Can a lawyer write to a juror after the verdict to defend himself and explain that defendants in injury cases are insured?

Plain-English summary

After a personal-injury verdict, a lawyer who had served as counsel wrote to one of the jurors. The letter said that, because Texas law and court rules bar telling a jury about insurance, he had not been "permitted to tell the whole truth" and could not answer opposing counsel's charge that he was trying to take the defendant's property. He referred indirectly to the "hundreds" of such cases he had handled, told the juror that in any future case in which he appeared the defendant would be covered by insurance and that neither he nor his client would seek to take property from the individual, and added a paragraph on his background and philosophy. The inquiry asked whether the letter violated the Canons.

The Committee held that the letter violated both Canon 24 and Canon 29. It found the letter contained enough advertising and self-laudation to violate Canon 24: even granting that the lawyer's purpose was self-defense, the letter and all such letters could only be a form of advertising and indirect solicitation, the reference to "hundreds" of cases was uncalled for, and the letter was in bad taste.

The Committee treated the Canon 29 violation as more serious. The letter sought to spread among prospective jurors the message that defendants in the writer's injury cases are always insured, that jurors could know this "in their own hearts and minds" even though it cannot be put in evidence, and, by implication, that they could and should act on it contrary to law. That effort to influence future jurors to decide on facts that cannot be in evidence was condemned as advice involving disloyalty to the law: an attorney may criticize or seek to change the law, but not advocate that it be evaded. The Committee noted that members had urged latitude because the writer seemed genuinely indignant and acting in self-defense, but it concluded the letter still violated Canons 24 and 29. The ruling was 9-0.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1963, under the former Texas Canons of Ethics, which the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct replaced effective January 1, 1990. It also predates Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which loosened categorical advertising restrictions, though prohibitions on solicitation were not eliminated. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can a lawyer write to a juror after trial to defend his reputation?

A: Under this opinion, a letter of that kind was improper. The Committee said that even if the lawyer's purpose was self-defense, the letter and all such letters could only be a form of advertising and indirect solicitation in violation of Canon 24.

Q: What made the letter a Canon 29 problem rather than just advertising?

A: The Committee said the letter urged future jurors to act on the message that injury defendants are always insured, information the law keeps from juries, which it treated as advice involving disloyalty to the law: advocating that the law be evaded rather than criticized or changed.

Q: Did the lawyer's good-faith motive excuse the letter?

A: No. The Committee acknowledged members had urged latitude because the writer seemed genuinely indignant and acting in self-defense, but it still concluded the letter violated Canons 24 and 29.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets former Texas Canon 24, which prohibited advertising and solicitation by lawyers, and Canon 29, which prohibited rendering advice involving disloyalty to the law. The modern analogs are ABA Model Rule 7.1, on communications concerning a lawyer's services, and Model Rule 3.5, on preserving the impartiality of the tribunal and improper communications with jurors.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• MR 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer's services), as the modern analog
• MR 3.5 (impartiality of the tribunal; communications with jurors), as the modern analog
• Texas Canon 24 (former canon)
• Texas Canon 29 (former canon)

See also

• TX Ethics Op. 278: Prosecutor's Letters to Jurors
• TX Ethics Op. 273: Lawyer ID in a Newspaper Letter
• TX Ethics Op. 280: Attorney-Holds-Duplicate Will Clause

Source

• Landing page: https://www.legalethicstexas.com/resources/opinions/opinion-257/
• Original PDF: https://tcle-web.s3.amazonaws.com/public/documents/Opinion_257.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

QUESTION PRESENTED

A member, after the jury verdict was returned in a case in which he participated as counsel, wrote to one of the jurors a letter explaining certain aspects of the case and defending himself against what he terms personal accusations directed toward him during the trial by opposing counsel.

The case involved a personal injury suit, and said member stated in his letter that, because of our laws and Court rules, which hold that a jury may not be advised of the existence of any insurance, nor of the role of the insurance company in such cases, he "was not permitted to tell the whole truth concerning these matters" and that he was, therefore, unable to defend himself against "personal accusations" made by opposing counsel to the effect that said member was trying to "take away Defendant's property for which he and his family had worked so hard" and, further, that the guardianship of the estate of the minor child involved was "some kind of shenanigan."

In his letter, said member, making indirect reference to the "hundreds" of such cases he had handled, explained the general situation regarding suits in which insurance companies have a part and continued with the statement: "In the event that you, your family or friends ever have the occasion to serve on another jury in which I am an attorney, you may be assured that the named Defendant is covered by insurance and that neither I nor my client will be seeking to take anything, money or property, away from the individual."

Said member included a paragraph referring briefly to his background and personal philosophy and, lastly, he attempted to justify his letter by saying: ". . . but I can but hope that this will help to erase some of the unfair, unnecessary and stinging personal prejudice which my opponent sought to throw at me. The verdict, at least to me, indicated that some similar seed had fallen into fertile ground and had started to grow."

Does such a letter violate the Canons of Ethics?

18 Baylor L. Rev. 333 (1966)

DISLOYALTY TO THE LAW - SELF-LAUDATION - INDIRECT ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
It is unethical for a member to write to a discharged juror a letter which urges disloyalty to the law and which contains elements of self-laudation, indirect advertising and solicitation.

Canons 24, 29.

It is the opinion of the committee that the letter violates both Canons 24 and 29.

The committee believes that the letter in question contains sufficient elements of advertising and self-laudation to constitute a violation of Canon 24. Even though it may be granted that the member's purpose in writing the letter was only to defend himself against allegedly improper charges, it is nevertheless concluded that this letter and all such letters can only constitute a form of advertising and an indirect solicitation of business. The letter also contains an undue element of self-laudation and, particularly, the reference to "hundreds" of personal injury cases which the member has handled seems uncalled for. In addition, the committee believes that the letter is in bad taste and fails to meet the general standards of conduct with which all lawyers should comply.

Of more serious import, however, is the writer's attempt to disseminate amongst prospective jurors the information that (1) in any personal injury case in which the writer represents a Plaintiff, there will always be insurance coverage for the Defendant and (2) though evidence to this effect cannot be submitted to or considered by a jury, the jurors can know it in their "own hearts" and "minds" and (3) by implication, the jurors can and should act on such information contrary to law.

This effort to influence future jurors to bring in verdicts based on facts which cannot be put in evidence is to be condemned. Such action violates Canon 29 which prohibits an attorney from rendering advice involving disloyalty to the law. An attorney may criticize case law or statutes and advocate changes in the law, but that is not the case we have before us. Here the attorney is advocating that the law be evaded. His letter attempts to induce the addressee and his friends, as future jurors in this attorney's suits, to bring in verdicts based on matters which the law forbids a jury a consider. This appears to be rendering advice involving disloyalty to the law and is condemned by Canon 29.

The committee has attempted to judge with considerable latitude the member's conduct in sending out such a letter because the letter seemed to show that said member was genuinely indignant and that his purpose in writing to the juror was only to correct impressions left by opposing counsel's charges. One of our committee feels that, though our committee is not in a position to judge whether the charges made against said member were proper, an attempt to defend one's self against improper charges, before one to whom the charges were stated, is not advertising even though some self-laudation was involved. It was further pointed out by another of our committee that though there did exist this element of self-laudation, the tone of the member's letter was much more one of self-defense than of solicitation. The committee nevertheless feels that the letter does incorporate elements which must be construed as self- laudation and indirect advertising and solicitation in violation of Canon 24, and that the remarks advising future jurors to act, contrary to law (on information given them by the writer of the letter) violate Canon 29. (9-0.)

Tex. Comm. On Professional Ethics, Op. 257 (1963)