Is it an ethics violation for a Virginia lawyer to have a sexual relationship with a current client during the representation?

Plain-English summary

The committee addresses the ethical problems that arise when a lawyer enters into a sexual relationship with a client during the course of the representation. It recognizes that no provision of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibits a lawyer-client sexual relationship, and it draws a distinction between relationships that predate the attorney-client relationship and those that begin during it, treating the latter as the more probable source of ethical breaches and lawyer discipline.

The committee identifies several rules the conduct can implicate. A sexual relationship can jeopardize competent representation (Rule 1.1) and diligence (Rule 1.3(c)) through indirect harm or prejudice to the client; it can impair the independent professional judgment Rule 2.1 requires, because emotional involvement can undercut the objective detachment representation demands; and it can create a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2), where the lawyer's personal interest in continuing the relationship materially limits the representation. The committee treats the relationship as an exploitation risk against the lawyer's fiduciary position, invoking Rule 1.8(b) (using information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage) and noting that the conflict is imputed to the firm under Rule 1.10(a). It also addresses confidentiality (Rule 1.6(a)), explaining that an intimate relationship blurs the line between professional and personal contexts and that using confidential information to pursue sexual relations violates Rules 1.6(a) and 1.8(b). A lawyer who coerces sexual favors through the fiduciary relationship, or solicits sex in lieu of fees, may violate Rule 8.4(b).

The committee concludes that because these obligations are so fundamental to the attorney-client relationship, the client's purported consent will rarely be sufficient to eliminate a potential violation, and in most situations the client's ability to give the informed consent Rule 1.7(b) requires is overwhelmed by the lawyer's position of power and the client's emotional vulnerability. It opines that a lawyer should refrain from entering into a sexual relationship with a client. A consensual relationship that predates the attorney-client relationship is not per se improper, and some such representations (for example, a spouse in a real estate closing or traffic matter) may present no conflict or a waivable one under Rule 1.7(b).

In practice

Under the Virginia rules as they stood when the opinion issued, the committee holds that there is no per se prohibition on a lawyer-client sexual relationship, but that a relationship begun during the representation can violate the rules on competence (1.1), diligence (1.3(c)), independent judgment (2.1), conflicts of interest (1.7(a)(2), with imputation under 1.10(a)), confidentiality (1.6(a)), and misuse of client information (1.8(b)), and can support an 8.4(b) violation where the lawyer coerces sexual favors or trades sex for fees. The opinion concludes that a lawyer should refrain from such a relationship during the representation, and that client consent will rarely cure the conflict because the client's ability to give informed consent under Rule 1.7(b) is typically overwhelmed by the lawyer's position of power and the client's vulnerability. It treats a relationship that predates the representation as not per se improper.

Common questions

Q: Does Virginia have a rule that flatly bans sex with a client?

A: No. The opinion states that no provision of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibits a lawyer-client sexual relationship; the analysis instead runs through the competence, judgment, conflict, and confidentiality rules.

Q: Why is a sexual relationship that begins during the representation a conflict of interest?

A: The opinion concludes that under Rule 1.7(a)(2) there is a significant risk the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer's personal interest in the relationship, and that the lawyer's emotional involvement can impair the independent judgment Rule 2.1 requires.

Q: Can the client just consent to the relationship to cure the problem?

A: Rarely. The opinion concludes that in most situations the client's ability to give the informed consent Rule 1.7(b) requires is overwhelmed by the lawyer's position of power and the client's emotional vulnerability, so consent will seldom eliminate a potential violation.

Q: What about a relationship that existed before the representation began?

A: The opinion concludes that a consensual relationship predating the attorney-client relationship is not per se improper, and gives examples (representing a spouse in a real estate closing, traffic matter, or contract review) where no conflict exists or a conflict may be waived under Rule 1.7(b).

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets several Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3(c) (diligence, prohibiting intentional prejudice to the client); Rule 2.1 (independent professional judgment); Rule 1.7(a)(2) (concurrent conflict where a personal interest materially limits the representation) and Rule 1.7(b) (informed-consent cure); Rule 1.8(b) (using information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage); Rule 1.10(a) (imputed disqualification); Rule 1.6(a) (confidentiality); and Rule 8.4(b) (criminal or deliberately wrongful act reflecting adversely on fitness). It draws on ABA Formal Opinion 92-364 (1992) for the fiduciary-conflict framing.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Model Rule 1.1 / Va. Rule 1.1 (competence)
• Model Rule 1.3 / Va. Rule 1.3(c) (diligence; no intentional prejudice to the client)
• Model Rule 2.1 / Va. Rule 2.1 (independent professional judgment)
• Model Rule 1.7 / Va. Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b) (personal-interest conflict; informed-consent cure)
• Model Rule 1.8 / Va. Rule 1.8(b) (use of client information to the client's disadvantage)
• Model Rule 1.10 / Va. Rule 1.10(a) (imputed disqualification)
• Model Rule 1.6 / Va. Rule 1.6(a) (confidentiality)
• Model Rule 8.4 / Va. Rule 8.4(b) (deliberately wrongful act reflecting on fitness)

