Truman McGill Hobbs

How Judge Hobbs rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Hobbs no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
Position
District judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1980–2015
Appointed by
Jimmy Carter (Democratic)
Commissioned
April 3, 1980
Education
University of North Carolina, A.B., 1942; Yale Law School, LL.B., 1948
Signed orders read
28

About Judge Hobbs

Truman McGill Hobbs was a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Judge Hobbs received a commission on April 3, 1980. Judge Hobbs assumed senior status on February 11, 1991 and served until death on November 4, 2015.

How Judge Hobbs decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He protected the traditional jury-trial right when Congress had not expressly withdrawn it.

“the right to a jury trial is too basic and fundamental in this nation’s legal system to construe Congressional silence as depriving litigants of a jury trial right”

He required search-warrant affidavits to state the probable-cause basis clearly enough for meaningful judicial review.

“they must strive to write clear and concise affidavits that provide sufficient information for a reviewing magistrate to determine if probable cause exists to justify a search.”

Procedural preferences

He considered the practical cost of forcing premature satellite litigation when damages were not yet fixed.

“Judges need not ignore the realities of life and court calendars are not so bare that judges need to force the filing of suits which may ultimately prove a waste of time and money to all concerned.”

He enforced statutory benefit limits even when the underlying recovery mechanism had been approved administratively.

“a waiver shall not be approved when it ‘would result in material impairment of any statutory or regulatory rights of participants or potential participants.”

Cautions

He treated false financial filings as conduct that could justify severe dismissal sanctions.

“False and forged documents prevent the courts from considering in an intelligent manner a petition for in forma pauperis status.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Johnston v. Alabama Pardon & Parole Board
· 1982-01-18
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.”

Shepard v. Stidham
· 1980-12-08
Civil rights claim (plaintiff) Denied

“the Court concludes that plaintiff’s claim should be denied.”

Algernon Blair Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority
· 1982-12-21
Motion to strike jury demand (defendant) Denied

“defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial be and the same is hereby denied.”

Best v. Boswell
· 1981-06-15
Motion for attorney fees (plaintiff) Denied

“plaintiff’s petition for attorney fees should be denied.”

Communication Equipment & Contracting Co. v. Municipality of Anchorage
· 1980-09-22
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied.”

Atwell v. Reese
· 1981-10-16
Dismissal sanction (court) Granted

“plaintiff’s complaint in this case be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.”

Dailey v. Sutton
· 1982-03-30
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“defendants’ motion to dismiss be and the same is hereby granted.”

Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer
· 1980-12-12
Motion to stay state proceedings (plaintiff) Denied

“plaintiff’s motion for stay of state court proceedings, filed herein on December 11, 1980, be and the same is hereby denied.”

Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Combs-Gates Indianapolis, Inc.
· 1980-11-04
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied.”

Wilder v. Commissioner
· 1984-04-06
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”

Motion for attorney fees (plaintiff) Denied

“plaintiff have and receive nothing on his claim for attorney’s fees”

Request for costs (plaintiff) Granted

“costs be taxed against defendant.”

Hawkins v. James
· 1981-01-14
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“defendants’ motions to dismiss be and the same are hereby granted.”

Bozeman v. Lambert
· 1984-07-13
Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment (respondents) Denied

“the Court will deny respondents’ motions on the condition that petitioners amend ‘ their petitions to add the appropriate warden as a party respondent.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The located writings span civil rights, jurisdiction, federal benefits, insurance, habeas corpus, criminal procedure, employment, taxation, and administrative review. They do not establish the distribution of Hobbs's full caseload.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years0
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 202600
Sep 202500
Mar 202500
Sep 202400
Mar 202400
Sep 202300
Mar 202300
Sep 202200
Mar 202200
Sep 202100
Mar 202100
Sep 202000

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

A historical record

Judge Hobbs no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.