Bernice Bouie Donald
Judge Donald no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Donald decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reads Fourth-Amendment search doctrine through the post-Katz property/trespass framework revived in United States v. Jones, not just the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test -- in the parking-'chalking' case she held a minimal physical touch of a car, done to gather information, is itself enough to make the act a 'search,' regardless of how trivial the intrusion.
“Adopting this definition, there has been a trespass in this case because the City made intentional physical contact with Taylor's vehicle.”
In ERISA plan-benefit reviews, will not defer to a plan administrator's bottom-line conclusion when the record contradicts the stated reason -- an administrator who says 'no objective evidence' exists when objective evidence is actually in the file has failed to engage in a 'deliberate, principled reasoning process,' regardless of how deferential the standard of review otherwise is.
“when a plan categorically states that there is no objective evidence when in fact there is such evidence -- favorable or not -- the plan acts arbitrarily and capriciously.”
Willing to align the Sixth Circuit with the clear majority of sister circuits on a live circuit split rather than chart an isolated path, whether the question favors the government (immigration burden-of-proof allocation) or a union defendant (no separate duty-of-fair-representation showing required for a Title VII claim).
“We are persuaded by the reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and adopt it here. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DFFA.”
Procedural preferences
In prisoner Eighth Amendment and malicious-prosecution cases, treats an unexplained multi-month gap between a known serious need and any responsive action -- or an officer's own concession that his account was false -- as itself capable of defeating summary judgment/qualified immunity, without requiring the plaintiff to also disprove every innocent explanation.
“the only apparent basis for this decision was that Methotrexate was listed on the drug formulary.”
Cautions
In habeas corpus, insists that even under AEDPA's deferential Brecht standard a Confrontation Clause violation is not harmless where the excluded testimony supplied the only eyewitness identification and the prosecution leaned on it heavily in closing -- a caution against assuming AEDPA deference forecloses relief on a thin, largely-circumstantial record.
“Dr. Lord's testimony therefore was not cumulative, but rather more akin to a keystone holding the arch of the State's case together. Remove that crucial block ... and the State's case collapses into disjointed pieces.”
In a capital case, will not let a state appellate court's after-the-fact independent reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances cure a jury verdict where the jury itself was never told what the aggravating circumstances were -- a caution that harmless-error/appellate-reweighing doctrines have a floor when the jury's own constitutionally required factfinding never happened.
“the jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; thus, the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life -- not death.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of the appellants' complaint against the city of Allegan, but REVERSE the district court's conclusion that the appellants' January 23, 2013 communication was an invalid acceptance. We REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Because the district court correctly determined that Sylvester failed to show prejudice, we AFFIRM the order dismissing Defendant's § 2255 motion.”
“We therefore hold that where a petitioner for relief under the INA was convicted under an overbroad and divisible statute, and the record of conviction is inconclusive as to whether the state offense matched the generic definition of a federal statute, the petitioner fails to meet her burden. ... For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the BIA's judgment.”
“Slusser, however, waived his right to challenge his designation as an armed career criminal through a § 2255 motion as part of his negotiated plea agreement. Therefore, we AFFIRM.”
“For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of habeas relief, and remand with instructions to reinstate the original sentence.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.”
“For the following reasons, we DENY the TVA's interlocutory appeal.”
“For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court's judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We find that these arguments fail and AFFIRM the district court's decision.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's decision.”
“Finding no error, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.”
A historical record
Judge Donald no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.