VSB March 20, 2001

What does Virginia's compendium advertising opinion say about actors, 'no recovery, no fee,' case results, trade names, referral services, and calling yourself a 'specialist' or 'expert'?

Short answer: This is Virginia's consolidated guidance on lawyer advertising under Rule 7.1. It treats as misleading: undisclosed actors posing as lawyers, 'no recovery, no fee' when the client may owe costs, unqualified specific or cumulative case results, trade names a firm does not actually use, and unsubstantiated 'best,' 'specialist,' or 'expert' claims. It permits truthful, non-misleading statements, 'soft' client endorsements, and accurate references to listings such as The Best Lawyers in America.

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2001. Ezel answers yours: whether it's allowed on your facts, under the current Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 2001
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later opinions or rule amendments may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original ethics opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

LEO 1750 is a compendium opinion: the Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation reviewed its prior advertising opinions and consolidated them into a single document, first issued March 20, 2001, then updated in 2006 and 2008, and revised again to incorporate the rule changes effective July 1, 2017. It was published as a Legal Ethics Opinion and approved by the Supreme Court of Virginia (most recently October 2, 2019). The controlling rules are Rule 7.1 (false or misleading communications about a lawyer's services) and Rule 7.3(d) (paying the usual charges of a legal service plan or not-for-profit referral service).

The opinion works through a series of advertising practices. Using an actor to portray a lawyer or member of the firm is misleading unless the ad discloses that the person is not associated with the firm or that the depiction is a dramatization. "No recovery, no fee" is misleading when the client may still owe costs and expenses; under Rule 1.8(e) a lawyer may, but need not, make repayment of costs contingent on the outcome, so the phrase is permissible only when the firm has decided the client's responsibility for costs is contingent. Firm names and trade names are governed by Rule 7.1 Comments 5 and 6: a firm may use a trade or fictitious name only if it is not misleading and only if the firm actually practices under that name, and a firm may not imply a partnership that does not exist.

On case results, the opinion holds it can be misleading to advertise specific or cumulative results without context, because results depend on case-specific factors; after the 2017 amendments, Rule 7.1 no longer requires a fixed disclaimer but asks whether a statement is misleading and whether qualifying information would cure it. Comparative or self-laudatory claims ("the best," "expert," "specialist") that cannot be factually substantiated violate Rule 7.1, and a lawyer cannot escape that bar by putting the comparison in a client testimonial (Rule 8.4(a)); "soft" endorsements (for example, that the lawyer returned phone calls) are allowed. Lawyers may advertise participation in a qualifying lawyer referral service and accurate listings such as The Best Lawyers in America, subject to Rule 7.1.

Currency note

LEO 1750 is a compendium that the Virginia State Bar has kept current: originally issued March 20, 2001, revised in 2006 and 2008, updated to reflect the rule amendments effective July 1, 2017, and approved by the Supreme Court of Virginia (most recently October 2, 2019). Because Virginia's advertising rules continue to change, verify the current text of Rules 7.1 and 7.3 before relying on any specific point here.

In practice

The opinion consolidates the committee's positions on common advertising questions. It holds that an ad using an actor to portray a lawyer or firm member is misleading absent a disclosure or dramatization label; that "no recovery, no fee" is misleading unless the firm has made the client's responsibility for costs contingent under Rule 1.8(e); that a trade or fictitious name is permissible only if not misleading and actually used by the firm; that specific or cumulative case results require enough context not to mislead; and that comparative or self-laudatory claims ("best," "specialist," "expert") that cannot be substantiated violate Rule 7.1, whether made by the lawyer or by a client testimonial.

Common questions

Q: Can a law firm use an actor to play a lawyer in its TV ad?

A: Only with disclosure. The committee holds it is misleading to use an actor portraying a lawyer or firm member without disclosing that the person is not associated with the firm, or that the depiction is a dramatization.

Q: When can a Virginia lawyer advertise "no recovery, no fee"?

A: Only when the firm has decided the client's responsibility for advanced costs and expenses will be contingent on the outcome. If the client may owe costs regardless of recovery, the committee says the phrase is misleading under Rule 7.1 unless that liability is explained. Rule 1.8(e) permits, but does not require, making cost repayment contingent.

