NYSBA 2016-03-07

Can a New York lawyer refer a client to an investment firm and accept a commission from that firm for managing the client's settlement money?

Short answer: No. The opinion concludes that taking a fee or commission from an investment firm for referring a client whose funds came from the lawyer's representation creates a non-consentable conflict, because the lawyer's stake in the size and form of the recovery cannot be cured by disclosure and consent.
Currency note: this opinion is from 2016
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later opinions or rule amendments may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked at the bottom of this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

NY State Bar Ethics Opinion 1086: Referral fee from an investment advisor

Short answer: A lawyer may not accept a fee or commission from an investment firm for referring a client to that firm when the money to be invested came from a matter the lawyer handled, because the arrangement creates a conflict that disclosure and client consent cannot cure.

Disclaimer: This is an advisory ethics opinion. Advisory opinions are not binding; they interpret the New York State Bar Association's rules of professional conduct and are persuasive authority. This summary is for research purposes only and is not legal advice. Verify current rules before acting on any specific guidance.

About this page: The plain-English summary and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official opinion. We do not reproduce the opinion text on this page; follow the linked source for the official text, which controls.

View original opinion

Plain-English summary

The inquirer represented clients in workers' compensation and personal injury matters. When a case produced a large recovery, clients often asked how to manage the funds, and the lawyer (who held securities and insurance licenses) wanted to refer them to a licensed investment professional and collect a fee or commission from the investment firm. He proposed to make the referral only after the case closed and to disclose that he would benefit financially (¶¶ 1-3).

The committee assumed, without opining on the legality question, that the firm could lawfully pay the commission, and analyzed the conflict under Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(f) (¶¶ 5-8). It surveyed prior opinions that allow referral fees in "very limited circumstances" and prior opinions that prohibit them, drawing on N.Y. State 682 (1996): a client can give informed consent to a referral fee only when the product or service is fairly uniform among providers and is either required in an objectively determinable quantity or is unconnected to any particular legal services (¶¶ 9-11).

Applying that test, the committee concluded that investment-advisor services are not uniform and the amount of money that should be entrusted to any adviser is not objectively determinable, so the lawyer could not exercise independent judgment in recommending one given the prospect of a referral fee. The result is a non-waivable conflict under Rule 1.7(b), which made it unnecessary to reach Rule 1.8(f) (¶¶ 13-16). The committee added that the conflict reaches the lawyer's underlying advice: the prospect of a commission could affect whether the lawyer counsels settlement or trial, or a lump sum versus a structured settlement (¶¶ 17-18). It also held that limiting the referral to after the representation concluded did not cure the problem, both because the lawyer's settlement judgment could still be skewed and because in workers' compensation matters it is hard to identify when the representation actually ends (¶ 19, following N.Y. State 1043 (2015)).

In practice

Under the New York rules as they stood at the time of the opinion, the committee treated this as a personal-interest conflict that crosses the line from waivable to non-waivable. The controlling factor was whether the referred service is fungible and required in an objectively determinable quantity; investment management is neither, so the lawyer's financial stake in steering more of the client's money to a particular adviser could not be neutralized by disclosure and consent. The opinion places investment-advisor referrals on the prohibited side of the line drawn in N.Y. State 682 and distinguishes them from the uniform, fixed-quantity services (such as title insurance) that earlier opinions allowed when the client consents and any fee is disclosed.

Common questions

Q: Can a New York lawyer ever take a referral fee from a service provider?

A: Sometimes. The opinion explains that prior opinions permit it in limited circumstances, generally where the service is fairly uniform among providers and is either needed in an objectively determinable quantity or is unconnected to the legal services, with client consent (¶¶ 9, 11). Investment management does not meet that test.

Q: Does it fix the problem if the lawyer waits until the case is over to make the referral?

A: No. The opinion concludes the conflict exists whether the fee is offered before or after the representation concludes, because the prospect of a commission can affect the lawyer's settlement advice and because in workers' compensation matters the representation may have no clear endpoint (¶ 19).

Q: Why is this conflict non-consentable when the lawyer offers full disclosure?

A: Because, per the opinion, the lawyer's interest in maximizing the funds and steering them to a particular adviser is in such direct conflict with the client's interest that the client cannot give meaningful consent; the lawyer might favor a lump sum or a larger recovery to enlarge the commission (¶¶ 15, 17-18).

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets New York Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2) and 1.7(b) (personal-interest conflicts and when they may be waived) and Rule 1.8(f) (compensation from someone other than the client), corresponding to ABA Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8(f). Rule 1.7(a)(2) prohibits a representation when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's personal interests will adversely affect professional judgment unless the conflict is consentable and consented to under Rule 1.7(b). Because the committee found the conflict non-waivable, it did not reach the separate informed-consent and independent-judgment conditions of Rule 1.8(f).

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

  • MR 1.7 / NY RPC 1.7(a)(2), 1.7(b) (personal-interest conflicts and waiver)
  • MR 1.8 / NY RPC 1.8(f) (compensation from a third party)

Other opinions cited:

  • N.Y. State 682 (1996): lawyer may not accept a fee from an investment adviser for a client referral; conflict non-consentable
  • N.Y. State 1043 (2015): conflict exists whether the referral fee is offered before or after the representation ends
  • N.Y. State 981 (2013): referral fee permitted where the service is unrelated to the legal services and the lawyer makes no recommendation
  • N.Y. State 667 (1994), 626 (1992), 576 (1986), 461 (1977): referral fees allowed for uniform, fixed-quantity services with consent

See also

Source