Bailey Brown
How Judge Brown rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Brown no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Brown
Bailey Brown was a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Judge Brown received a commission on September 26, 1979. Judge Brown previously served on the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, commissioned there on August 21, 1961. Judge Brown assumed senior status on June 16, 1982 and retired on December 31, 1997.
How Judge Brown decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Clark's employment-discrimination appeal, he affirmed summary judgment because the record did not show permanent alternative work was available under the employer's policies.
“In this case, though, there is no evidence that any permanent alternative employment was available to Clark under the company's employment policies.”
In Wilson's sentencing appeal, he upheld inclusion of drug sales as relevant conduct because the district court's finding of participation was not clearly erroneous.
“the government showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Wilson participated in the drug sales”
In Donegan's racing-injury suit, he affirmed summary judgment because the driver had waived a gross-negligence claim and the record did not support wanton or willful negligence.
“we find that Donegan waived his right to sue for gross negligence”
Procedural preferences
In Robinson's habeas appeal, he vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether a pretrial showup created a substantial likelihood of misidentification.
“Since it is far from clear that the district court applied the Manson approach and since the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, there existed a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the case will be remanded for such a hearing and determination.”
In Bickel's aviation-damages appeals, he declined to consider an argument Korean Air had omitted from its opening briefs; an intervening Supreme Court decision had not changed the relevant law.
“We normally decline to consider issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief”
In Fort Gratiot's remand appeal, he held the district court had to address the live complaint under the law of the case after an earlier dismissal was reversed.
“The court had a duty to assess the law of the case and then handle the complaint accordingly, thus carrying the appellate mandates into effect.”
Cautions
In the Hall property-forfeiture appeal, he held that convictions did not automatically preclude the claimants from contesting forfeiture and examined what the verdicts necessarily decided.
“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies if three requirements are met.”
In KI's labor-election appeal, he denied enforcement of the bargaining order because a union letter appealed to racial prejudice without truthfully reflecting the employer's views.
“Given the circumstances of this case, especially in light of the short time available to the Company to respond to the Nakamura letter and the difficulty of responding to such attacks at all, we cannot allow the results of the Union's certification election to stand.”
In Horton's tax appeal, he held that pre-1989 punitive damages for physical injury were excluded from gross income under Internal Revenue Code section 104(a)(2).
“We AFFIRM the Tax Court’s determination that the Taxpayers’ punitive damages recovery is excludable under section 104(a)(2).”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“We AFFIRM the part of the district court’s order which stays proceedings in that court. We REVERSE the part of the order which compels the University to resume the processing of Wedding’s grievance. We REMAND the case to the district court for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.”
“Because there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the company was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“The judgment of the district court is therefore vacated and the cause remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the forgoing reasons, we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part the judgments of the district court. We REMAND these cases for the entries of judgments consistent with this opinion.”
“The judgment of the district court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Because we agree with the district court’s conclusions that this case sounds in contract and must be decided under Pennsylvania law, we AFFIRM.”
“For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.”
“For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“Because the services which Ms. Salyer provides for her husband fall squarely within the ‘companionship services’ exemption from the FLSA, we AFFIRM.”
“The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants is AFFIRMED.”
A historical record
Judge Brown no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.