Amul Roger Thapar
How Judge Thapar decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Textualist / anti-deference: post-Loper Bright he insists it is the court's duty to independently determine a statute's meaning from its text and will not defer to an agency's interpretation absent an express statutory delegation of discretion. Argue the words and structure of the statute, not the agency's gloss.
“Chevron is no more. Before we defer to the agency, we must find that the statute expressly confers discretion on the agency.”
Procedural preferences
Rigorous on Article III jurisdiction and mootness: when an appellant voluntarily gives the appellee the complete relief sought at the preliminary-injunction stage, the appeal of that injunction is moot and will be dismissed without a merits ruling.
“Because that waiver provides Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage, we dismiss the NCAA's appeal as moot.”
Holds litigants to the precise terms of a governing legal test rather than a looser paraphrase -- e.g. for Sec 1983 social-media state action, a power to do a job is not a power to make official announcements about it; the authority must be 'actually part of the job that the State entrusted the official to do,' analyzed post-by-post.
“It isn't enough that "making official announcements could fit within the job description" of an official. Rather, issuing official announcements must be "actually part of the job that the State entrusted the official to do."”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because that waiver provides Pavia complete relief at the preliminary-injunction stage, we dismiss the NCAA's appeal as moot.”
“Because the factual record isn't developed enough for us to apply the Supreme Court's revised test, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.”
“We deny the petition for review.”