Can a lawyer represent a husband in post-dissolution proceedings when the lawyer's former firm once consulted the wife, if the lawyer learned no confidences?

Plain-English summary

The inquiring lawyer had been associated with a law firm that a woman consulted about a marriage dissolution, but the lawyer gained no confidences or secrets from that consultation. The committee concluded the lawyer was not prohibited by RPC 1.10(b) from now representing the woman's former husband in post-dissolution proceedings.

The committee added a second point. The lawyer's letterhead, identifying the practice as "Doe, Jones & Smith," appeared to imply a partnership, which was inconsistent with the lawyer's statement that he practiced as a sole practitioner. The committee enclosed Formal Opinion 178 on that issue.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986, before the 2006 revisions to the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct. RPC 1.10 on imputed disqualification was later renumbered and amended. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: If your former firm once consulted the opposing party but you learned no confidences, can you take the case against her?

A: Under this opinion, yes. The committee concluded that, because the lawyer gained no confidences from the firm's consultation with the woman, RPC 1.10(b) did not prohibit the lawyer from representing her former husband in post-dissolution proceedings.

Q: What was the deciding fact for the conflict question?

A: The committee's stated basis was that the lawyer did not gain any confidences and secrets from the consultation.

Q: What was the committee's concern about the letterhead?

A: The committee said a letterhead identifying the practice as "Doe, Jones & Smith" appeared to imply a partnership, which was inconsistent with practicing as a sole practitioner, and it pointed to Formal Opinion 178.

Background and rules framework

The opinion applies Washington RPC 1.10(b) (imputed disqualification), corresponding to Model Rule 1.10, to a lawyer who had left a firm that a prospective client had consulted. The analysis turned on whether the lawyer had acquired confidences from that consultation. The committee separately addressed a firm-name and letterhead concern by reference to Formal Opinion 178.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Washington RPC 1.10(b) (imputed disqualification), corresponding to Model Rule 1.10.

Other opinions cited:

• WSBA Formal Opinion 178 (letterhead that implies a partnership).

See also

• WSBA Ethics Op. 990: a firm hiring a lawyer who holds an adverse co-defendant's confidences must withdraw
• WSBA Ethics Op. 986: opposing a prior client's co-defendant when no confidences were gained
• WSBA Ethics Op. 987: keeping a departed lawyer's name in the firm name

Source

• Landing page: https://ao.wsba.org/print.aspx?ID=107

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Advisory Opinion: 996
Year Issued: 1986
RPC(s): RPC 1.10(b)
Subject: Conflict of interest; imputed disqualification; prior law firm consulted with opposing party

The Committee was of the opinion, based upon the facts set out in your inquiry, that while you were formerly associated with a law firm which was consulted by a woman regarding a marriage dissolution, and that you did not gain any confidences and secrets from the consultation, you would not now be prohibited by RPC 1.10(b) from now representing her former husband in post-dissolution proceedings. I was also directed to point out to you that your letterhead identifying you as [Doe, Jones & Smith] appears to imply that you are a partnership, which is inconsistent with your statement in your inquiry that you are practicing as a sole practitioner. I enclose Formal Opinion 178 in that regard.