Bernice Bouie Donald
How Judge Donald rules, drawn from 27 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Donald no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Donald
Bernice Bouie Donald was a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Donald received a commission on September 8, 2011. Judge Donald previously served on the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, commissioned there on December 26, 1995. Judge Donald assumed senior status on September 27, 2022 and retired on January 20, 2023.
How Judge Donald decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Taylor's parking-chalking suit, she held that marking a vehicle's tire to gather information was a Fourth Amendment search and reversed dismissal because the city had not established a warrant exception.
“Adopting this definition, there has been a trespass in this case because the City made intentional physical contact with Taylor's vehicle.”
In Zuke's disability-benefits appeal, she vacated judgment for the plan because its administrator ignored objective medical evidence and had not used a deliberate, principled reasoning process.
“when a plan categorically states that there is no objective evidence when in fact there is such evidence -- favorable or not -- the plan acts arbitrarily and capriciously.”
In Detroit firefighters' Title VII appeal, she adopted the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' reasoning that the claim against their union did not require a separate showing that the union breached its duty of fair representation, and reversed summary judgment for the union.
“We are persuaded by the reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and adopt it here. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DFFA.”
Procedural preferences
In Darrah's prison-medical-care appeal, she reversed summary judgment because the evidence raised a genuine dispute over whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his treatment needs.
“the only apparent basis for this decision was that Methotrexate was listed on the drug formulary.”
Cautions
In McCarley's habeas appeal, she held that admitting a psychologist's testimony recounting an unavailable child's eyewitness identification violated the Confrontation Clause and was not harmless under Brecht.
“Because D.P.’s statements constitute testimonial evidence and the Confrontation Clause violation at McCarley’s second trial was not harmless error, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of McCarley’s § 2254 petition and REMAND to the district court with instructions to grant McCarley a conditional writ of habeas corpus.”
In Hutton's capital habeas appeal, she held that defective jury instructions on aggravating circumstances could not be cured by the state appellate court's later reweighing and conditionally granted habeas relief for a new sentencing hearing.
“the jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; thus, the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life -- not death.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of the appellants' complaint against the city of Allegan, but REVERSE the district court's conclusion that the appellants' January 23, 2013 communication was an invalid acceptance. We REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Because the district court correctly determined that Sylvester failed to show prejudice, we AFFIRM the order dismissing Defendant's § 2255 motion.”
“We therefore hold that where a petitioner for relief under the INA was convicted under an overbroad and divisible statute, and the record of conviction is inconclusive as to whether the state offense matched the generic definition of a federal statute, the petitioner fails to meet her burden. ... For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the BIA's judgment.”
“Slusser, however, waived his right to challenge his designation as an armed career criminal through a § 2255 motion as part of his negotiated plea agreement. Therefore, we AFFIRM.”
“For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of habeas relief, and remand with instructions to reinstate the original sentence.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.”
“For the following reasons, we DENY the TVA's interlocutory appeal.”
“For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court's judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We find that these arguments fail and AFFIRM the district court's decision.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.”
“Finding no error, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.”
A historical record
Judge Donald no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.