to her earlier dissent (United States v. Esteras, 88 F.4th 1170, 1171-76 (2023) (Moore, J., dissenting)). Grounding quote: 'KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc. ... I would grant the current petition for rehearing because United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007), and the amended panel order in this case contravene the statutory text, disregard Supreme Court precedent, and place the Sixth Circuit at the extreme of a circuit split, allowing our district courts expressly to punish defendants for violations of supervised release.' The statutory-text question Moore pressed — that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) omits the § 3553(a)(2)(A) retribution factor and so bars punishing supervised-release violators — reached the Supreme Court, decided as Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025). It illustrates Moore's textualist method and influence and captures reasoning, not an outcome attributable to her as a panel author.

“Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint and REMAND the case for further proceedings.”

“Easlick is not entitled to summary judgment because Hughey has created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Easlick violated her clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. We thus REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.”

“We DISMISS Fitzgerald's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal concerns neither a final order nor a non-final order entitled to review under the collateral order doctrine.”

“For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's order and REMAND for reconsideration consistent with this opinion of Owens's motion for compassionate release.”

“For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying Middlebrooks's habeas petition.”

“For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”