Deborah Louise Cook
How Judge Cook rules, drawn from 49 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Cook
Deborah L. Cook is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Cook received a commission on May 7, 2003. Judge Cook assumed senior status on March 6, 2019.
Judge Cook's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Cook's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Cook decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. Malone, Cook held that Kentucky second-degree burglary categorically matched generic burglary under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause.
“We therefore hold that Kentucky second-degree burglary categorically qualifies as generic burglary under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause.”
In Detroit Free Press v. Department of Justice, Cook wrote for the en banc court in overruling its earlier zero-privacy rule for booking photos under FOIA Exemption 7(C).
“We overrule Free Press I, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
In Sysco Grand Rapids v. NLRB, Cook limited enforcement of the Board’s order after finding that some access and public-notice-reading remedies exceeded a remedial purpose.
“Remedies may not be used as an instrument of punishment.”
In Corey v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Cook reversed a denial of disability benefits. The administrator had not explained why documented medication and treatment for cluster headaches failed the plan's definition of objective findings.
“It never explained why his medications and treatment plan failed to satisfy the plan’s objective-findings definition. Nor did its rejection letters offer any other explanation for the benefits denial. Accordingly, the Administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.”
In Ison v. Madison Local School District Board of Education, Cook's opinion struck portions of a school board's public-comment policy banning abusive, antagonistic, and personally directed speech. The panel held those terms discriminated by viewpoint while upholding an in-person preregistration requirement.
“These terms plainly fit in the ‘broad’ scope of impermissible viewpoint discrimination because, like in Matal, Iancu, and American Freedom Defense Initiative, they prohibit speech purely because it disparages or offends.”
Procedural preferences
In Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp., Cook held that warning letters and informal notice did not satisfy Rule 11's safe harbor, which required timely service of the sanctions motion itself.
“Permitting litigants to substitute warning letters, or other types of informal notice, for a motion timely served pursuant to Rule 5 undermines these goals.”
In Abraitis v. United States, Cook's opinion classified a tax statute's administrative-exhaustion requirement as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. The panel nevertheless affirmed dismissal because the taxpayer missed filing deadlines and forfeited his equitable-tolling argument.
“These rules, which ‘promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules’ that the Supreme Court treats as nonjurisdictional.”
An agreement delegating arbitrability to an arbitrator is independently enforceable unless the party specifically challenges that delegation clause. An attack on the loan agreement as a whole did not authorize the court to decide enforceability itself.
“Only a specific challenge to a delegation clause brings arbitrability issues back within the court’s province.”
In an employee disability-benefits appeal, Cook applied the plan's requirement that the claimant supply objective medical evidence. The administrator was not required to order its own physical examination to make up for the missing proof, and the panel reversed the benefits judgment.
“Ultimately, by the terms of the disability plan, Filthaut bears the burden of proving her disability by providing objective medical evidence of her condition—something she failed to do.”
Cautions
In a dissent in a life-insurance benefits appeal, Cook objected that the majority's award rested on an assumed application for a larger policy that the record did not show. She would have deferred to the administrator's reasonable reading of the plan's enrollment and eligibility terms; the majority's judgment remained controlling.
“I find I am unable to join the majority opinion as it hinges a substantial award on the supposition that this decedent applied for $150,000 worth of life insurance, though there exists no record evidence of his application.”
In a partial dissent over professional liability coverage, Cook objected to resolving the appeal on arguments the insured had not presented. She would have enforced the policy’s claim definition and false-warranty clause, leaving the insurer’s judgment intact.
“We consistently decline to reach arguments without the parties addressing them first.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We overrule Free Press I, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We GRANT the petition for review in part, GRANT the cross-application for enforcement in part, and ENFORCE the Board's order as modified by this opinion.”
“AFFIRM the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, and DISMISS defendant's cross-appeal as moot.”
“The Noerr-Pennington doctrine insulates Insight from liability for its activities here, we reverse the district court's decision.”
“We reverse the district court's decision and remand for the district court to determine whether the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States ... established a new AEDPA limitations period.”
“For the following reasons, we affirm the BIA and deny the petition.”
“Because the district court reasonably sentenced Williams, we affirm.”
“Because Banks fails to distinguish Donald Graham, we decline to categorically prohibit the consideration of juvenile-age offenses ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM.”
“Because the record demonstrates that the officers did not act objectively unreasonably, we REVERSE.”
Draft for Judge Cook with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Cook, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Cook's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace