Billy Wayne Lewis Jr.

In Lively v. Crabtree, Lewis denied the habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the case with prejudice because the petition was time-barred.

“is DENIED without an evidentiary hearing as time-barred”

In the reviewed immigration-detention dispute, preliminary relief failed where the asserted revocation had not occurred and the petitioner could not show a substantial likelihood of success.

“the court finds that the Petitioner’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 5) is due to be DENIED.”

In the reviewed detainee-death case, competing evidence about force and causation left factual disputes for trial, defeating qualified immunity and summary judgment.

“there is a genuine dispute of material fact. 18 literature, he answered: ‘the textbooks, which I studied in residency and fellowship on regular basis, everything—every textbooks says that has to be multiple blunt force trauma, if it is extensive injuries to the head.’ (Doc. 82-6 at 34). While the field of forensic pathology is obviously a science involving testable methodologies, Dr. Shaker clearly testified that his opinion in this case was based on his knowledge and experience; his methodology was to compare the injuries he observed with his knowledge of what events typically produce such injuries. The Supreme Court has made clear that expert testimony like this can be reliable. Thus, to the extent the Defendant’s motion to exclude hinges on Dr. Shaker’s failure to name a specific scientific method he used to arrive at his conclusion, the Defendant’s motion fails. The Defendant’s motion is right, though, to demand an explanation as to ‘how [Dr. Shaker’s] experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.’ See Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amend. But the court finds that Dr. Shaker has provided this explanation. According to the Defendant, Dr. Shaker ‘has offered no explanation of what principles, within his 30 years of experience, lead him to distinguish multi-blow injury patterns from single-impact-plus-fall patterns. He has identified no analytical framework, no checklist, no protocol, and no error-testing mechanism.’ (Doc. 83 at 7–8). While he did not identify a checklist, protocol, or error-testing mechanism, 19 Dr. Shaker did cite the specific characteristics of the injuries that led him to conclude that they were inconsistent with the events described by the Defendant. He cited the nature of the injured bones and the severity to support his conclusion that they could not have been caused by one strike and a fall. This explanation is sufficient in the court’s view. Like in Kumho Tire, the court cannot test the reliability of Dr. Shaker’s methodology by reviewing its error rate or asking whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; the court must ask better-fitted questions. To evaluate the reliability of Dr. Shaker’s experience-based testimony, the court will examine whether Dr. Shaker’s experience-based methodology is generally accepted in the forensic pathology community and whether his preparation is of a kind that others in this field would recognize as acceptable. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151. When asked what the standard methodologies are for forensic pathologists, the chief medical examiner for the state of Alabama and expert retained by the Defendant, Dr. Reedy, responded, ‘I’m not sure I can quantify that because it’s all a matter of training and experience. You’re trained to do an autopsy in a certain way. Most forensic pathologists will do an autopsy the same way every other forensic pathologist does it. I was trained . . . to utilize every information source possible— in this case, medical records—before coming to a definitive conclusion.’ (Doc. 82- 2 at 17); (See also doc. 85 at 19). Dr. Reedy specifically commended Dr. Shaker for 20 waiting to review the medical records before completing his autopsy report, stating: ‘That was the right thing to do.’ (Doc. 82-2 at 15). So, Dr. Shaker reviewed the medical records and performed an autopsy, and then relied on his training and experience to reach conclusions about what could have caused Brannon’s injuries. This is the same approach taken by the Defendant’s experts, and it appears to be accepted in the field of forensic pathology. The Defendant attempts to distinguish Dr. Shaker’s approach from the approach his two experts took, noting that Dr. Uribe based his conclusion (that the fracture in the base of the skull could be caused by the impacts described by the Defendant) on ‘peer-reviewed literature demonstrating a direct, biomechanical association between zygomatic-arch fractures and temporal-bone/skull-base fractures through force-transmission pathways.’ (Doc. 83 at 11). The Defendant asserts that the literature ‘supplies precisely the analysis Dr. Shaker never performed.’ (Doc. 83 at 11). Regarding Dr. Reedy, the Defendant simply sets forth Dr. Reedy’s explanation for how the single strike and backward fall account for every one of Brannon’s injuries. Neither of these points establish that Dr. Shaker’s experience-based opinion is unreliable. As explained above, there is no requirement in the case law that an expert must rely on peer-reviewed literature. Dr. Shaker explained how he reached his conclusion based on his expertise. The court finds no significant difference between the experts’ approaches, and it is not for this court to 21 weigh the quality of the expert opinions against one another. Their competing interpretations should be presented to the fact-finder. The Defendant argues that Dr. Shaker’s analysis is ‘far less rigorous than the methodology found wanting in Davis [v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 183 F.4th 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2026)].’ (Doc. 83 at 8). But Davis concerned a causation opinion, that is, an expert opinion declaring the cause of something, and ruling out other possibilities. This is not the type of opinion Dr. Shaker offers. Dr. Shaker concludes merely that the injuries could not have been caused by one strike and a fall because they required more impacts. This is a much more narrow conclusion. The Defendant argues that Dr. Shaker utilized the unreliable principle that ‘multiple injuries equals multiple blows,’ (Doc. 83 at 8) and notes Dr. Reedy’s testimony that forensic pathologists do not determine the number of impacts simply by counting the number of injuries. (Doc. 82-2 at 15). But Dr. Shaker’s conclusion was not based on such a simple principle. He testified that he considered which bones were injured and the geographic distribution of the injuries, not merely their number. Moreover, Dr. Shaker’s inability to determine the exact number of impacts does not render his opinion that the injuries were inconsistent with one strike and a fall inadmissible as a matter of law. Again, to determine the exact number of impacts that caused certain injuries is a far greater task than simply determining whether one strike and a fall could have caused the injuries. Dr. Shaker explained clearly why 22 he ruled out the possibility of one strike and a fall; he need not have an exact picture of the sequence of events to lend reliability to his limited conclusion. The Defendant can draw out the limitations of Dr. Shaker’s narrow opinion on cross-examination. Finally, Dr. Shaker’s opinion is not unreliable just because he did not ‘rule out’ the facts the Defendant relies on to support his version of events, i.e. Brannon’s lack of protective reflexes and intoxication. Dr. Shaker expressly considered the possibility that Brannon’s injuries were caused by a single strike and a fall to the ground and testified explicitly that some of the injuries could have been caused by those impacts (doc. 82-6 at 39) but ultimately found no way to square the injuries with that explanation because of their severity. Because Dr. Shaker’s opinion is limited to ruling out the Defendant’s version of events, he need not rule out any other possible explanations. It is important to note that whether an expert opinion’s logical basis has been established is within the discretion of the trial judge and the weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert’s opinion go to its weight rather than its admissibility. On cross-examination, the opposing counsel is given the opportunity to ferret out the opinion’s weaknesses to ensure the jury properly evaluates the testimony’s weight and credibility. . . . [A]s long as a logical basis exists for an expert’s opinion and the inadequacies are fully disclosed to the jury, the weaknesses in the underpinnings of the opinion, go to the weight and not the admissibility of the testimony. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 663 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The court will not exclude Dr. Shaker’s opinion. 23 II. Excessive Force—42 U.S.C. § 1983 Having resolved the evidentiary issue, the court now turns to examine the merits of the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court will address each claim in turn. First, the Plaintiff alleges that ‘Officer Geoffrey Blake Young used excessive force upon [him] and thereby violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be free from excessive physical force.’ (Doc. 1 at 4). The Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.”