Chad Andrew Readler

How Judge Readler rules, drawn from 62 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Appointed by
Donald Trump (Republican)
Commissioned
March 7, 2019
ABA rating
Well Qualified
Education
University of Michigan (B.A., 1994); University of Michigan Law School (J.D., 1997, cum laude)
Signed orders read
62

About Judge Readler

Chad Andrew Readler is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Readler received a commission on March 7, 2019.

Judge Readler's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Readler's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Readler decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Fulkerson's ERISA insurance appeal, he held that the plan's exclusion for death caused by a crime could encompass reckless driving under the ordinary meaning of 'crime.'

“the plain and ordinary meaning of crime includes reckless driving.”

In Fitzgerald Truck Parts' excise-tax appeal, he construed one safe-harbor provision as a numerical 75% test but remanded because another required proof that each tractor had originally incurred the tax.

“We agree with Fitzgerald that § 4052(f)(1) poses a bright-line, 75% test without any further qualitative inquiry, meaning its vehicles constructed with used engines and transmissions could qualify for the safe harbor.”

Readler treated a facially discriminatory state energy rule as subject to strict scrutiny regardless of whether the state's asserted purpose was benign.

“Even the most benign purpose, for instance, cannot save a facially discriminatory law from strict scrutiny.”

For protection against private threats under the Convention Against Torture, Readler required evidence that a public official would acquiesce in the threatened conduct.

“Because the Patels’ CAT claims are based on local officials ignoring threats from a nongovernmental entity (i.e., the loan sharks), they must show that a public official would acquiesce to the loan sharks’ conduct.”

Procedural preferences

In Whitman's habeas appeal, he enforced a procedural default despite the warden's failure to raise it in district court, distinguishing the warden's forfeiture from an express waiver.

“We have discretion whether to consider a forfeited procedural default argument. In this instance, the notable interests entwined in AEDPA weigh in favor of doing so.”

Concurring in Heiney's habeas appeal, he agreed that the missing trial exhibits did not require remand because the petitioner identified neither an inaccurate factual summary nor a material evidentiary gap.

“No binding precedent applies the rule in Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2003), to trial exhibits.”

Cautions

Dissenting in Nash's excessive-force appeal, he would have affirmed qualified immunity because he viewed administrative findings that the prisoner pulled away from officers as establishing a plausible safety reason for their takedown.

“Because Nash cannot demonstrate that the ‘exclusive purpose [of the takedown was] to inflict pain,’ Sootsman, 79 F.4th at 621, he cannot show the officers violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, qualified immunity was properly granted to the officers. On that basis, I would affirm the district court.”

Reviewing denial of an immigration motion to reopen, Readler asked whether the agency had engaged the central theory and supplied a rational explanation rather than whether the court preferred a different result.

“In the end, we cannot say the Board’s decision was so irrational as to warrant a remand.”

In Basalyga, Readler upheld the sentencing court’s rejection of a downward variance based on a defendant’s immigration-related collateral consequences after reviewing its stated reasons.

“the district court considered Chirinos de Urena’s arguments and had a reasoned basis for rejecting them”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. William Dale Wooden
945 F.3d 498 · 2019-12-19
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Finding no error in the district court's Fourth Amendment or sentencing analyses, we AFFIRM the decision below.”

Sheet Metal Workers' Health & Welfare Fund of North Carolina v. Law Office of Michael A. DeMayo, LLP
21 F.4th 350 · 2021-12-17
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“But resolution of those issues must remain on ice, so to speak, because they were not preserved for appellate review. On that basis, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”

Todd Allen Moats v. Commissioner of Social Security
42 F.4th 558 · 2022-07-27
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“As substantial evidence supports that determination, we affirm. In so doing, we reject Moats's argument that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record.”

J.H. v. Williamson County, Tennessee
951 F.3d 709 · 2020-02-27

Authored separate writing (NOT a panel disposition; excluded from the appellate-disposition counts). Cole, J. (joined by Stranch) authored the majority; Readler concurred in part and in the judgment. Subject: a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim by a juvenile detainee (J.H.) held in a single cell at a county juvenile detention center, and the Bell v. Wolfish framework for pretrial-detainee 'punishment.' Grounding quote: 'CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and in the judgment. The public employees operating the Williamson County Juvenile Detention Center faced a dilemma. Responsible for the care of up to a dozen minors, those officials had under their supervision one minor, J.H., who, due to mental health concerns, was a threat to himself and others.' Readler's separate writing parses the two prongs of Bell and argues the framework was not designed for in-custody-misconduct scenarios. Captures reasoning/method, not an outcome attributable to him as panel author.

Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Tre Hargett
2 F.4th 548 · 2021-06-22

Authored separate writing (NOT a panel disposition; excluded from the appellate-disposition counts). Gibbons, J. (joined by Readler) authored the majority VACATING a preliminary injunction for lack of a live controversy (standing/mootness); Moore, J. dissented. Readler concurred separately. Subject: a First/Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Tennessee election laws, including the state's 'first-time voter' in-person-voting requirement (Tenn. Code Ann. 2-2-115(b)(7)). Grounding quote: 'CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge, concurring. With no live controversy between the parties, I agree that the preliminary injunction must be vacated. And should this dispute resurrect itself in some form, it seemingly would take little work to conclude that Tennessee's first-time voter law easily passes constitutional muster.' Illustrates his views on justiciability and on the merits of voter-identity safeguards; reasoning, not an outcome attributable to him as panel author.

Republic Building Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of Clinton, Michigan
81 F.4th 662 · 2023-09-07

Authored separate writing (NOT a panel disposition; excluded from the appellate-disposition counts). Bush, J. (joined by Gilman) authored the majority, which agreed the district court wrongly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but AFFIRMED on the alternative Rule 12(b)(6) ground of res judicata (collateral attack on a state-court consent judgment). Readler concurred in part (agreeing jurisdiction existed) and dissented in part. Grounding quote: 'CHAD A. READLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority opinion that the district court should have exercised its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' complaint. For today's purposes, however, I would stop there, leaving the res judicata issue to the district court on remand. ... when we inquired about the issue at oral argument, the point was affirmatively waived by the Township for purposes of this appeal.' Readler invokes the principle of party presentation (United States v. Sineneng-Smith) to argue the panel should not decide an unraised, affirmatively-waived issue. Reasoning/method, not an outcome attributable to him as panel author.

United States v. Wesley Muchow
924 F.3d 272 · 2019-05-08
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Damion Faulkner
926 F.3d 266 · 2019-06-07
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Reynaldo Pineda-Duarte
933 F.3d 519 · 2019-07-31
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Nonetheless, we VACATE the defendant's sentence and REMAND the case to the district court for resentencing after application of the correct legal standard regarding the use of violence.”

United States v. David Buie
960 F.3d 767 · 2020-05-29
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Rafael Moore
999 F.3d 993 · 2021-06-07
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Jaquar Keyshore Latimer
16 F.4th 222 · 2021-10-18
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgments of the district court.”

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