Amul Roger Thapar
How Judge Thapar rules, drawn from 51 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Thapar decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Textualist / anti-deference: post-Loper Bright he insists it is the court's duty to independently determine a statute's meaning from its text and will not defer to an agency's interpretation absent an express statutory delegation of discretion. Argue the words and structure of the statute, not the agency's gloss.
“Chevron is no more. Before we defer to the agency, we must find that the statute expressly confers discretion on the agency.”
Thapar treated contradictions in an asylum applicant's account as supporting the agency's conclusion that the record did not establish government unwillingness or inability to address private harm.
“Given these contradictions, Owusu’s testimony does not establish that the Board failed to make a ‘substantially reasonable’ finding.”
On habeas review, Thapar did not treat conflicting witness testimony as enough to overcome the evidence supporting the state conviction.
“So the witnesses’ inconsistent testimony doesn’t give legs to James’s sufficiency challenge, either.”
When a due-process claim turns on property ownership, Thapar begins with the governing state's law and distinguishes government custody from a transfer of title before selecting the constitutional framework.
“But under Michigan law, the original owners of presumptively abandoned property continue to own that property—even after the state takes custody of it.”
Procedural preferences
Rigorous on Article III jurisdiction and mootness: when an appellant voluntarily gives the appellee the complete relief sought at the preliminary-injunction stage, the appeal of that injunction is moot and will be dismissed without a merits ruling.
“Because that waiver provides Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage, we dismiss the NCAA's appeal as moot.”
Holds litigants to the precise terms of a governing legal test rather than a looser paraphrase: e.g. for Sec 1983 social-media state action, a power to do a job is not a power to make official announcements about it; the authority must be 'actually part of the job that the State entrusted the official to do,' analyzed post-by-post.
“It isn't enough that ‘making official announcements could fit within the job description’ of an official. Rather, issuing official announcements must be ‘actually part of the job that the State entrusted the official to do.’”
Thapar held a defendant to facts accepted at sentencing rather than allowing the defendant to challenge the resulting enhancement as invited error.
“Because Cabbage agreed to the facts the district court relied on, we hold him to his agreement and affirm.”
On an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, Thapar dismissed when resolving the officer's argument would have required deciding factual disputes reserved for trial.
“And because we can’t resolve those disputes on appeal, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand.”
Cautions
In affirming a repeat offender's sentence, Thapar concluded that the district court could prioritize public protection over the defendant's rehabilitation argument on the record before it.
“And at some point, protecting the public must trump a defendant’s desire to ‘rebuild his life.’ This is one such case.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because that waiver provides Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage, we dismiss the NCAA's appeal as moot.”
“Because the factual record isn't developed enough for us to apply the Supreme Court's revised test, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.”
“Because Officer Patrick’s appeal rests on a factual dispute, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.”
“The district court granted summary judgment, concluding Officer Layne was entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm.”
“The district court denied the officers qualified immunity, and they appealed. We dismiss in part, reverse in part, and remand.”
“Because existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, we affirm.”
“Since such a long delay is tantamount to a denial, we reverse and remand.”
“The district court thought it did. We disagree and reverse.”
“But because the officers reasonably believed they were acting within the law, Novak can’t recover.”
“We REVERSE the district court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss on Novak’s claims related to anonymous speech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech. We AFFIRM the district court’s decision with respect to all other claims except municipal liability, over which we lack jurisdiction.”
“The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that neither the officers nor the City did anything wrong. We affirm.”
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