Q: Can a lawyer advertise specific case results or jury verdicts?

A: Yes, if not misleading. The committee holds that specific or cumulative results can mislead without context (for example, a verdict obtained after a larger settlement offer was refused, or an award later reduced by the court). After the 2017 amendments, Rule 7.1 asks whether the statement is misleading and whether qualifying information would cure it, rather than imposing a fixed disclaimer.

Q: Can a lawyer call himself "the best," a "specialist," or an "expert"?

A: Not unless it can be factually substantiated. The committee treats "best" and "expert" as comparative or self-laudatory claims that violate Rule 7.1 when unsubstantiated. A lawyer may state that she concentrates or specializes in a field if true, and may name a certifying organization, but may not imply an unsubstantiated comparison.

Q: Can a client testimonial say things the lawyer could not say directly?

A: No. The committee holds Rule 7.1's standard applies to statements by clients as well as lawyers, and that a lawyer who lets a testimonial make an unsubstantiated comparison violates Rule 7.1 (with Rule 8.4(a)). "Soft" endorsements that do not compare results, such as that the lawyer returned calls, are allowed.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets Rule 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer's services; the bar on false or misleading communications, including over the internet) and Rule 7.3(d) (payment of the usual charges of a legal service plan or not-for-profit lawyer referral service), and draws on Rule 1.8(e) (advancing litigation costs) and Rule 8.4(a) (violating the rules through the acts of another). It incorporates the 2017 amendments to Rule 7.1 and references the ABA Model Supreme Court Rules Governing Lawyer Referral Services in defining a qualifying referral service.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

  • Virginia Rule 7.1 (false or misleading communications about a lawyer's services; Comments 2, 4, 5, 6)
  • Virginia Rule 7.3(d) (paying the usual charges of a legal service plan or not-for-profit referral service)
  • Virginia Rule 1.8(e) (making repayment of litigation costs contingent on outcome)
  • Virginia Rule 8.4(a) (violating the rules through the acts of another)

Cases:

  • Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), a state may require disclosure of a client's liability for costs in contingent-fee advertising.

Other opinions cited:

  • Virginia LEO 1751: a not-for-profit lawyer referral service may charge the usual referral fee.
  • Virginia LEOs 910, 1014, 1175: misleading lawyer-referral-service advertising and qualifying-service criteria.
  • Virginia LEO 1872: a lawyer may not list rented or alternative office space to imply a larger or more diverse practice.
  • Virginia LEOs 1229, 1292, 1406, 1425, 1443: self-laudatory, "specialist," and "expert" claims under Rule 7.1.
  • Philadelphia Ethics Opinion 91-17: "soft endorsement" testimonials permitted.

See also

Source

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1750. LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION.
The Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation reviewed all of its
previous opinions, and issued a compendium opinion March 20, 2001, summarizing many of the
existing advertising opinions and incorporating previously issued legal ethics opinions on the
subject of lawyer advertising. The Committee updated this opinion in 2005 and 2008 to reflect
rule amendments and lawyer advertising amendments that had been adopted since 2001. The
Standing Committee on Legal Ethics is now further updating the opinion to incorporate the
significant rule changes effective July 1, 2017.
Some of the issues addressed in this opinion include: use of actors; use of the phrase “no
recovery, no fee;” laudatory statements by third parties; use of specific or cumulative case results;
participation in a lawyer referral service; communications involving listing of inclusion in
publications such as The Best Lawyers in America; and the use of the terms “Specialist” or
“Specializing In.” The prohibition in Rule 7.1 concerning advertising which is false or
misleading applies to all public communications and includes communications over the internet.
In order to provide all members of the Bar with better access to the advertising opinions,
this compendium opinion, issued by the Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation, will be published as a Legal Ethics Opinion. See Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia, Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 10; Virginia State Bar Bylaws, Article VII, Section 5.

