Damon J. Keith
How Judge Keith rules, drawn from 38 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Keith no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Keith decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
A blanket closure rule for designated deportation hearings failed because it lacked narrow tailoring and case-specific findings despite the government's compelling security interest.
“However, the Creppy directive is neither narrowly tailored, nor does it require particularized findings. Therefore, it impermissibly infringes on the Newspaper Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of access.”
A deadly-force claim required trial when the record left a genuine dispute over whether the fleeing person posed a serious threat to the officer or others.
“We find there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Davis posed a significant threat of death or serious injury to Moekler or others.”
The amended sentencing framework governed a sentence-reduction calculation because it best carried out Congress's express demand for consistency.
“Because we must give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Procedural preferences
Agency action was final only after the decisionmaking process was complete and the action determined rights or produced legal consequences.
“Two conditions must be met in order for an agency action to be considered final: (1) ‘the action must mark the “consummation” of the agency’s decisionmaking process,’ and (2) ‘the action must be one by which “rights or obligations have been determined,” or from which “legal consequences flow.”’”
Qualified immunity did not justify summary judgment when a jury could find that an officer affirmatively increased a confidential informant's exposure to private violence.
“Accordingly, the district court properly denied Officer Wolowiec’s summary judgment motion because a reasonable jury could find that, under the state created danger theory of liability, he engaged in affirmative acts that increased Hilliard’s risk of exposure to private acts of violence, which deprived Hilliard of her clearly established Due Process right to personal security and bodily integrity.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we hold that applying the new minimums in Defendant's 1B1.10(b)(1) calculation is the only way to give effect to Congress's intent to achieve consistency with other Guidelines provisions ... Defendant is eligible for sentence reduction and the district court has jurisdiction to reduce his sentence ... For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Accordingly, for the above-mentioned reasons, we AFFIRM the convictions and sentence of the district court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.”
“A thorough review of the record reveals ambiguity as to what the district court believed about its statutory authority to grant § 2255 relief, and we must therefore vacate Ajan's sentence and remand the case.”
“Because we hold that the denial of Hosseini's application was a final agency action, we REVERSE.”
“the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to grant petitioner's release unless the state initiates procedures to retry him within a reasonable time.”
“we conclude that the district court erred in its determination that the initial stop of the defendant was unreasonable, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
“Since we are unable to find an abuse of discretion on the record before us, we affirm.”
“Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Because Sargent has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief under Johnson, his motion is GRANTED. We AUTHORIZE the district court to consider his proposed application, and TRANSFER the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for further proceedings. Sargent's motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice to his making such a motion in the district court.”
“For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the BIA.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly denied Officer Wolowiec's motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Nelson's state created danger claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of summary judgment.”
A historical record
Judge Keith no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.