Eugene E. Siler Jr.
How Judge Siler rules, drawn from 51 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Siler
Eugene Edward Siler, Jr. is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President George H.W. Bush, Judge Siler received a commission on September 16, 1991. Judge Siler previously served on the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, commissioned there on November 13, 1975. Judge Siler assumed senior status on December 31, 2001.
Judge Siler's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Siler's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Siler decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Dougherty's securities suit, he held that certain statements about Esperion's present FDA discussions fell outside the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements and reversed dismissal.
“Take for instance a man's statement to his friend, ‘My girlfriend has agreed to marry me.’ That is not a forward-looking statement. Rather, it is a backward-looking statement concerning a future event.”
In Ingram Barge's contract dispute, he held that grain consignee Zen-Noh was not bound by a bill of lading's forum clause because it had neither signed nor consented to the contract.
“Zen-Noh Grain Corporation was neither a party to nor consented to Ingram Barge Company’s contract for the transportation of goods (a bill of lading) and thus is not bound to the contract’s forum selection clause.”
Procedural preferences
In Eason's ACCA sentencing appeal, he held prior drug-manufacturing convictions qualified as serious drug offenses and remanded for resentencing.
“Congress did not attach a mens rea requirement to manufacturing. And it is clear that Congress could have done so, since it did for convictions involving possession of a controlled substance.”
In Malak's immigration appeal, he denied review because the BIA received the notice of appeal after its filing deadline; the lost Express Mail delivery did not justify intervention.
“[N]either the Postal Service's provision of incorrect information nor its failure to deliver the notice on time constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that would justify intervention by this court into the Board's exercise of discretion.”
In Becker's arbitration appeal, he held that a challenge to the delegation clause was not specific because it repeated the challenge to the whole agreement, leaving enforceability to the arbitrator.
“Indeed, Becker does not even separate his analysis of the enforceability of the delegation provision from his analysis of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole. Thus, under StockX, Becker’s challenge is not ‘specific’ to the delegation provision.”
In Brown's criminal appeal, he held that a district court's later findings could not justify a Speedy Trial Act continuance already underway and vacated the convictions.
“Because the district court’s ends-of-justice findings could not have been made before the continuance began, they were improper.”
In Harris's criminal appeal, he ordered a hearing into a colorable claim of outside influence on a juror even though the defendant had not yet proved unauthorized contact.
“Although Harris did not establish that Juror 12 was exposed to unauthorized communication, Harris did present a colorable claim of extraneous influence, which necessitated investigation.”
In UEC Holdings' trade-secrets appeal, he vacated a forensic-imaging order because it lacked protections for the defendants' confidential and privileged information.
“Ultimately, the district court failed to provide protections for the Defendants’ confidential, privileged, and private information, making its order overbroad.”
Cautions
In the Greers' mistaken-address search case, he affirmed denial of officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings because the complaint plausibly alleged an unreasonable home search.
“Because we find that the complaint states a plausible claim that the officers violated the plaintiffs' clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by executing a search warrant on their home in an unreasonable manner, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.”
In General Medicine's Medicare-audit appeal, he held that lack of advance notice could be excused only without substantial prejudice and affirmed because the agency's no-prejudice finding was supported.
“Therefore, we hold that a court may excuse a CMS contractor’s failure to give notice of an audit under 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(7)(A) if, and only if, the provider is not substantially prejudiced by the lack of notice.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We affirm the district court's determination that Michigan's crime of third-degree home invasion is categorically equivalent to generic burglary. ... AFFIRMED.”
“we REVERSE Harris's conviction on Count 5, obstruction of justice, and REMAND ... We VACATE the judgment of the district court denying Harris's request to ... hold a Remmer hearing and REMAND for a Remmer hearing. We AFFIRM Harris's convictions on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 ...”
“Because we lack jurisdiction, we DISMISS Reid's appeal. ... Appeal DISMISSED.”
“We hold today that our July 13, 2016 order instructing the district court to vacate its preliminary injunction in Miller did not render this damages-only action moot. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We agree with the district court that Dr. Dargie's repayment to UT in 2002 was a personal expense and, therefore, not deductible under I.R.C. 162. ... AFFIRMED.”
“In each case, the district court disagreed, finding the penalties to be nondischargeable. We affirm the decisions below because the penalties are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).”
“The district court granted summary judgment for both First Advantage and Elder Living, holding that the FCRA's two-year statute of limitations barred Rocheleau's lawsuit. We AFFIRM.”
“Because the MSPA does not provide Osborne a cause of action, the district court's decision is AFFIRMED.”
“Because we find that the complaint states a plausible claim that the officers violated the plaintiffs' clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by executing a search warrant on their home in an unreasonable manner, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.”
“Since these convictions are serious drug offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), we REVERSE Eason's sentence and REMAND for resentencing.”
“Because Plaintiffs adequately alleged scienter, we REVERSE and REMAND.”
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