Opinion
The appropriate and controlling rules of professional conduct relevant to the questions
raised are Rules 7.1 and 7.3(d):
RULE 7.1. Communications Concerning A Lawyer's Services.
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a
whole not materially misleading.
1

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

RULE 7.3. Solicitation of Clients.
*

*

*

(d) A lawyer shall not compensate, give, or promise anything of value to a person who is
not an employee or lawyer in the same law firm for recommending the lawyer’s services except
that a lawyer may:
*

*

*

(2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or not-for-profit qualified lawyer referral
service.
A. Use of Actors in Lawyer Advertising.
The Committee considered the issue of whether a television advertisement is misleading
when an attorney or law firm uses an actor to portray an attorney associated with the law firm
without disclosing that fact in the advertisement.
The Committee is of the opinion that failing to disclose that the actor is not truly an
employee or member of the law firm, when the language used implies otherwise, is misleading.
For example, some advertisements feature actors who use first person references to themselves as
lawyers or as members of the law firm being advertised. When the advertisement implies that an
actor is actually a lawyer or client of the law firm, a disclosure that the actor is not associated with
the firm, or that the depiction is a dramatization, is necessary to prevent the advertisement from
being misleading. 1
B. Use of “No Recovery, No Fee.”
The Committee considered whether the language “no recovery, no fee” or language of
similar import contained in advertising or other public communication soliciting claims for cases
in which contingent fees are permissible was false or misleading pursuant to Rule 7.1, as the
1

There may also be legal requirements to disclose compensation given in exchange for
endorsements or testimonials in advertising. These requirements are beyond the purview of the
Committee. See, e.g., Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 16 CFR Part 255.
2

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

client might still be responsible for advanced costs and expenses regardless of whether any
recovery was obtained.
The Committee determined that use of the explicit phrase “no recovery, no fee” in the
solicitation of contingent fee cases is misleading when the lawyer or law firm may or will require
the client to remain responsible for costs and expenses of litigation. According to Rule 1.8(e), a
lawyer is permitted, but not required to, make repayment of costs and expenses contingent on the
outcome of litigation. Thus, an advertisement or other public communication may only use the
phrase “no recovery, no fee” when the lawyer or law firm has already made the decision that the
client’s responsibility for advanced costs and expenses will be contingent on the outcome of the
matter. If the lawyer or law firm intends that the client will be ultimately responsible for the costs
and expenses of litigation, it is misleading to use the phrase “no recovery, no fee” with no
additional explanation that litigation expenses and court costs would be payable regardless of
outcome because the public generally may not distinguish the differences between the terms “fee”
and “costs.” See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 652-3 (1985) (finding that “[t]he State’s position that it is deceptive to employ
advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client’s liability for
costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability
for costs be disclosed”). The statement “no recovery, no fee” is misleading if a client is or may be
liable for costs even if there is no recovery. See Rule 1.8(e).
Also, the Committee considered the propriety of such phrases as “we guarantee to win, or
you don't pay,” “we are paid only if you collect,” “no charge unless we win,” or other language
not making explicit reference to a legal “fee.” Language of this type that does not make explicit
reference to a “fee” may be false and misleading in violation of Rule 7.1 if the language includes
the implication that the client will not be required to pay either expenses or attorney's fees if there
is no recovery, but the lawyer does not intend to make the costs and expenses contingent on the
outcome of the matter. See also Rule 1.8(e).
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Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

C. Firm Names and Offices.
The question arises whether and under what circumstances attorneys may advertise using
a corporate, trade, or fictitious name which is not the name or names of the firm, the attorney, or
the attorneys in the firm. Comments 5 and 6 to Rule 7.1 allow a firm to use a trade or fictitious
name as long as it is not misleading. For example, a firm may use the name or names of lawyers
associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm, or the name of a member of the firm who is
deceased or retired from the practice of law. It is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not
associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm, or the name of a nonlawyer. The firm name
also may only state or imply a partnership between lawyers when that is the fact. A firm may not
call itself “Smith and Jones” unless Smith and Jones are actually associated as partners in the
firm.
It is also misleading under Rule 7.1 for an attorney or attorneys to advertise using a
corporate, trade or fictitious name unless the attorney or attorneys actually practice under such
name. Use of a name which is not the name used in the practice is misleading as to the identity,
responsibility, and status of those using such name. The usage of a corporate, trade, or fictitious
name should include, among other things, displaying such name on the letterhead, business cards,
and office sign. Furthermore, the usage of such name shall comply with applicable laws,
including Sections 13.l-542 et seq. or Sections 59.l-69 et seq. of the Code of Virginia.
It is also potentially misleading under Rule 7.1 for a lawyer to advertise the use of a nonexclusive office space, including an executive office rental, if that is not actually an office where
the lawyer provides legal services. See LEO 1872, which cautions that:
[A] lawyer may not list alternative or rented office spaces in public communications for
the purpose of misleading prospective clients into believing that the lawyer has a more
geographically diverse practice and/or more firm resources than is actually the case.
D. Advising That an Attorney Must Be Consulted.
The question arises whether it is permissible for an advertisement to state that an
4

