NYSBA July 27, 2000

Can a lawyer who represents lenders or borrowers in real estate deals pay the firm's employees to steer those clients to a title insurance agency the lawyer owns?

Short answer: The opinion concluded that a lawyer may not compensate the firm's employees for soliciting clients or other parties to engage a title insurance agency the lawyer owns, because the lawyer could not ethically represent a party in a deal while acting as a principal in the title agency, and that conflict cannot be cured even by client consent where the agency does more than ministerial work.

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This page answers the general question as of 2000. Ezel answers yours: whether it's allowed on your facts, under the current New York Rules of Professional Conduct, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 2000
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later opinions or rule amendments may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

A lawyer who represents mortgage lenders and brokers in real estate transactions, and who owns a title company without running its day-to-day insurability decisions, proposed to pay firm employees monetary incentives based on their success in soliciting lenders or borrowers to use that title company in deals where the firm represented the lender. The committee concluded the arrangement is impermissible under DR 5-101(A).

The committee grounded its answer in N.Y. State 595 (1988) and N.Y. State 621 (1991), which held that a lawyer may not represent a party in a real estate transaction while acting as a principal in the title agency engaged for that transaction. The conflict arises because the lawyer-owned agency, in preparing a title report or acting as the underwriter's agent, in effect negotiates title exceptions and insurability "with itself" while representing a party. That conflict can be cured by client consent only when the agency performs the purely ministerial service of a title search.

The committee held that if the lawyer cannot make the referral directly, the lawyer also cannot pay employees to make it. It noted that the 1999 amendment replacing DR 5-101(A)'s "obviousness" test with the "disinterested lawyer" standard did not change the analysis. It added that the opinion does not disturb a lawyer's general ability to run a non-legal business, and addressed only this specific arrangement; the referral to a lawyer-owned title agency in a deal the firm handles is barred regardless of any party's consent. The committee noted that federal and state statutes such as RESPA and the Insurance Law might also bear on the proposal but were outside its jurisdiction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000, under New York's former Code of Professional Responsibility, which New York replaced with the Rules of Professional Conduct in 2009. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Can a lawyer pay employees to refer clients to the lawyer's own title agency?

A: The opinion concluded no. Because the lawyer could not make the referral directly without an impermissible conflict under DR 5-101(A), the lawyer also may not compensate employees to make it.

Q: Does client consent fix the problem?

A: Not where the title agency does more than a ministerial title search. The opinion held the dual-role conflict is not consentable when the agency prepares the title report or acts as the underwriter's agent, regardless of any party's consent.

Q: Did the 'disinterested lawyer' amendment change the result?

A: No. The committee concluded that replacing the "obviousness" test with the "disinterested lawyer" standard in DR 5-101(A) left the essential analysis unchanged.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interpreted DR 5-101(A) (personal-interest conflicts and the limits on consent) and DR 5-105(C) (the consent test), together with EC 5-2, of New York's former Code of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rule analogue is Rule 1.7 (concurrent conflicts of interest, including personal-interest conflicts and the limits of client consent). New York replaced the Code with the Rules of Professional Conduct in 2009; the DR numbers cited here are historical.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

  • MR 1.7 (concurrent conflicts of interest)
  • NY DR 5-101(A); DR 5-105(C)

Statutes:

  • Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. section 2601 et seq. (noted as outside the committee's jurisdiction)

Other opinions cited:

  • N.Y. State 595 (1988) and N.Y. State 621 (1991): lawyer-owned title agency conflict; ministerial work only
  • N.Y. State 583 (1987): a lawyer may engage in a non-legal business consistent with the rules

See also

Source

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