Harry Francis Barnes
Judge Barnes no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Barnes decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He required evidence of actual or inevitable misuse before allowing a trade-secret claim to proceed.
“evidence showing nothing more than that the defendant could misuse the plaintiffs confidential information and that the plaintiff fears it will cannot support a finding of inevitability.”
He rejected a sophisticated-user defense where the end user lacked education about the chemical hazard and the record did not justify shifting the warning duty.
“Affording Defendants effective immunity based upon the purported sophistication of or knowledge on the part of Cooper Tire is inappropriate given the summary judgment record before the Court.”
He found class treatment superior where common proof could resolve the claims of numerous workers who were unlikely to finance individual suits.
“Since all Plaintiffs share a common grievance against the same Defendants and the sources of proof will be the same for all members, a class action is the appropriate and superior method for resolving this adjudication.”
Procedural preferences
He permitted amendment where a dismissal order left a related commercial-disparagement theory capable of more specific pleading.
“Luxpro is directed to file any amendments to its FAC regarding its commercial disparagement claim within 14 days of the date of this order.”
He treated a claim-by-claim summary-judgment record as mixed rather than forcing an all-or-nothing result.
“Plaintiffs interference claim will proceed to trial as scheduled, and her retaliation claim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.”
Cautions
Speculation that workplace incidents were race-motivated did not substitute for evidence linking the conduct to race.
“Without such evidence, Bishop may only speculate that the alleged misconduct was racially motivated. Such speculation is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment.”
Proposed intervenors had to establish the jurisdictional amount with evidence once it was challenged.
“If the amount in controversy is challenged, then the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants should be and hereby is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs interference claim will proceed to trial as scheduled, and her retaliation claim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.”
“Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. TBA’s claims against UHS are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All outstanding motions are DENIED as moot.”
“Accordingly, the court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 29] should be and is hereby granted in part and denied part. Specifically, the official capacity claims are dismissed. As to the remaining claims, the Motion is denied.”
“Accordingly, the decision of the bankruptcy court should be and hereby is AFFIRMED.”
“For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that Defendant Pittman Nursery’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings should be and hereby is GRANTED.”
“For reasons discussed herein and above, the Court finds that Separate Defendant Harrah’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Apple’s Motion to Dismiss should be and hereby is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Luxpro’s claim of attempted common law monopolization is DISMISSED. Furthermore, Luxpro’s interference claims regarding Orchard Company, Web Worker, Carrefour, EUPA, 3C, ET Mall, Kaga Electronics, and Compu Import are DISMISSED without prejudice. Luxpro is directed to file any amendments to its FAC regarding its commercial disparagement claim within 14 days of the date of this order.”
“For reasons discussed herein and above, the Court finds that Separate Defendant Farm Bureau’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims against Separate Defendant Farm Bureau are dismissed with prejudice.”
“The Court also finds that Separate Defendant William Grant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be and hereby is DENIED at this time.”
“Lastly, the Court finds that Separate Defendant William Grant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“For the reasons discussed herein and above, the Court finds that Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is granted.”
“Ashland’s and UNOCAL’s Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the sophisticated user doctrine should be and hereby is DENIED.”
“For reasons stated herein and above, Defendant Texarkana School District No. 7 of Miller County’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotion distress or outrage claim, and DENIED with regard to the remainder of Plaintiffs claims, which will proceed to trial.”
“Based on the reasons presented above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Court-Authorized Notice to Similarly Situated Workers is GRANTED IN PART.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 207.5 days (N = 40).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 125 days (N = 1).
The forty enumerated cases filed from 2005 through 2011 were all terminated. They included civil-rights, prisoner and habeas matters; contracts and insurance; personal-injury and product-liability cases; and criminal cases. This bounded historical enumeration is not a career-wide caseload estimate.
A historical record
Judge Barnes no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.