Can a collections lawyer tell the opposing side that he will advise his client to pursue criminal charges, and that repayment will not stop them, without making an improper threat?

Plain-English summary

In a breach-of-contract dispute, a plaintiff had paid a contractor $4,000 for refrigerator installation; the contractor's lawyer conceded no viable defense and said the account now held only a few hundred dollars. The plaintiff's lawyer wrote that, since only $1,125 had been spent on equipment, he assumed the contractor illegally diverted the rest, and that he would advise his client to file criminal charges, which repayment would not stop. The committee was asked whether that criminal-charges language was an improper threat, and whether similar language could go in a form letter to bad-check debtors.

The committee notes Comment 5 to Rule 3.4(h) expressly lets a lawyer advise his own client about the possibility of criminal prosecution and the client's related rights. So advising the client is fine; the scrutiny falls on communicating that intent to the other side. Applying the two-part test from LEO 1582 (is it a threat; if so, was it made solely for civil advantage, which turns on subjective motive case by case), the committee finds the letter is a threat but, unlike LEO 1582 (where the lawyer had said he never intended to prosecute, showing an intimidation purpose), this letter says the prosecution will continue even if the debtor takes remedial action. On its face that is notice of prosecution, not an attempt to change the outcome of the breach-of-contract suit, so absent other motive evidence it does not violate Rule 3.4(h). A footnote adds the letter was unnecessary for civil advantage anyway, since opposing counsel had already conceded no viable defense.

On the form letter to bad-check debtors, the committee finds it would be a threat, but whether it would be solely for civil advantage depends on whether the lawyer actually intends to pursue prosecution in each case, which the request does not establish. The committee cautions that sending such a letter with no intention to prosecute, only to encourage payment, would not be permissible.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Virginia's Rule 3.4 may have changed since. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific requirement mentioned here.

In practice

The opinion holds that, under the rules as they stood at the time, advising one's own client about possible criminal prosecution is permitted, while communicating that intent to the other side is judged by the two-part threat test; a statement that prosecution will proceed regardless of repayment is notice, not a threat solely for civil advantage. It also holds that a form collection letter threatening prosecution would be improper if sent with no intention to prosecute, merely to pressure payment.

Common questions

Q: Can a lawyer mention criminal charges when collecting a debt?

A: A lawyer may advise his own client about possible prosecution (Comment 5 to Rule 3.4(h)). Communicating the intent to the other side is permissible only if it is not a threat made solely to gain a civil advantage.

Q: Why was this particular letter not an improper threat?

A: Because it said the prosecution would proceed even if the debtor repaid. The committee treats that as notice of prosecution rather than leverage to change the outcome of the civil suit, so absent other motive evidence it did not violate Rule 3.4(h).

Q: Could the lawyer put the same language in a form letter to bad-check debtors?

A: Only carefully. The committee says such a letter is a threat, and would be impermissible if sent with no intention to actually pursue prosecution and only to encourage payment.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets Rule 3.4(h) (Virginia's bar on threatening criminal or disciplinary charges solely to gain a civil advantage; derived from former DR 7-104), including Comment 5's allowance for advising one's own client about prosecution. It applies the two-part threat test from LEO 1582 and prior opinions LEO 715, 716, 1388, 1569.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Virginia Rule 3.4(h) and Comment 5 (threatening criminal or disciplinary charges; advising one's own client; former DR 7-104)

Other opinions cited:

• Virginia LEO 1582: two-part test for an improper threat; threat there was solely for civil advantage.
• Virginia LEOs 715, 716, 1388, 1569: prior applications of the threat prohibition.

See also

• VA LEO 1755: Threatening Charges to Stop Contact
• VA LEO 1867: Release-Dismissal Agreements
• VA LEO 1795: Advising Witnesses Not to Cooperate

Source

• Landing page: https://vsb.org/Site/about/rules-regulations/leo-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://www.vsb.org/common/Uploaded%20files/LEOs/1753.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Committee Opinion
May 17, 2001
LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1753

COLLECTIONS BY ATTORNEY: ADVISING
DEBTOR THAT NONPAYMENT WILL RESULT
IN ATTORNEY ADVISING CLIENT TO
PURSUE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