Other opinions cited:

• ABA Formal Op. 92-364 (1992): conflicts arising from lawyer-client sexual relationships

See also

• VSB Ethics Op. 1866: Of-Counsel Relationships and Imputed Conflicts
• VSB Ethics Op. 1858: Lawyer Indemnifying an Insurer as a Settlement Condition

Source

• Landing page: https://vsb.org/Site/about/rules-regulations/leo-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://www.vsb.org/common/Uploaded%20files/LEOs/1853.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1853

SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH A
CLIENT.

The Committee has been asked to address the numerous issues involved when a lawyer
enters into a sexual relationship with a client during the course of the representation. The
manifold ethical issues that arise from these circumstances do not require the Committee
to describe the actual acts of the lawyer nor what indeed defines a “sexual relationship.”
Many problems addressed arise from the impropriety and unfair exploitation of the
lawyer’s fiduciary position as well as the lawyer’s untold influence and potential personal
conflict. As the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Ethics identified in Formal
Opinion No. 92-364 (1992), “[t]he roles of lawyer and lover are potentially conflicting
ones as the emotional involvement that is fostered by a sexual relationship has the
potential to undercut the objective detachment that is often demanded for adequate
representation.” While distinctions may be drawn between sexual relationships that
predate the formation of the attorney/client relationship and those that begin during the
attorney-client relationship, the lawyer must always be mindful of the ethical
considerations involved. Clearly, the situation where the sexual relationship develops
during the attorney-client relationship risks more probable ethical breaches and in most
instances forms the basis for lawyer discipline. This opinion outlines the host of ethical
problems a lawyer faces in having a sexual relationship with a client during the course of
a professional engagement.
APPLICABLE RULES
The Committee recognizes that no provision in the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct specifically prohibits sexual relationships between lawyer and client;1 however,
the lawyer must consider that such conduct could: (1) jeopardize the lawyer’s ability to
competently represent the client (Rule 1.1), (2) wrongfully exploit the lawyer’s fiduciary
relationship with the client, (3) interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment (Rule 2.1), (4) create a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client
(Rule 1.7, Rule 1.7 Comment [10], Rule 1.8(b) and Rule 1.10(a)), (5) jeopardize the duty
of confidentiality owed to the client (Rule 1.6(a)), or (6) potentially prejudice the client’s
matter (Rule 1.3(c)). Additionally, a lawyer who intentionally uses the fiduciary
relationship of lawyer and client to coerce sexual favors from a client may be found to
1

In response to growing concerns over breaches of fiduciary duty and exploitation of trust issues, prior to
the development of ABA Model Rule 1.8(j), many states had developed their own specific rules regarding
lawyer-client sexual relationships. By 2003, thirteen states had amended their model rules of professional
ethics or disciplinary codes to include provisions regarding the propriety of consensual lawyer-client sexual
relationships, ranging from absolute prohibition to limited restrictions to commentary advising about the
possible negative consequences of such relationships. On April 2, 1992, California became the first state to
enact a formal rule regarding attorney-client relationships when the state adopted Rule of Professional
Conduct 3-120. Phillip R. Bower & Tanya E. Stern, “Conflict of Interest?: The Absolute Ban on LawyerClient Sexual Relationships Is Not Absolutely Necessary, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 540 (2003)
(explaining how a blanket rule prohibiting consensual lawyer-client sexual relations is both over inclusive
and under inclusive). Currently, according to the American Bar Association, 27 states have addressed
lawyer-client sexual relations in some form in their rules of professional conduct. Daniel Gilbert, “Virginia
State Bar rules against adopting sexual misconduct regulation,” Bristol Herald Courier, August 9, 2009
(“Gilbert article”). Critics of an unqualified ban acknowledge that a lawyer often holds a position of
substantial power vis-à-vis a client, but both attorney and client have rights of privacy and freedom of
association which should not lightly be restricted by the state. As one commentator notes, “any regulation
by the bar of attorney-client sexual relations must account for the complex variety of relationships that can
and do exist between attorneys and their clients.” William K. Shirley, “Dealing with the Profession’s Dirty
Little Secret: A Proposal for Regulating Attorney-Client Sexual Relationships,” 13 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS
131, 133 (1999).

