Eric L. Clay
How Judge Clay rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Clay decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Requires a clear jurisdictional signal before treating a statutory filing deadline as an absolute bar; when Congress has not supplied one, he treats the deadline as nonjurisdictional and leaves fact-specific equitable tolling for the lower court.
“we join the Second and Third Circuits in holding that § 6213(a)’s petition-filing deadline is not jurisdictional.”
In reviewing discriminatory economic restrictions, demands concrete evidence that the challenged rule actually advances the asserted public-health or safety interest.
“Because the record is virtually ‘devoid of any concrete evidence showing that the [Restriction] actually promotes public health or safety,’ we conclude that the predominant effect of the law is not the protection of public health.”
Clay treated a trademark owner's authorization of the challenged use as defeating the owner's federal infringement claim.
“Guided by this reasoning, we hold that authorization to use a mark defeats an infringement claim under § 1125(a).”
In construing an immigration-detention statute, Clay gave independent effect to Congress's narrower phrase rather than extending mandatory detention to every applicant for admission.
“Congress could have easily drafted IIRIRA to extend § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s reach to all applicants for admission, but it chose not to do so.”
Title VII retaliation uses the materially-adverse-action standard, which is substantially different from the adverse-employment-action element governing a discrimination claim.
“The ‘materially adverse action’ element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the ‘adverse employment action’ element of a Title VII race discrimination claim.”
A later copyright agreement supported standing because it formalized earlier agreements that had already granted the plaintiff exclusive live commercial-distribution rights.
“We conclude that the Copyright Agreement gave JHP an enforceable right to sue Defendants because it formalized a series of earlier agreements under which JHP went about exclusively licensing and distributing the Fight to commercial establishments in a specific region before the Fight aired.”
A credible threat of enforcement supplied injury in fact where election laws prohibited the intended ballot-photo speech and officials had publicly maintained that the prohibition applied.
“On this record, an individual deciding whether to display a photograph of his or her marked ballot must do so in light of the following: a law that punishes revealing one’s marked ballot with imprisonment, repeated statements by Defendants that posting photographs of a marked ballot is illegal, no evidence that Defendants have publicly disavowed these statements, and at least one past instance in which the Board has ordered an individual to remove a ballot from display.”
Dark, indecipherable body-camera screenshots and conclusory testimony did not establish that officers could see suspected drugs through a tinted vehicle window under the plain-view doctrine.
“those screenshots are dark to the point of being indecipherable. Besides conclusory statements as to what officers saw, the government has furnished no evidence to establish that the photo taken from inside the car was an accurate depiction of what was seen from outside the vehicle.”
Procedural preferences
On cross-motions for summary judgment, Clay treated attacks on the strength of the opposing party's evidence as creating a factual dispute rather than proving entitlement to judgment.
“Furthermore, attacks on the strength of Yost’s evidence at most create a dispute of material fact, which would weigh against summary judgment.”
Clay applied labor-law preemption even though the plaintiffs' ERISA claims themselves could not be adjudicated by the labor board.
“Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs’ ERISA claims cannot be brought before the NLRB does not necessarily defeat the application of the Garmon doctrine.”
An equitable-tolling argument must be developed with unconflicted counsel when the lawyer responsible for the late habeas filing presented the initial tolling case.
“we VACATE the district court's decision and REMAND in order to allow Nassiri an opportunity to develop and present his equitable tolling argument anew, while represented by unconflicted counsel.”
Cautions
Clay rejected a party's attempt to make its undisclosed subjective understanding control the meaning of a written agreement.
“This argument is plainly foreclosed by Michigan law, which is clear that ‘the unilateral subjective intent of one party cannot control the terms of a contract.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability on both her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims. ... For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff and REMAND for further proceedings.”
“we agree with the district court's conclusion that Plaintiff has not established that he was constructively discharged ... However, we find that the district court improperly analyzed -- and improperly dismissed -- Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim. ... For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.”
“For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the summary judgment in favor of Defendants and REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”
“For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court's order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and REMAND with instructions to grant Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of copyright standing and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants.”
“Therefore, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment to Defendants for lack of standing and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.”
“For those reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Avantax.”
“For the reasons stated above, the district court's denial of Behovitz's motion to intervene as of right and permissively is AFFIRMED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, this Court AFFIRMS the district court's order denying a new trial.”
“For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court's order granting summary judgment to Continental.”
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