TX 1958

Can a law firm handle all the adoptions a charitable children's home places when the home requires adopting parents to use the firm it designates?

Short answer: The Committee concluded that a law firm may properly accept and handle all or any of the adoptions of children placed by a charitable home, even though the home requires adopting parents to use the firm it designates, absent solicitation by the firm or such control over the home that 'feeding' of business results.

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This page answers the general question as of 1958. Ezel answers yours: whether it's allowed on your facts, under the current Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1958
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later opinions or rule amendments may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original ethics opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

The inquiry asked whether a law firm could handle all, or any, of the adoptions of children placed by a charitable home where the home required adopting parents to sign an agreement to use only the attorney the home selected, and whether it would matter if the home used two or three firms.

The Committee held the firm could accept such employment. Absent facts showing solicitation by the firm of the adoption business, or such control over the charitable home by a lawyer or firm that "feeding" of business resulted, the Committee unanimously agreed that Canons 24 and 25 would not be violated. On whether the arrangement was the intervention of a lay agency between attorney and client, the Committee found a close question, but noted that Canon 32 broadly provides charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries, and that a charitable institution placing a child owes a duty to the child, and to itself, to assure the legal requirements are met. On that reasoning, brought within Opinion 150, the institution may properly designate competent counsel to handle the entire adoption, and the designated counsel may accept the employment. The vote was 7-1; one member added that there would be no violation only if the required agreement did not bar adopting parents from employing an attorney of their own choosing to be present and review the instruments used to complete the adoption.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1958, under the former Texas Canons of Ethics, which the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct replaced effective January 1, 1990. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can a charity require adopting parents to use the law firm it designates for the adoption?

A: Under this opinion, yes. The Committee held a charitable home may designate competent counsel to handle the entire adoption, and the designated firm may accept the employment, absent solicitation or "feeding" of business.

Q: When would the arrangement violate the Canons?

A: The Committee said Canons 24 and 25 would be violated if the firm solicited the adoption business, or if a lawyer or firm so controlled the charitable home that "feeding" of business resulted.

Q: Is a charitable home an improper lay intermediary between lawyer and client?

A: The Committee found it a close question but concluded no, relying on Canon 32's provision that charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries, and on the institution's duty to the child.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets former Texas Canons 24 (solicitation), 25 (stirring up litigation), and 32 (intervention of a lay agency between attorney and client, with an exception for charitable societies aiding the indigent), as applied to a charitable home that designated a single firm for the adoptions it placed. The Committee brought the situation within its earlier Opinion 150. The modern analogs are ABA Model Rule 5.4(c) (a person who recommends or pays for legal services may not direct the lawyer's professional judgment) and Model Rule 7.2 (referrals).

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

  • MR 5.4 (professional independence of a lawyer), as the modern analog
  • MR 7.2 (advertising and referrals), as the modern analog
  • Texas Canons 24, 25, and 32 (former canons)

Other opinions cited:

  • Texas Ethics Opinion 150: designation of counsel by an institution

See also

Source

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Is it a violation of the Canons of Ethics for a law firm to handle all, or any, of the adoptions of children placed by a charitable home with adopting parents where the home requires the adopting parents to sign an agreement that only the attorney selected by the home would be used?

Would there be any violation if the home used two or three law firms?

18 Baylor L. Rev. 301 (1966)

INTERMEDIARIES - SOLICITATION - STIRRING UP LITIGATION - CHARITABLE INSTITUTION REQUIRING EMPLOYMENT OF DESIGNATED LAW FIRM
A law firm may properly accept and handle all or any of the adoptions of children placed by a charitable home although the home requires the adopting parents to use only the firm designated by the home.

Canons 24, 25, 32.

In the absence of facts indicating solicitation by a law firm of the business of handling the adoption proceedings, or of facts showing such control over the charitable home by a lawyer or law firm so that "feeding" of business results, the committee unanimously agrees that Canons 24 or 25 would not be violated by the law firm accepting such employment.

Whether this situation constitutes the intervention of a lay agency between attorney and client presents a close question. It is noted that Canon 32 broadly provides, "Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries." Moreover, in placing a child for adoption such a charitable institution owes a duty to the child, and to itself, to assure that all necessary legal requirements are properly met. For this reason the situation described is brought within the purview and reasoning of Opinion 150. Therefore, the charitable institution may properly designate competent legal counsel to handle the entire adoption proceedings, and counsel so designated may properly accept such employment.

One member of the committee expressed the view that there would be no violation if the required agreement would not prohibit the adopting parents from employing an attorney of their choosing to be present and review the instruments used in completing the adoption. (7-1.)

Tex. Comm. On Professional Ethics, Op. 215 (1958)

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