Charles S. Coody
Judge Coody no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Coody decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Social Security appeals he reverses and remands when the ALJ's decision does not adequately develop the medical record on a documented condition -- e.g. ordering no neurological workup for diagnosed cerebral atrophy -- reasoning that the ALJ's inquisitorial duty to develop both sides of the record is independent of the claimant's own burden of proof.
“Without a more developed record and further inquiry, the court concludes that the ALJ erred as a matter of law when he failed to develop the record regarding the severity of Fletcher's cerebral atrophy and the effect of that impairment on Fletcher's ability to perform work.”
On a criminal defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, he focuses less on whether the defendant had close assistance of counsel and more on whether counsel's substantive advice was correct -- affirmative, incorrect assurance from counsel that a mandatory sentencing enhancement would not apply defeats the knowing-and-voluntary requirement even where the court itself gave an ambivalent warning at the plea colloquy.
“These ambivalent statements about the possibility of the ACCA applying to Tellis, coupled with his attorney's unequivocal advice that Tellis was not subject to the ACCA, lead the court to conclude that Tellis' plea was not knowing and voluntary.”
Procedural preferences
On a habeas petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to support equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period, he requires the petitioner to show he took some independent step -- such as contacting the clerk's office -- to verify an appeal was actually filed, rather than relying solely on unanswered attempts to reach counsel.
“Although Robinson alleges he made many attempts to contact Abbott about the status of his direct appeal, he makes no allegation that he attempted to contact the state trial court or the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals to determine the status of his appeal.”
On motions for spoliation sanctions, he applies the circuit's bad-faith requirement strictly, declining to draw an adverse inference from even a fairly careless failure to preserve evidence (here, an officer's disabling of a taser's internal clock) absent some showing the loss was intentional.
“Although shortsighted, the defendants' decision to initially place the taser back into service in March 2013 and then to remove the battery in July 2014 for storage in the evidence room does not rise to the level of bad faith. At best, it constitutes negligence, and in this circuit, even gross negligence is insufficient to justify an adverse inference.”
Cautions
On a second or successive Section 2254 petition, he treats the absence of a pre-filing authorization order from the Eleventh Circuit as a jurisdictional bar and recommends summary dismissal without reaching the merits, a pattern he has applied across different petitioners years apart.
“This cause of action be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(3)(A) as Gardner has failed to obtain the requisite order from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider his successive habeas application.”
He dismisses prisoner cases for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders (including a change-of-address requirement) only after the litigant has been expressly forewarned in a prior order that noncompliance would result in dismissal, and he considers less-drastic sanctions before doing so.
“The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than dismissal is appropriate. ... After such review, it is clear that dismissal of this case is the proper course of action.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants be granted and that this case be dismissed with prejudice.”
“Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 1. The motion for summary judgment be GRANTED; 2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; and 3. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.”
“1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 11) be GRANTED; 2. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff; 3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; and 4. Costs of the proceeding be TAXED against Plaintiff for which execution may issue.”
“(1) That the defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. # 38) the claims against defendants the City of Phenix City, Joe Edwards, Jessica Carter, S. Frederick and John Gwin be GRANTED and these defendants be DISMISSED as defendants in this action. (2) That the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against defendants Ray Smith and Michele Kilday in their official capacities be GRANTED. (3) That, with respect to the plaintiff's First Amendment claim against defendants Smith and Kilday in their individual capacities, the motion to dismiss be DENIED.”
“1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gardner be DENIED. 2. This cause of action be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(3)(A) as Gardner has failed to obtain the requisite order from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider his successive habeas application.”
“ORDERED that the defendant's motion to remand (doc. # 20) be and is hereby GRANTED. By separate final order the decision of the Commissioner will be reversed and this case remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g) for further proceedings.”
“Accordingly, in light of the inadequate development of the medical evidence and the ALJ's failure to fully and fairly develop the record in this case, the court concludes that this case should be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Accordingly, it is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be DENIED. (Doc. No. 7.)”
“ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss Count III of the complaint be and is hereby GRANTED and the plaintiff's claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII be and is hereby DISMISSED. It is further ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint be and is hereby DENIED.”
“the petition for habeas corpus relief should be dismissed without prejudice so that Sims can pursue his available state court remedies.”
“the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”
“it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea (doc. # 42) be GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Coody's sampled consent-jurisdiction caseload spans Social Security disability appeals, prisoner Section 1983 civil-rights and Section 2254 habeas matters, employment discrimination, personal-injury and insurance diversity cases, and general civil litigation -- consistent with a full-career general-civil consent docket rather than a single specialty.
A historical record
Judge Coody no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.