You have presented a hypothetical situation concerning language in correspondence between
attorneys for the parties in a breach of contract action. The plaintiff had paid four thousand
dollars to the defendant contractor for commercial refrigerator installation. The defendant's
attorney advised the court that there was no viable defense to the breach of contract claim and
stated that the account for the four thousand dollars now only contained a few hundred dollars.
The plaintiff's attorney subsequently wrote the defendant's attorney regarding that account. In
that letter, the plaintiff's attorney noted that as only $1125 of the four thousand had been spent on
equipment, he assumes the defendant illegally diverted the remainder. The letter states that the
plaintiff's attorney plans to advise his client to file criminal charges against the defendant for that
diversion and that repayment of the diverted funds will not stop that course of action.
Under the facts you have presented, you have asked the committee to opine as to whether the
provision in the plaintiff's attorney’s letter regarding criminal charges constitutes an improper
threat. You also ask whether, if that particular provision is not improper, would it then be proper
for you to include in a form letter, to be sent to debtors who write bad checks to your clients, a
provision indicating that you would advise your client at some future date that the client should
institute criminal proceedings for larceny and that repayment will not cease that pursuit once
initiated.
The appropriate and controlling disciplinary rule relative to your inquiry is Rule 3.4(h), which
states as follows: “A lawyer shall not present or threaten to present criminal or disciplinary
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”
The Committee notes that Comment 5 to Rule 3.4(h) expressly allows a lawyer to advise his
client of “the possibility of criminal prosecution and the client’s rights and responsibilities in
connection with such prosecution.” Thus, the plaintiff's attorney in this hypothetical may advise
his client of his right to pursue criminal charges against the defendant without triggering the
prohibition of Rule 3.4(h). However, in the hypothetical, the plaintiff's attorney does not merely
advise his client of his rights; he also communicates to the defendant’s attorney the intent to
provide that advice. That communication warrants close scrutiny regarding whether it constitutes
an improper threat as contemplated by Rule 3.4(h).
This Committee has rendered several opinions establishing that it is improper, under 3.4(h)’s
similar predecessor DR 7-104, for an attorney to allude to criminal prosecution in a letter to a
debtor of the lawyer’s client solely to obtain an advantage in the civil suit. See LEOs 715, 716,
1388, and 1569. The most recent review of that provision occurred in LEO 1582. In the
hypothetical presented in that opinion, a part-time Commonwealth’s Attorney wrote a letter to
his civil client’s sister regarding concerns about the mother’s finances. In that letter, the attorney
stated that if the sister does not take certain steps, the attorney “will have no choice but to seek
assistance through legal enforcement and legal avenues.” LEO 1582. In considering whether
such a letter in that context violated the improper threat prohibition, the Committee developed a
two-part test for that analysis: “(1) is the letter a threat; and (2) if so, is the threat solely to obtain

Committee Opinion
May 17, 2001
an advantage in a civil matter.” Id.
While the test presented in LEO 1582 involved an application of DR 7-104, the newer Rule
3.4(h) is substantially similar enough to DR 7-104 that the Committee opines that the test
continues to be appropriate. In applying the two-part test to the present hypothetical, the
Committee does consider the communication to include a threat. Specifically, the provision
informing the defendant’s attorney of the plan to advise the plaintiff to pursue criminal charges
does operate as a threat to present criminal charges. The harder part of the test to apply is the
second part: was the threat made solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. Determination
of whether a threat is made “solely” for that reason becomes a matter of determining the
subjective motive on a factual case-by-case basis. LEO 1388. In LEO 1582, the hypothetical
contained information that despite the letter threatening criminal prosecution, the attorney had in
fact stated elsewhere that he had no intention of ever pursuing a criminal complaint. Based on
that information, the Committee believed that the purpose of the reference to legal action by the
Commonwealth Attorney was to intimidate the sister into taking the actions requested by the
attorney. Thus, the Committee opined that the sole purpose of the threat was to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter and, therefore, that the letter violated the prohibition. In contrast, in
the present hypothetical, the letter states that even if the defendant takes remedial action, the
criminal prosecution will not cease. On its face, the language does not seem to be an attempt to
affect the conduct of the defendant or to change the outcome of the breach of contract suit.
Rather, it seems to be a giving of notice of the criminal prosecution. Unlike in LEO 1582, no
other information is provided regarding motive to contradict the plain language of the letter: that
regardless of any action taken by the defendant, the plaintiff's attorney was advising a course of
criminal prosecution. As no advantage is sought in the breach of contract claim, the “threat”
provision of this letter does not alone seem to constitute a Rule 3.4(h) violation. Absent some
other information regarding the plaintiff’s attorney’s motive, the letter is not improper. 1
Your request asks whether, if such language is found to be proper, could you insert similar
language in a form letter you use for transmittal to people who write bad checks to your clients.
Returning to the two-part test from LEO 1582, the Committee does find that such use of a form
letter in that context would constitute a “threat” of criminal prosecution. As for whether that
threat would be made solely for the purpose of obtaining an advantage in a civil matter, your
request provides no information as to whether you would indeed pursue criminal prosecution in
each instance. Accordingly, the Committee cannot make that determination from the information
provided. Certainly, if you were to send such a letter with no intention of pursuing criminal
charges and with the hope of encouraging payment for the bad check, then the letter would not be
permissible.
Committee Opinion
May 17, 2001

1

The committee also observes that since the defendant’s attorney advised the court that there was no viable
defense to the breach of contract claim, the letter was not necessary to obtain an advantage in any event.