Amul Roger Thapar
How Judge Thapar rules, drawn from 66 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Thapar
Amul Roger Thapar is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Thapar received a commission on May 25, 2017. Judge Thapar previously served on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, commissioned there on January 4, 2008.
Judge Thapar's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Thapar's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Thapar decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Moctezuma-Reyes’s immigration appeal, he applied the post-Chevron rule that deference to an agency requires an express statutory grant of discretion.
“Chevron is no more. Before we defer to the agency, we must find that the statute expressly confers discretion on the agency.”
Thapar treated contradictions in an asylum applicant's account as supporting the agency's conclusion that the record did not establish government unwillingness or inability to address private harm.
“Given these contradictions, Owusu’s testimony does not establish that the Board failed to make a ‘substantially reasonable’ finding.”
On habeas review, Thapar did not treat conflicting witness testimony as enough to overcome the evidence supporting the state conviction.
“So the witnesses’ inconsistent testimony doesn’t give legs to James’s sufficiency challenge, either.”
In O’Connor’s Michigan property case, he concluded that original owners retain ownership of presumptively abandoned property even after the state takes custody.
“But under Michigan law, the original owners of presumptively abandoned property continue to own that property—even after the state takes custody of it.”
Procedural preferences
In Pavia’s NCAA dispute, he dismissed the appeal as moot because a waiver gave Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage.
“Because that waiver provides Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage, we dismiss the NCAA's appeal as moot.”
On remand in a social-media state-action case, Thapar required proof that the official had authority to speak for the government and directed a post-specific inquiry into whether he exercised it.
“And a grant of authority to perform job responsibilities doesn’t necessarily come with authority to make official statements about those responsibilities.”
Thapar held a defendant to facts accepted at sentencing rather than allowing the defendant to challenge the resulting enhancement as invited error.
“Because Cabbage agreed to the facts the district court relied on, we hold him to his agreement and affirm.”
On an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, Thapar dismissed when resolving the officer's argument would have required deciding factual disputes reserved for trial.
“And because we can’t resolve those disputes on appeal, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand.”
Cautions
In affirming a repeat offender's sentence, Thapar concluded that the district court could prioritize public protection over the defendant's rehabilitation argument on the record before it.
“And at some point, protecting the public must trump a defendant’s desire to ‘rebuild his life.’ This is one such case.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because that waiver provides Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage, we dismiss the NCAA's appeal as moot.”
“Because the factual record isn't developed enough for us to apply the Supreme Court's revised test, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.”
“We deny the petition for review.”
“Because Officer Patrick’s appeal rests on a factual dispute, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.”
“The district court granted summary judgment, concluding Officer Layne was entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm.”
“The district court denied the officers qualified immunity, and they appealed. We dismiss in part, reverse in part, and remand.”
“Because existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, we affirm.”
“Since such a long delay is tantamount to a denial, we reverse and remand.”
“The district court thought it did. We disagree and reverse.”
“But because the officers reasonably believed they were acting within the law, Novak can’t recover.”
“We REVERSE the district court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss on Novak’s claims related to anonymous speech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech. We AFFIRM the district court’s decision with respect to all other claims except municipal liability, over which we lack jurisdiction.”
“The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that neither the officers nor the City did anything wrong. We affirm.”
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