have violated Rule 8.4(b)’s prohibition against a “deliberately wrongful act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s . . . fitness to practice law.”2 Also, when a lawyer solicits
sexual favors in lieu of charging the client legal fees, the lawyer will have violated Rule
8.4(b).3
ANALYSIS
Competence and Diligence
Rule 1.1 states that “a lawyer must provide competent representation to a client ….”
While a sexual relationship with a client may not directly impede the ability of a lawyer
to provide competent representation, the danger of indirect harm or prejudice to the client
nonetheless exists. Depending upon the circumstances of the client’s matter, disclosure
of the relationship may prejudice the client or compromise the competency of the
representation thereby violating Rule 1.3(c)4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the
principles underlying the Rules outlined in the following sections as well. Accordingly,
the lawyer’s conduct may play a significant factor in denying the client the full benefit of
the assistance normally available in a traditional attorney-client relationship. A sexual
relationship with the client creates a grave risk that the lawyer’s duties of competence and
diligence will be breached.
Lawyer’s Independent Judgment
A lawyer is required to exercise detached and independent professional judgment when
representing a client. Rule 2.1 states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.
A lawyer involved in a sexual relationship with a client, especially one that arose
during the attorney-client relationship, could become conflicted in providing the
“straightforward advice” that “involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may
be disinclined to confront.” Rule 2.1 Comment [1].5 Additionally, the lawyer’s ability to
2

See Virginia State Bar v. Wade Trent Compton, infra at n.11, infra.

3

The facts of reported disciplinary cases also provide support for the position that the client’s purported
“consent” may be illusory in this context. In the Matter of Sterling Weaver, Sr., VA Disp. Op.
97-010-0846, 1997 WL 873025 (Va.St.Bar.Disp.Bd., Nov. 17, 1997) (lawyer testified that sexual
intercourse with client was consensual; public reprimand); Disciplinary Counsel v. Sturgeon, Ohio, No.
2006-1209 (Nov. 15, 2006) (permanent disbarment of lawyer for repeatedly pressuring financially
vulnerable female clients to trade sexual favors for reduced legal fees, exposing himself, using crude
language, and falsely denying fault); Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, Iowa, No.
113/05-0575 (April 21, 2006) (three-year suspension of lawyer who pressed three vulnerable female clients
to have sex with him in lieu of paying his fees); In re Gamino, Wis., No. 2003AP2422-D (Dec. 20, 2005)
(two-year suspension for sex with two vulnerable female clients and repeated misrepresentations about the
relationships).

4

Rule 1.3 Diligence
(c) A lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage a client during the course of the
professional relationship, except as required or permitted under Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3.
5
A lawyer may be disinclined to provide bad news to a client about their legal matter while the lawyer is
having a sexual relationship for fear of losing the personal sexual relationship. In that situation, the
lawyer’s personal interests in continuing the sexual relationship could materially limit the legal

maintain independent objectivity free from emotion or bias could be impaired because of
the personal relationship. The lawyer risks losing the objectivity and reasonableness that
form the basis of the lawyer’s independent professional judgment.
Fiduciary Obligations
The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary one in which the client places trust and
confidence in the lawyer in return for the lawyer’s placing the interest of the client ahead
of any self-interest.6 This fiduciary relationship imposes the highest standards of ethical
conduct on the lawyer, which requires the lawyer to exercise and maintain the utmost
good faith, honesty, integrity, fairness, and fidelity. This fiduciary relationship precludes
the lawyer from having personal interests antagonistic to those of the client. ABA
Formal Op. 92-364.
The lawyer’s position of trust places the burden on the lawyer to ensure that all dealings
between the lawyer and client are fair and reasonable. Rule 1.8 Comment [1]. By nature,
the attorney-client relationship is often inherently unequal: the client comes to the lawyer
because he or she needs help with a problem and puts faith in the lawyer to respond
reasonably and objectively on his or her behalf. Such reliance potentially places the
lawyer in a position of dominance and the client in a position of vulnerability. While this
dynamic might not exist in every situation, e.g., with corporate clients, clients involved in
divorce, criminal, probate, and immigration matters often feel particularly dependent
upon their lawyers. Such vulnerability may result from the client’s emotional state, age,
social status, educational level, or the nature of the matter being handled by the lawyer
for the client. 7 The more vulnerable the client is in his or her ability to make reasoned
judgments regarding the matter, the more heightened becomes the lawyer’s fiduciary
obligation to avoid any improper relationship with the client. If the lawyer abuses the
client’s reliance and trust, the lawyer has violated Rule 1.3(c).
The principle of Rule 1.3(c)8 rests on public policy and is a protection to the client that
the lawyer will not take advantage of any confidence imparted by the client. Further,
Rule 1.8(b)9 supports the fundamental principle that a lawyer may not use client
representation and create a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 (a)(2). See the discussion of conflicts of
interest beginning at p.5 of this opinion.
6