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

individual injured in an automobile accident must consult an attorney before speaking to any
representative of an insurance company. While it may make good sense for an individual involved
in an accident with an injury to consult with an attorney before speaking with a representative
from an insurance company, there is no legal requirement for this. Since the proposed
advertisement makes an explicitly false statement, to wit, that an individual “will have to consult
an attorney,” the proposed advertisement would be in violation of Rule 7.1.
E. Participation in Lawyer Referral Services.
Attorneys may advertise participation in lawyer referral services and joint marketing
arrangements so long as the advertising is not false or misleading. See Rule 7.1. Lawyers may pay
the “usual charges” of a legal service plan or not-for-profit lawyer referral service. See Rule
7.3(d) and LEO 1751. The Committee is concerned that some advertising concerning lawyer
referral services and joint marketing arrangements are misleading. As noted in LEO 910,
statements which violate the Rules of Professional Conduct and which are used in advertisements
by lawyer referral services would create automatic rules violations by the participating attorneys.
The following practices of lawyer referral services are misleading:
1.

Implying in advertising that a lawyer is selected for participation in a Lawyer

Referral Service based on quality of services or some other process of independent endorsement
when in fact no bona fide quality judgment has been objectively made;
2.

Stating or implying that the Lawyer Referral Service contains all of the lawyers or

law firms eligible to participate in the Service by the objective criteria of the Service when in fact
the Service is closed to some lawyers or law firms who meet the objective criteria;
3.

Stating or implying that there are a substantial number of attorneys or firms

participating in the Service when in fact all calls in a geographic area will be directed to one or
two attorneys or firms;
4.

Using the name of a Lawyer Referral Service or joint marketing arrangement in a

way which misleads the public as to the true identity of the advertiser; or
5

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

5.

Advertising participation in a Lawyer Referral Service which is not a true,

qualifying Lawyer Referral Service as defined in this opinion, based on the American Bar
Association Model Supreme Court Rules Governing Lawyer Referral Services. 2
In order to qualify as a lawyer referral service for purposes of these rules, the service
must: be operated in the public interest for the purpose of providing information to assist the
clients; be open to all licensed lawyers in the geographical area served who meet the requirements
of the service; require members to maintain malpractice insurance or provide proof of financial
responsibility; maintain procedures for the admission, suspension, or removal of a lawyer from
any panel; and not make any fee-generating referral to any lawyer who has an ownership interest
in the service, or to that lawyer’s law firm. See also LEOs 910, 1014, and 1175.
F. Advertising Specific or Cumulative Case Results/Jury Verdicts/Comparative Statements.
The Committee considered the question of whether it is misleading to the public for an
attorney to advertise results obtained in a specific case or to advertise cumulative results obtained
in more than one specific case, e.g., “We’ve collected millions for thousands,” or “We’ve
collected $30 million in 1996.”
The Committee determined that it can be misleading to the public for an attorney to
advertise specific case results, whether individually or cumulatively, for two reasons:
1.

The results obtained in specific cases depend on a variety of factors, and any

advertisement of the results obtained in a specific case or cases that does not include all factors
can be misleading. This is true, in part, because it is generally impossible to know all factors that
have influenced a specific result or an accumulation of specific results.
2.

