David William McKeague
How Judge McKeague rules, drawn from 49 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge McKeague decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In ERISA cases, treats a benefits-recovery remedy as adequate on its own and resists layering an additional equitable remedy for the same wrongful denial: a 'make whole is enough' anti-duplication principle. Useful to cite defensively against a disgorgement/surcharge claim once the claimant has already recovered benefits, fees, and interest.
“Rochow is made whole under Sec. 502(a)(1)(B) through recovery of his disability benefits and attorney's fees, and potential recovery of prejudgment interest... Allowing Rochow to recover disgorged profits under Sec. 502(a)(3), in addition to his recovery under Sec. 502(a)(1)(B) ... would -- absent a showing that the Sec. 502(a)(1)(B) remedy is inadequate -- result in an impermissible duplicative recovery, contrary to clear Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.”
Even under deferential review of an ERISA benefits decision, he examines whether the administrator used accurate facts and completed the review process it undertook. An unsupported assertion that the claimant had returned to work and an unfinished physician interview made remand for a full review necessary in Smith.
“Although review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is highly deferential, it ‘is not no review, and deference need not be abject.’”
He treats professional judgment as capable of objective testing when the evidence permits it. In Paulus, disagreement among physicians did not make angiogram measurements legally unfalsifiable; properly admitted competing expert evidence was for the jury to weigh.
“Even state-of-the-art scientific measurements may sometimes be imprecise. But in these circumstances, it is up to the jury—not the court—to decide whether the government’s proof is worthy of belief.”
Procedural preferences
Repeatedly reframes an appeal around whether the LOWER court applied the correct standard of review, rather than re-deciding the underlying merits question itself: seen across the two Price v. Ind. Laborer's Pension Fund appeals, McGowan v. Burt, and McKinney v. Hoffner. When arguing to him, lead with the standard-of-review question.
“The proper inquiry then is whether the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. When the district court decided the case below, it engaged in the wrong inquiry.”
Declines to resolve genuinely novel legal questions on a record or briefing he views as underdeveloped, preferring a remand with guidance over a first-impression ruling issued without adequate adversarial testing: seen in the Greektown Casino bankruptcy bar-order appeal.
“These issues have not been adequately briefed and argued by the parties and were not addressed below. We therefore remand this case to the district court and instruct the district court to reevaluate the bar order under the guidance provided in this opinion.”
He leaves fact-sensitive reasonableness questions to a jury when the record supports competing conclusions. In Carhartt, the timing of notice about a latent fabric defect could not be resolved on summary judgment without evidence establishing when destructive testing should reasonably have occurred.
“It is possible that Carhartt should have conducted the fire-resistance tests earlier. But reasonable minds could differ on that conclusion—so it is a question for a jury.”
Cautions
In Fourth Amendment excessive-force cases, evaluates officer conduct strictly on the facts known in the moment (no 20/20 hindsight) and expressly refuses to craft new bright-line carve-outs (e.g., a 'de minimis resistance' exception) that would complicate that in-the-moment analysis: a consistently defense-favorable framework for law enforcement in qualified-immunity appeals.
“Nor, finally, will we read a de minimis resistance exception into the Fourth Amendment... When a person resists arrest -- say, by swinging his arms in the officer's direction, balling up, and refusing to comply with verbal commands -- the officers can use the amount of force necessary to ensure submission.”
A party cannot manufacture appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory class-certification ruling by inviting judgment against itself. He treats that tactic as nonfinal when it would enable piecemeal appeals and bypass discretionary review.
“Thus, where a plaintiff manufactures a dismissal in a manner that implicates these concerns, there is no final judgment, and thus there is no appellate jurisdiction.”
Correcting an omitted claim in bankruptcy only after an opponent identifies the omission may not avoid judicial estoppel. In Stanley, a belated disclosure that listed the claim's value as unknown despite a prior six-figure demand did not show an absence of bad faith.
“This late, perfunctory disclosure does not demonstrate an absence of bad faith.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the district court's judgment, which is hereby AFFIRMED.”
“For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM the BIA's decisions and DENY the petitions for review.”
“Accordingly, the district court's denial of the Trump defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for entry of an order dismissing the Count III claim against the Trump defendants.”
“the denial of Malease's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for an entry of an order of DISMISSAL, without prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
“We hold that the district court erred in its assessment of the record, and conclude that plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the Fiscal Court had an impermissible purpose or that the Foundations Display endorses religion.”
“we find that CCC's denial of disability benefits was arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, this case is remanded to the district court for the entry of an order requiring CCC to provide a full and fair review of Smith's disability claim.”
“there has been no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate. We therefore AFFIRM the decision of the district court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the decision of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We therefore REVERSE the decision of the district court, and REMAND with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants.”
“Accordingly, upon de novo review, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.”
“For the reasons that follow, we reverse the denial of plaintiff's motion to remand and vacate the district court's judgment on the pleadings.”
“The district court was clearly acting within its discretion when it denied the motion for reconsideration, so we affirm its order denying reconsideration. But the bar order itself raises several interesting questions of first impression in this Circuit ... We therefore remand this case to the district court and instruct the district court to reevaluate the bar order under the guidance provided in this opinion.”
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