A fiduciary relationship arises from principles of common law. As stated by the Supreme Court in 1850,
“There are few business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than those of attorney and
client, or generally speaking one more honorably and faithfully discharged, few more anxiously guarded by
the law or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to
administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus
reposed shall not be used to the detriment of prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.” Stockton v.
Ford, 52 U.S. (11. How) 232, 247 (1850); see also Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602
A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 1992) (citing Stockton with approval); In re Education Law Center, Inc., 86 N.J. 124,
429 A.2d 1051 (1981) (same); 98 A.L.R. 2d 1235 (1964) (collecting cases).

7

See ABA Formal Op. 92-364, supra, noting that an individual client, in particular: is likely to have
retained a lawyer at a time of crisis; the divorce client's marriage is disintegrating; the criminal client may
have just been arrested and could be facing the possibility of jail; the probate client is dealing with the loss
of a loved one; the immigration client may fear deportation; a client may be trying to save a business or
salvage a reputation; the corporate employee's job may be on the line, depending on the outcome of the
transaction or litigation.

8

See note 4, supra.

9

Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transaction

confidences to the disadvantage of the client, and Rule 1.7(a)(2)10 prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client when the representation may be limited by the lawyer’s own
interests.
Rules 1.3(c), 1.8(b), and 1.7(a)(2) reflect the fundamental fiduciary obligation of a
lawyer not to exploit a client’s trust for the lawyer’s benefit, which implies that the
lawyer should not abuse the client’s trust by taking sexual or emotional advantage of a
client. ABA Op. No. 92-364. The inherently unequal relationship, which is much more
problematic in the sexual relationship that arises during the course of the attorney-client
relationship, may provide an opportunity for the lawyer to exploit the client either
emotionally, sexually, or financially. Since the attorney-client relationship is based upon
trust and confidence, a lawyer has a heightened duty to protect those obligations. There
are scenarios too numerous to mention in which a lawyer’s sexual conduct with a client
presents ethical problems for the lawyer. Client vulnerability may be even more acute in
legal aid or pro bono cases because the client may lack the resources necessary to change
lawyers if unwanted advances occur.11 The client may feel obliged to provide sexual
favors to the lawyer because he or she has no other means to compensate the lawyer for
his or her work or out of fear that the lawyer will not continue to pursue his or her legal
interests diligently.12
Conflict of Interests
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client for the advantage of the
lawyer or of a third person or to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation,
except as permitted or required by Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3.
10

Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(2) there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a
personal interest of the lawyer.

11

12

See note 12, infra.

A client may not feel free to rebuff a lawyer’s unwanted advances for fear the rejection will reduce the
lawyer’s attention to the case or cause the client to find a new lawyer. See, e.g., Virginia State Bar v. Wade
Trent Compton, CL08-172 (Cir, Ct. Dickenson Co. (2009) and related “Gilbert article,” supra at n.1. Mr.
Compton stipulated in an agreed disposition that he engaged in sexual conduct with
clients while employed at a licensed legal aid society. On December 15, 2008, a threejudge panel of the Dickenson County Circuit Court suspended Wade Trent Compton’s
license to practice law for five years with terms for violating professional rules that
govern conflict of interest and misconduct that involves a criminal or deliberately
wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
as a lawyer. Clients in emotionally traumatic domestic relations and criminal cases may
be psychologically distressed, weakened and vulnerable, and the lawyer can become a
powerful figure who can victimize the client by exploiting the weakness. See Matter of
Berg, 955 P.2d 1240 (Kan. 1998) (attorney disbarred). See also In re Landry, M.R.
14025, 95 CH 446 (Ill. Nov. 25, 1997) (lawyer took advantage of emotionally troubled
divorce client the day before a hearing by having sexual relations with the client); Otis'
Case, 609 A.2d 1199, 1203 (N.H. 1992) (attorney disbarred); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics
Op. 92-6 (October 30, 1992).

