Can a Virginia prosecutor prosecute defendants represented by a lawyer with whom the prosecutor co-owns a law office building and equipment?

Plain-English summary

Former partners A and B co-own the building housing their old law office and the office equipment, computers, and furniture used there. A became an Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney; B stayed in solo practice in the building. B pays no rent, but the two share responsibility for the building's mortgage and real estate taxes and remain jointly liable on a partnership loan now serviced by B, and both benefit from the building's equity and tax deductions. B represents criminal defendants in A's jurisdiction. The committee was asked whether A may prosecute defendants B represents.

The committee reviews its prior treatment of business relationships between opposing counsel. Older opinions on landlord/tenant and shared-office arrangements (LEOs 1416, 1578) applied former DR 5-101(A)'s broad "may affect" standard, while current Rule 1.7(b) uses the narrower "may be materially limited" test. Only LEO 1767 had applied Rule 1.7(b) to such a relationship, finding a conflict where a Commonwealth's Attorney was himself the client of the defense lawyer, because loyalty to the client cannot be watered down by a personal business relationship with opposing counsel, and the Commonwealth cannot give consent.

The committee explains that not every business tie is categorical; a landlord/tenant relationship is fact-specific and may or may not create a conflict. Here, though, the entanglement goes well beyond a lease: the prosecutor and defense lawyer co-own the building, are each responsible for its mortgage, and the prosecutor co-owns the very equipment and furniture of the defense lawyer's law practice, with the connection running directly to that law practice. The committee concludes this is a personal-interest conflict under Rule 1.7(b). Because the prosecutor's client is the Commonwealth, the Rule 1.7(b)(2) consent cure is unavailable, so the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney is barred from prosecuting B's clients, and under Rule 1.10(a) that disqualification is imputed to every prosecutor in the office.

In practice

The opinion holds that, under the Virginia rules as they stood at the time, a prosecutor's business entanglement with defense counsel that is tied directly to the lawyer's law practice (co-owning the office building and its equipment, with shared mortgage and loan obligations) is a personal-interest conflict under Rule 1.7(b). Per the opinion, because the prosecutor's client is the Commonwealth, the conflict cannot be cured by consent, so the prosecutor cannot prosecute that defense lawyer's clients, and Rule 1.10(a) imputes the bar to the entire Commonwealth's Attorney's office. The opinion treats a plain landlord/tenant relationship as fact-specific, not automatically disqualifying.

Common questions

Q: Can a prosecutor prosecute defendants represented by a lawyer he shares a building with?

A: The opinion says a bare landlord/tenant relationship is fact-specific, but here the prosecutor co-owned the building and the defense lawyer's office equipment with shared debt tied to the law practice, which created a Rule 1.7(b) personal-interest conflict barring prosecution.

Q: Can the prosecutor cure the conflict with consent?

A: No. The opinion says the prosecutor's client is the Commonwealth, which cannot give the consent Rule 1.7(b)(2) requires, so the conflict cannot be waived.

Q: Does the conflict affect the whole office?

A: Yes. The opinion says Rule 1.10(a) imputes the disqualification to every lawyer in the Commonwealth's Attorney's office, which fits the Rules' definition of "firm."

Q: Is every business relationship between opposing counsel a conflict?

A: No. The opinion says the determination is often fact-specific; a mere landlord/tenant arrangement will not always create a conflict, but the deep, law-practice-related entanglement here did.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets Rule 1.7(b) (Model Rule 1.7, personal-interest conflicts and the "materially limited" standard, with Comment 4 on independent professional judgment) and Rule 1.10(a) (Model Rule 1.10, imputed disqualification, applied to a Commonwealth's Attorney's office as a "firm"). It traces the shift from former DR 5-101(A)'s broader "may affect" test and relies on LEOs 1416, 1578, 789, 1311, and 1767.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Model Rule 1.7 / Virginia Rule 1.7(b) (personal-interest conflicts; "materially limited" standard; Comment 4)
• Model Rule 1.10 / Virginia Rule 1.10(a) (imputed disqualification within a firm or office)

Other opinions cited:

• Virginia LEOs 1767 (prosecutor as client of defense counsel), 1416, 1578 (shared-office and landlord/tenant relationships), 789, 1311 (business relationships between opposing counsel)

See also

• VA LEO 1815: Local Government Lawyer Conflict
• VA LEO 1810: GAL Conflict, Ex-Partner Opposing
• ABA Formal Op. 507: Office Sharing With Lawyers

Source

• Landing page: https://vsb.org/Site/about/rules-regulations/leo-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://www.vsb.org/common/Uploaded%20files/LEOs/1799.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Committee Opinion
June 30, 2004
LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1799

CONFLICT OF INTEREST – CAN A
COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY
PROSECUTE CASES WHERE THE
DEFENDANT IS REPRESENTED BY THE
COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY’S FORMER
PARTNER WITH WHOM HE/SHE OWNS AN
INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE?