Each legal matter consists of circumstances that are peculiar or unique to the

specific case, and the result obtained under one set of circumstances may not provide useful
information to the public as a predictor of the result likely to be obtained in a case that necessarily
involves different circumstances.
2

Available at www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_referral/policy.html
6

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

An example will illustrate why information describing a specific case result or a blanket
statement of cumulative results may be entirely accurate, but nonetheless misleading. An attorney
could accurately cite in advertising a verdict of one million dollars, yet the public would be
misled if the verdict were obtained under circumstances in which the offer prior to trial had been
two million dollars. The same advertisement would be similarly misleading if the one million
dollar verdict were obtained against an uncollectible defendant, under circumstances in which the
case was lost as to a collectible co-defendant who had made a substantial offer prior to trial. More
importantly, since no member of the public is likely to have a case in which the circumstances
precisely duplicate the advertised verdict, the report of a specific case result may mislead the
consumer “if presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that
the same results could be obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the
specific factual and legal circumstances of each client’s case.” Rule 7.1, Comment 2.
The 2017 amendments to Rule 7.1 shifted the focus from a mandatory disclaimer with a
number of technical requirements for language and placement to an assessment of whether a
particular statement is misleading, and if so, whether there is a disclaimer or additional
information that would put the statement in the proper context and avoid any misleading
implications. Rule 7.1 no longer requires a specific disclaimer to precede any statement of case
results, although Comment 2 does clarify that the inclusion of “an appropriate disclaimer or
qualifying language may preclude a finding that a statement is likely to create unjustified
expectations or otherwise mislead the public.”
For example, the above statement of a “one million dollar verdict” obtained after a two
million dollar settlement offer was refused would need to include the full context in order not to
be misleading. Nor would the boilerplate disclaimer language previously required by Rule 7.1 be
sufficient to avoid the misleading implication – the communication would have to state the fact
that a two million dollar settlement offer was made prior to the trial in which the one million
dollar verdict was obtained. Another example of a misleading statement of case results would be a
7

Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

statement that a lawyer obtained an $8 million jury verdict in a medical malpractice case, when
the court reduced the award to the statutory cap of $2.25 million. A lawyer advertising such a
result must include the fact that the award was reduced by the court.
On the other hand, a lawyer who advertises that she has obtained pre-trial dismissal of
criminal charges after prevailing on a motion to suppress evidence, when that is a complete and
true statement of what happened in the case, may do so without including any disclaimer or
limiting language. Similarly, a lawyer may truthfully advertise that he obtained a $5 million
settlement following a three-day mediation.
The Committee has repeatedly opined that the use of claims such as “the best lawyers,”
“the biggest earnings,” and “the most experienced” are self-laudatory and amount to comparative
statements that cannot be factually substantiated, in violation of Rule 7.1. See also Comment 2 to
Rule 7.1. This Committee continues to adhere to the belief expressed in Comment 2 that
statements that use extravagant or self-laudatory words that cannot be factually substantiated are
designed to and in fact mislead laypersons to whom they are directed and, as such, undermine
public confidence in our legal system. See also LEOs 1229 and 1443.
G. Statements by Third Parties.
The Committee addressed whether a lawyer can circumvent the prohibition against
comparative statements with the use of client testimonials. For example, a lawyer’s television
advertisement shows a former client making statements about the client’s satisfaction and about
the quality of the lawyer’s services, using statements to the effect that the lawyer is “the best” and
will get you “quick results.”
Rule 7.1 prohibits statements comparing attorneys’ services, unless the comparison can be
factually substantiated. See Comment 2 to Rule 7.1. The Committee has previously opined that a
lawyer’s advertising of specific case results may be misleading, if the communication does not
include an appropriate disclaimer or other context for the case results. Thus, an attorney has clear
guidance as to the impropriety of making certain statements in his advertising. Rule 8.4(a) states
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Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