The independent professional judgment of a lawyer is based solely on behalf of the best
interests of the client. A lawyer involved in a sexual relationship with a client risks
compromising that judgment because of personal interests. Rule 1.7(a)(2). Lawyers, like
any other person, have personal emotional factors that become intertwined when they
engage in a sexual relationship. When that relationship with a client begins during the
attorney-client relationship, the lawyer’s ability to be impartial and objective is impaired.
When the lawyer’s interests interfere with decisions that must be made for the client, the
representation is impaired. See Rule 1.7 Comment [10].13
While certainly not all situations would present such a problem, these conflicting
situations are likely to arise when the lawyer develops a sexual relationship with the
client during the attorney-client relationship. A typical conflict arises when a lawyer has
a sexual relationship with a divorce client—not only does the lawyer risk becoming an
adverse witness on issues of adultery or child custody, but the lawyer’s behavior actually
poses a threat of additional harm to the client.14 Likewise, a sexual relationship with a
client in other situations, such as a corporate client, a criminal client, and even a real
estate or estate planning client, may, under some circumstances, present ethical problems
for the lawyer. The same ethical considerations may be raised when the client is an
organization and the lawyer’s relationship is with one of the organization’s
representatives. If there is a reasonable possibility that the client might be harmed or that
client representation may be impaired by the lawyer’s engaging in a sexual relationship
with the client, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation.
While Rule 1.7(b)15 provides that client consent may cure an existing conflict of
interest, in these types of situations the client’s ability to give informed consent is suspect
because of his or her potentially impaired objectivity and emotional stability. Due to the
significant danger of harm to client interests, Rule 1.7(b) provides no assistance in curing
the lawyer’s conflict in most situations because the client’s own emotional involvement
renders it unlikely that the client can give informed consent.16 Additionally, Rule
1.10(a)17 imputes the lawyer’s conflict and disqualification to all lawyers in that lawyer’s
firm.

13

Rule 1.7 Comment [10]: A lawyer may not allow business or personal interests to affect representation
of a client …. A lawyer’s romantic or other intimate personal relationship can also adversely affect
representation of a client.

14

See Rule 3.7, which requires that a lawyer terminate representation if the lawyer is likely to be called as
a witness against his client.
15
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may
represent a client if each affected client consents after consultation, and:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) the consent from the client is memorialized in writing.
16
17

See cases cited at n. 3, supra.

Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, or 2.10(e).

However, a consensual sexual relationship that predates the attorney-client relationship
is not per se improper, such as the representation of a spouse or significant other with
whom the lawyer has had an ongoing romantic/sexual relationship. While such
representation may warrant consideration of some of the ethical problems identified in
this opinion, clearly there are circumstances where a conflict may not exist or may be
waived pursuant to Rule 1.7(b); by way of example and not limitation, representation of a
spouse in a real estate closing, traffic matter or contract review.18
Preservation of Client Confidences
While the lawyer has a duty under Rule 1.6(a)19 to protect client confidences, this duty
may become difficult to ascertain when a sexual relationship exists between the lawyer
and client. Client confidences are protected only when they are imparted in the context
of the professional relationship. An intimate sexual relationship with a client blurs the
line that exists between the professional and personal relationship, which in turn may
make it difficult to predict if and when client confidences may be protected.
In addition, a lawyer who uses confidential client information to pursue sexual relations
with a client violates Rules 1.6(a) and 1.8(b), particularly in circumstances where the
lawyer acts upon client vulnerabilities to manipulate the client to participate in sexual
relations. Clients in domestic, child custody, criminal, and pro bono cases are especially
prone to such manipulation.20
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that entering into a sexual relationship with a client during the
course of representation can seriously harm the client’s interests. The numerous ethical
obligations of a lawyer to a client are so fundamental to the attorney-client relationship
that obtaining the client’s purported consent to entering into a sexual relationship with the
lawyer will rarely be sufficient to eliminate any potential ethical violation. Therefore, it
is the opinion of this Committee that a lawyer should refrain from entering into a sexual
relationship with a client. In most situations, the client’s ability to give the informed
consent required by Rule 1.7(b) is overwhelmed by the lawyer’s position of power and
influence in the relationship and the client’s emotional vulnerability.
This opinion is advisory only and not binding on any court or tribunal.
Committee Opinion
December 29, 2009

18

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 n.1 (July 6, 1992).

19

Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law or other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).

20

See cases cited in notes 3 and 12, supra.