Jane Branstetter Stranch
How Judge Stranch rules, drawn from 71 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Stranch
Jane Branstetter Stranch is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Stranch received a commission on September 15, 2010. Judge Stranch assumed senior status on July 14, 2025.
Judge Stranch's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Stranch's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Stranch decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Hart's protest excessive-force suit, she reversed qualified immunity for one officer because a jury could find firing a crowd-control munition at point-blank range excessive.
“a reasonable jury could find that [Officer Reinink] used excessive force when he fired Spede-Heat at Hart at point-blank range.”
In the Kellogg and FedEx pension appeals, she reversed dismissals because married retirees plausibly alleged outdated mortality data reduced benefits contrary to ERISA's actuarial-equivalence requirement.
“We therefore hold that § 1055(d) prohibits employers from using unreasonable, inappropriate actuarial assumptions when calculating QJSAs.”
In Dudenhoefer's ERISA stock-plan case, she reversed dismissal because the Kuper presumption of reasonableness did not apply at the pleading stage.
“the Kuper presumption of reasonableness ... does not apply at the motion to dismiss stage.”
Procedural preferences
In Tavarez's supervised-release appeal, she vacated a summary denial of early termination because the record did not show consideration of the relevant Section 3553(a) factors.
“Thus, we hold that the record must demonstrate that the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors before denying an early termination motion.”
Concurring in Moctezuma-Reyes's immigration appeal, she would have reserved whether to redefine the statutory hardship test until parties directly litigated that question.
“Loper Bright does not give this court the power or the responsibility to define ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ from new cloth—it instead teaches that reinterpreting a statute should be undertaken only with great caution.”
In Holbrook's habeas appeal, she held the petition timely because AEDPA tolling continued during the period in which he could have appealed the state denial of post-conviction relief.
“AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals' denial of his motion for post-conviction relief.”
In the Sheet Metal Workers' collective-bargaining dispute, she held the agreement's heading could not narrow its otherwise unambiguous coverage language and reversed summary judgment.
“titles and headings 'cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.'”
In Hunt’s sentencing appeal, Stranch treated asserted errors in the sentencing process separately from a challenge to the sentence’s length.
“Hunt attempts to characterize procedural errors as substantive ones.”
Cautions
In Clark's habeas case, she reversed a grant of relief based on an untested new witness affidavit and remanded for further proceedings on its credibility.
“Nor can it be confidently declared that a hearing 'would only confirm' Jackson's version of events.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Officer Johnson and Sergeant Bush and AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, but we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Officer Reinink, and REMAND for further proceedings on that claim.”
“we VACATE the district court's Summary Order, AFFIRM the district court's Documents Access Order, and REMAND for further proceedings.”
“we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Stranch concurred in the judgment denying Moctezuma-Reyes’s immigration petition. She would have left the statutory hardship test for a case in which the parties litigated its meaning, rather than resolving that question in this appeal.
“We find no clear error. We therefore AFFIRM the decision of the district court.”
“Although the district court erred when it refused to reduce Susany's offense level pursuant USSG 2X1.1(b), the error was harmless. We therefore AFFIRM Susany's sentence.”
“The Government's acquisition of Carpenter's CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court nevertheless properly denied suppression because the FBI agents relied in good faith on the SCA when they obtained the data. We therefore AFFIRM.”
“We affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court that approved a Chapter 13 plan using a 12% interest rate for overdue property taxes.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s application of the enhancements found at Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) and § 3B1.1(c).”
“Because we find Cybriwsky's motion for attorney's fees to be untimely and the doctrine of equitable tolling inapplicable on this record, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court denying Cybriwsky's motion for attorney's fees.”
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