that an attorney shall not violate a disciplinary rule through the actions of another. Moreover, the
language of the restriction in Rule 7.1 makes no qualification as to the maker of the regulated
statements. To the contrary, the rule’s requirements are directed at any statements contained in the
communication. Thus, there is no support in Virginia’s Rules of Professional Conduct for
affording greater leeway to advertising statements made by clients than to those made by
attorneys. The standard is the same in both instances. Applying that standard to this hypothetical,
the client’s statements make a comparison (“the best”) that cannot be factually substantiated. If
such improper statements are contained in the lawyer’s advertisement, the lawyer would be in
violation of Rule 7.1.
In further clarification, even statements of opinion by clients that contain comparative
statements are not appropriate. This Committee adopts the mixed approach of Philadelphia Ethics
Opinion 91-17; while prohibiting testimonials regarding results and/or comparisons, it does allow
“soft endorsements.” Examples of “soft endorsements” from the Philadelphia opinion include
statements such as “the lawyer always returned phone calls” and “the attorney always appeared
concerned.”
In sum, the requirements for lawyer advertising are all intended for the protection of the
public. The restrictions on advertising content are carefully chosen to avoid misleading the public
as they make the important choice of whom to select for legal representation. This Committee
will not erode that protection where non-lawyers or their statements appear in the advertisements.
Such a distinction would violate both the language of the pertinent rule and the spirit behind it.
H. Communications Involving Listing in Publications such as The Best Lawyers in America.
The Committee addressed this issue and stated that a lawyer may advertise the fact he/she
is listed in a publication such as The Best Lawyers in America, or a similar publication, and
include additional statements, claims or characterizations based upon the lawyer’s inclusion in
such a publication, provided such statements, claims or characterizations do not violate Rule 7.1.
If, for some reason, the lawyer is delisted by a publication, the statement in the advertisement
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March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

must accurately state the year(s) or edition(s) in which the lawyer was listed.
Further, the lawyer may not ethically communicate to the public credentials that are not
legitimate, such as one that is not based upon objective criteria or a legitimate peer review
process, but is available to any lawyer who is willing to pay a fee. Such a communication is
misleading to the public and therefore prohibited.
Similarly, statements that explain, and do not exaggerate the meaning or significance of
professional credentials, in laymen’s terms are permissible. For example, if the lawyer is
communicating his “A.V.” rating by Martindale-Hubbell, the lawyer may properly include a
description that states that “A.V.” represents “the highest rating” that particular service assigns.
Also, if the lawyer is recognized and listed in the book The Best Lawyers in America, that lawyer
may properly note he is among those lawyers “whom other lawyers have called the best.” The
lawyer should be mindful to exercise discretion when communicating this information, that it be
objective and not misleading. For example, although the lawyer may properly characterize
inclusion in the book The Best Lawyers in America, he cannot properly characterize that inclusion
into statements such as “since I am included in the book, that means I am the best lawyer in
America,” nor can the lawyer impute any such endorsement to others in the law firm not so
recognized.
The Committee’s decision includes objective and factual statements and claims of such
inclusions and warns that descriptive characterizations and other qualitative statements must meet
the requirements of Rule 7.1. See also LAO-0114.
I. Use of “Specialist” or “Specializing In.”
Rule 7.1 permits a lawyer to hold herself out as limiting or concentrating the lawyer’s
practice in a particular area or field of law as long as that is a true and accurate statement.
Comment 4 to Rule 7.1 (formerly comment 1 to Rule 7.4) provides that a lawyer can
generally state that she is a “specialist,” practices a “specialty,” or “specializes in” particular
fields, as long as the statement is not false or misleading in violation of Rule 7.1. The 2017
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Committee Opinion
March 20, 2001
Committee Revised Opinion
April 4, 2006
Committee Revised Opinion
December 18, 2008
Supreme Court Approved
April 20, 2018
Supreme Court Approved
October 2, 2019

amendments to the Rules removed the longstanding requirement that a lawyer who claims to be
certified as a specialist include a disclaimer stating that no certifying organization has been
recognized by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Instead, the lawyer is required to identify the name
of the organization that purportedly conferred the certification, so that a prospective client or
other member of the public can verify the validity of the certification and the criteria for
conferring the certification. Any claim of certification as a specialist is still subject to the
requirement that it is not false or misleading – the certifying organization must undertake some
bona fide evaluation of lawyers rather than just awarding the certification to anyone who pays a
required fee or joins an organization.
J. Use of “Expert” and “Expertise.”
Rule 7.1 prohibits a lawyer from using or participating in the use of any form of public
communication which contains a false or misleading statement or claim. The Committee opines
that a lawyer’s use of the words “expert” or “expertise” in public communications, if the claim
cannot be factually substantiated, amounts to a misleading comparative statement and is therefore
prohibited. See Comment 2 to Rule 7.1. See also LEOs 1292, 1406 and 1425.

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