Richard Sheppard Arnold

United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas district Retired 2004 · served 1978–2004 Appointed by Jimmy Carter (Democratic) 17 signed orders read

Judge Arnold no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Arnold decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He required fraud-based objections to discharge to provide factual notice rather than merely repeat statutory language.

“Fair notice requires something more than a quotation from the statute.”

He allowed fees for reasonably related claims that advanced the client’s interests even when those claims did not supply the precise ground for relief.

“Although this is a factor to consider, all claims which were pressed on plaintiff’s behalf were reasonably calculated to advance his interests; attorneys’ fees for time spent on such claims should not be denied solely because they did not provide the precise basis for the relief granted.”

Procedural preferences

He favored transfer over dismissal when doing so preserved a potentially meritorious claim for decision on the merits.

“In general, the rules and statutes should be interpreted to produce decisions disposing of claims on their merits.”

He expected withdrawal motions to be served on the client personally or at least on continuing counsel.

“The better practice, in the Court’s view, is for motions for leave to withdraw to be served upon the client personally, or at least upon other counsel representing him.”

Cautions

He remanded administrative cases when the decision below lacked findings clear enough to permit meaningful review.

“The difficulty with the opinion below in this case is that it fails to find the facts with sufficient clarity to allow this Court to exercise its reviewing function.”

He stayed a federal dispute when state regulators could resolve overlapping local questions without depriving plaintiffs of their remaining federal remedies.

“It is the opinion of this Court that the PSC should be given an opportunity to act to correct any discrimination which might exist, and further proceedings in this Court will be held in abeyance pending determination of the PSC proceeding.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Turner v. McClain
· 1978-10-31
Motions to transfer (plaintiffs) Granted

“It is therefore ORDERED that the motion for transfer of venue be, and it is hereby, granted, and that this cause be, and it is hereby, transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Southeastern Division.”

Motion for leave to withdraw (plaintiffs’ counsel) Denied

“It is therefore ORDERED that the motion for leave to withdraw be, and it is hereby, denied, without prejudice to its being renewed after transfer.”

Hawkins Equip. Co. v. Goldstein
· 1978-12-01
Bankruptcy appeal Granted

“The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”

Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Hart
· 1978-12-12
Bankruptcy appeal (Worthen Bank & Trust Company) Denied

“That the judgment of ‘the Bankruptcy Court be, and it is hereby, affirmed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”

Davidson v. Union National Bank
· 1978-12-18
Bankruptcy appeal (bankruptcy trustee) Denied

“In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion entered herein, the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court is affirmed this 18th day of December, 1978.”

Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Morris
· 1978-12-28
Bankruptcy appeal (Worthen Bank & Trust Company) Granted

“That the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court be, and it is hereby, reversed, and the cause remanded to that Court for a determination of the amount of attorney’s fees properly allowable and for such further proceedings, if any, not inconsistent with this Court’s opinion, as may be just.”

Porter v. Gaston
· 1978-12-29
Bankruptcy appeal (debtors) Denied

“The preliminary injunction issued April 25, 1978 is dissolved, and the judgment of the Court below is affirmed.”

Motion for permanent injunction (debtors) Denied
Davidson v. Califano
· 1979-02-13
Motions to dismiss (Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) Granted

“The motion to dismiss is granted, and the complaint is hereby dismissed.”

Marchant v. Califano
· 1979-02-13
Motions to dismiss (Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) Granted

“The motion to dismiss is granted, and the complaint is hereby dismissed.”

Mauldin v. United States
· 1979-04-10
Summary judgment (United States) Denied

“The motion of the United States for summary judgment is denied.”

Money v. Califano
· 1979-05-11
Social security appeal (claimant) Granted

“That portion of the Secretary’s decision finding that disability ended on May 17, 1977, must therefore be reversed.”

Strayhorn v. Califano
· 1979-06-06
Summary judgment (Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) Denied

“The Secretary’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”

Motions to remand (claimant) Granted

“The plaintiff’s motion for remand is granted, and the case is remanded to the Secretary with directions to carry into effect this Court’s holding.”

Taylor v. Teletype Corp.
· 1979-08-29
Motions to dismiss (Teletype Corporation) Granted

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to these four, which their counsel did not oppose, was granted in open court.”

Motion to amend class definition (intervenors) Denied

“This request is denied. The class was certified by Order dated June 5, 1979.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The reviewed decisions span bankruptcy, civil rights, employment, Social Security, estate tax, venue, public utilities, habeas corpus, and school administration. This publication-selected sample cannot support a career-wide caseload estimate.

A historical record

Judge Arnold no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.