You have presented a hypothetical in which A and B were the only partners in a firm. A and B
as individuals owned the office building in which the law office was located. A was appointed
the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney for the locality. B continued as a sole practitioner in
the office building. B pays no rent for the law practice, but two other tenants pay rent, which
goes to the mortgage payments and for upkeep of the building. A is responsible for one-half of
the real estate taxes, with B responsible for the other half, only if rents are insufficient to cover
the taxes. Where the rent paid is insufficient to cover the mortgage, B pays the balance. A and
B benefit from the increasing equity and from tax deductions for the building. A and B also own
the office equipment, computers, and furniture used by the tenants of the building, including B’s
law practice. The AB law firm obtained a loan for partnership business. Monthly payments on
that loan are now paid solely by B, but A remains legally responsible for the balance, along with
B. B represents criminal defendants in A’s jurisdiction.
You have asked the Committee to opine, under the facts of the inquiry, whether A is precluded
from prosecuting those defendants represented by B.
This Committee has in the past considered landlord/tenant relationships between opposing
counsel. See LEOs ##1416, 1578. The focus of those opinions was less on the mere fact of a
landlord/tenant relationship and more on the fact that the offices of opposing counsel were in the
same building. For instance, in LEO 1416, this Committee found a conflict where the opposing
counsel shared a law library, waiting room, and receptionist while the situation in LEO 1578 was
distinguished in that no such sharing was present. Neither opinion addresses whether
thelandlord/tenant relationship rose to a personal interest creating a conflict of interest for the
attorneys.
It is this question of potential conflict of interest that is at issue in the present inquiry. Prior
opinions considering business relationships between opposing counsel as a source of conflicts of
interest applied DR 5-101(A), predecessor to the current Rule 1.7(b). DR 5-101(A) stated the
following:
A lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional
judgment on behalf of his client may be affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interests, except with the consent of his client
after full and adequate disclosure under the circumstances.
In contrast, the current Rule 1.7(b) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Committee Opinion
June 30, 2004
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
Thus, the prior opinions looking at business relationships between opposing counsel applied
the DR 5-101 standard of “may affect,” as opposed to the current, Rule 1.7’s narrower standard
of “may be materially limited.” See, LEO ## 789, 1311, and 1767. Only recent LEO 1767 has
applied Rule 1.7(b) to a business relationship between opposing counsel to consider the issue of
a conflict of interest.
LEO 1767 involved a Commonwealth’s Attorney who retained private counsel to do
collections work for the Commonwealth’s Attorney. That opinion found that such a relationship
did create a conflict of interest for the Commonwealth’s Attorney in any case were that private
attorney represented the defendant. The normal Rule 1.7(b) conflicts “cure” was not available
in that instance due to the Commonwealth’s Attorney having no means to obtain the necessary
consent from his client, the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Committee in finding a conflict in
that scenario noted the following:
The prosecutor who is the client of the defense attorney may find his ability to
represent the Commonwealth against the attorney compromised. Loyalty to a
client must not be watered down by a personal business or relationship with
opposing counsel. This Committee finds that …the Commonwealth’s
Attorney’s representation “may be materially limited” in any case where he is
the client of opposing counsel.
The concern of diminished loyalty to one’s client is at the heart of a “personal interest” conflict
for a lawyer. Comment 4 to Rule 1.7 states that a critical question for determining a conflict of
interest is “whether it will interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment.” In
LEO 1767, the Committee concluded that interference with or watering down of the lawyer’s
professional judgment and loyalty to the client would always be present whenever a lawyer is the
client of his opposing counsel.
In contrast, not all conflict scenarios can be decided so categorically. The determination of
whether the business relationship between opposing counsel constitutes a conflict will often be
very fact-specific. A landlord/tenant relationship between opposing counsel is that sort of factspecific context; the mere existence of the leasing arrangement will not always give rise to a
conflict, nor will it never do so. It will be the particular details surrounding each such situation
that will be critical to the determination.

Committee Opinion
June 30, 2004
In the present scenario, several facts indicate further entanglement between the prosecutor and
the defense attorney beyond a mere landlord/tenant relationship. While the prosecutor is a
landlord for the defense attorney’s law practice, the following conditions are also present:
1) The two opposing counsel co-own the building;
2) The two opposing counsel are each responsible for the mortgage on that
building;
3) The prosecutor is landlord not for a residence or a nonlegal business of the
defense attorney, but for his law practice; and
4) The prosecutor is co-owner of the computers, office equipment and furniture
of the defense attorney’s law practice.
Because the business connection between the prosecutor and this defense attorney is directly
related to the law practice of the defense attorney, the Committee opines that this business
relationship qualifies as a personal interest of the prosecutor giving rise to a conflict of interest
under Rule 1.7(b). As the prosecutor’s client is the Commonwealth, he is not able to obtain
client consent as contemplated in Rule 1.7(b)(2). Accordingly, in this hypothetical, the Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney is precluded from prosecuting clients represented by the defense
attorney. Moreover, as the all conflicts arising under Rule 1.7 are imputed to each member of a
firm 1 under Rule 1.10(a) 2, no other prosecutor in that office may prosecute a defendant
represented by this defense attorney.
This opinion is advisory only, based only on the facts you presented and not binding on any
court or tribunal.
Committee Opinion
June 30, 2004

1

The definition of “firm” from the Terminology section of the Rules of Professional Conduct is as follows, “a
professional entity, public or private, organized to deliver legal services, or a legal department or a corporation or
other organization.” That definition is not limited to private law firms but also applies, for example, to a
Commonwealth Attorney’s office.
2
Paragraph (a) of Rule 1.10 states in pertinent part, [while] lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by … [Rule]
1.7.