John Marshall Rogers

In Stanovsek, Rogers held that the aggravated-felony bar to a hardship waiver did not extend to someone initially admitted as a nonimmigrant who later adjusted to permanent resident status.

“The inescapably clear language of the statute, however, requires the conclusion that the bar does not extend to the latter situation.”

In Adamov v. U.S. Bank, he held that the bank forfeited a nonjurisdictional exhaustion defense by failing to raise it in the district court.

“given that the question of administrative exhaustion is nonjurisdictional, U.S. Bank forfeited the argument that Adamov did not exhaust his retaliation claim by failing to raise it to the district court”

In a bankruptcy fraudulent-transfer case, ties a bank's good-faith defense to what its own employees actually knew and shared internally: once one employee at the bank discovers a critical fraud clue, the bank's good faith ends even if the officers managing the account never personally learned of it.

“Huntington's investigator discovered a critical clue to Cyberco's fraud on April 30, 2004”

A warrantless search of a closed satchel violated the Fourth Amendment, so the suppression order stood against the government’s interlocutory appeal.

“We affirm the order of the district court, as the search of the satchel violated McClendon's Fourth Amendment rights.”

NEPA review for a fill permit could reasonably be limited to effects proximately caused by the specific activities the permit authorized rather than the entire mining operation.

“The Corps reasonably limited its scope of review to the effects proximately caused by the specific activities that were authorized by the permit.”

Failure to investigate and present mitigation did not justify presumed Strickland prejudice where the state court reasonably found no prejudice after weighing both mitigating and responsive aggravating evidence.

“Given the negligible effect of the presented mitigating evidence and the aggravating evidence that would have been admitted in response, it was reasonable for the state court to conclude that Sherrod had not demonstrated prejudice.”

In a municipal broadband case, Rogers held that a general federal directive to promote telecommunications competition did not clearly authorize the agency to displace states' allocation of authority to their municipalities. The court granted the states' petitions and reversed the preemption order.

“Furthermore, nowhere in the general charge to ‘promote competition in the telecommunications market’ is a directive to do so by preempting a state’s allocation of powers between itself and its subdivisions.”