Mary Anne Richey
Judge Richey no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Richey decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Richey treated the federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity as limited by the procedural conditions Congress attached to it.
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted because as a matter of law the plaintiff’s action is not within the limited, conditional waiver of sovereign immunity granted in the Federal Tort Claims Act and this court has no jurisdiction to hear the case.”
When reviewing agency action, she rejected requirements that were not part of the regulation governing the application when it was filed.
“The decision of the BIA is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.”
Procedural preferences
She limited immediate appellate review to truly collateral matters that could not be effectively reviewed after final judgment.
“Review of the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment should be postponed until final judgment is obtained.”
Cautions
She required evidentiary support for every portion of a judgment and vacated relief that extended beyond the record even while affirming the central holding.
“Certain portions of the district court’s judgment are unsupported by the record and are therefore vacated.”
For Warsaw Convention disembarkation claims, she focused on the passenger's location, activity, and the airline's control after the passenger entered the terminal.
“Appellant contends that the district court erred in holding that her injury did not occur in the course of disembarking within the meaning of Article 17. Unpersuaded by appellant’s arguments, we affirm.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted because as a matter of law the plaintiff’s action is not within the limited, conditional waiver of sovereign immunity granted in the Federal Tort Claims Act and this court has no jurisdiction to hear the case.”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the assessments made on the income of plaintiff-taxpayer Nolan are reasonable under the circumstances.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the estimated amount of income be redetermined pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7429(b)(3).”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Burns & McDonnell’s motion to dismiss Count V in CIV 80-027-TUC-MAR and CIV 80-028-TUC-MAR [treated by the Court as motions for summary judgment under Rule 12(b)] is granted.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Burns & McDonnell’s motion to dismiss Count VII in CIV 80-027-TUC-MAR is denied.”
“The decision of the BIA is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.”
“483 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1973), we find appellants’ contentions to be without merit and affirm the decision below.”
“We affirm the district court’s decision that the California sales tax is unconstitutional as to leases of tangible personal property to the United States because the legal incidence of the sales tax falls on the United States. In light of this holding, we find it unnecessary to reach the discrimination issue. Certain portions of the district court’s judgment are unsupported by the record and are therefore vacated.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No electronic case-level dockets assigned to Richey were located for her historical tenure, so no caseload mix or duration claim is made.
A historical record
Judge Richey no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.