Deborah Louise Cook
How Judge Cook rules, drawn from 36 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Cook decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Applies a categorical, elements-focused approach to sentencing-enhancement questions (ACCA/Guidelines 'crime of violence'), matching a state offense's statutory elements against the generic federal definition rather than the facts of the underlying conduct, and treats an unraised distinction as forfeited rather than reaching it sua sponte.
“If the statute requires proving that someone used, attempted, or threatened to use physical force against another, it satisfies the elements clause even if the statute does not match the elements clause word for word.”
Willing to overturn the circuit's own stale precedent en banc when a fresh textual analysis demands it, rather than preserving institutional inertia: here reversing a categorical zero-privacy rule for booking photos under FOIA Exemption 7(C).
“We overrule Free Press I, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
In administrative and agency-enforcement remedies, insists remedies be tailored to the violation rather than punitive or symbolic, closely policing NLRB remedial orders for First Amendment / compelled-speech overreach.
“Remedies may not be used as an instrument of punishment.”
In benefits disputes, she holds plan administrators to the definitions they wrote and requires a reasoned explanation addressing evidence that fits those definitions. A denial for lack of objective findings was arbitrary when the plan expressly counted medications and treatment plans, yet the administrator ignored both.
“It never explained why his medications and treatment plan failed to satisfy the plan’s objective-findings definition. Nor did its rejection letters offer any other explanation for the benefits denial. Accordingly, the Administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.”
She treats public-comment rules that suppress criticism or offense as viewpoint discrimination, even in a limited public forum. Terms such as antagonistic, abusive, and personally directed were invalid because they favored praise over opposition rather than neutrally regulating a subject or disruption.
“These terms plainly fit in the ‘broad’ scope of impermissible viewpoint discrimination because, like in Matal, Iancu, and American Freedom Defense Initiative, they prohibit speech purely because it disparages or offends.”
Procedural preferences
She requires strict compliance with Rule 11's safe harbor before sanctions are available. Warning letters and informal notice do not substitute for serving the actual motion early enough to permit withdrawal or correction.
“Permitting litigants to substitute warning letters, or other types of informal notice, for a motion timely served pursuant to Rule 5 undermines these goals.”
She distinguishes a mandatory claim-processing deadline from a jurisdictional bar, but still enforces the deadline when an equitable-tolling theory was not preserved and lacked supporting authority. Nonjurisdictional does not mean optional.
“These rules, which ‘promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules’ that the Supreme Court treats as nonjurisdictional.”
An agreement delegating arbitrability to an arbitrator is independently enforceable unless the party specifically challenges that delegation clause. An attack on the loan agreement as a whole did not authorize the court to decide enforceability itself.
“Only a specific challenge to a delegation clause brings arbitrability issues back within the court’s province.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We overrule Free Press I, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We GRANT the petition for review in part, GRANT the cross-application for enforcement in part, and ENFORCE the Board's order as modified by this opinion.”
“AFFIRM the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, and DISMISS defendant's cross-appeal as moot.”
“The Noerr-Pennington doctrine insulates Insight from liability for its activities here, we reverse the district court's decision.”
“We reverse the district court's decision and remand for the district court to determine whether the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States ... established a new AEDPA limitations period.”
“For the following reasons, we affirm the BIA and deny the petition.”
“Because the district court reasonably sentenced Williams, we affirm.”
“Because Banks fails to distinguish Donald Graham, we decline to categorically prohibit the consideration of juvenile-age offenses ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM.”
“Because the record demonstrates that the officers did not act objectively unreasonably, we REVERSE.”
Draft for Judge Cook with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Cook, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Cook's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace