NVBAR October 15, 1987

Can a lawyer send direct-mail letters soliciting people facing foreclosure or tax liens?

Short answer: The Committee concluded that mailing targeted solicitation letters to specific people known to need legal services because of a pending foreclosure, an existing tax lien, or prior litigation, where the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, is prohibited solicitation under SCR 197.

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This page answers the general question as of 1987. Ezel answers yours: whether it's allowed on your facts, under the current rules of professional conduct in your state, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1987
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later opinions or rule amendments may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: Advisory only. Not binding precedent.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official ethics opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original ethics opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A lawyer asked whether he could mail solicitation letters to three groups: people whose homes were about to be foreclosed (offering a Chapter 13 plan to cure arrearages over five years), people with IRS tax liens (offering a Chapter 13 plan), and people similarly situated to litigants in pending tax litigation. The recipients were to be identified from published foreclosure-sale notices, published IRS lien notices, and tax court records.

The Committee evaluated the question under SCR 197 ("Direct Contact with Prospective Clients") rather than SCR 198 ("Communication of Fields of Practice"), because the targeting method aimed at specific persons known to need legal services. SCR 197 (taken from ABA Model Rule 7.3) bars a lawyer from soliciting professional employment, by mail or otherwise, from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive is the lawyer's pecuniary gain; the rule excludes general letters or advertising circulars distributed to persons not known to need the particular services. The Committee found the sample letters were written communications directed to specific recipients known to need legal services, sent for pecuniary gain, and not within the general-mailing exclusion.

Addressing the lawyer's suggestion that SCR 197 was constitutionally infirm, the Committee reviewed the commercial-speech cases (including Zauderer, Ohralik, In re R.M.J., Adams, and Spencer) and concluded they did not compel that result, distinguishing advertising and blanket-prohibition cases from a targeted-solicitation rule. It adopted the reasoning of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, which had endorsed Model Rule 7.3's treatment of targeted mail as carrying the same dangers of overreaching as in-person solicitation. The Committee concluded that, absent a supervening decision by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Nevada Supreme Court, SCR 197 could constitutionally apply, so the proposed targeted mailings would be improper.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987, before Nevada's 2006 adoption of the current Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (the renumbered Rules 1.0 et seq. that replaced the former Supreme Court Rules) and the related Ethics 2000-based revisions. The opinion expressly conditioned its conclusion on the absence of a supervening U.S. Supreme Court decision; in 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky decision the Committee relied on (Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)), holding that a state may not categorically prohibit truthful, non-deceptive targeted direct-mail solicitation. The solicitation rule is now Rule 7.3. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules and case law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Why did the Committee treat this as solicitation rather than advertising?

A: Per the opinion, the letters were selected for and directed to specific persons known to need legal services (from foreclosure notices, lien notices, and tax court records), which made it direct contact with prospective clients under SCR 197 rather than a general communication of fields of practice.

Q: Did a prior family or professional relationship matter?

A: Yes. The opinion concluded the mailings were improper because the lawyer had no family or prior professional relationship with the targeted recipients; SCR 197's bar turns on the absence of such a relationship.

Q: Is this opinion still reliable on the constitutional question?

A: The opinion conditioned itself on the absence of a supervening U.S. Supreme Court decision, and in 1988 the Court's Shapero ruling held states may not categorically ban truthful targeted direct mail; treat the constitutional analysis as overtaken and verify current law.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets the Nevada solicitation rule then in force, SCR 197 (now Rule 7.3, solicitation of clients), distinguishing it from SCR 198 (now Rule 7.4, communication of fields of practice). It traces SCR 197 to ABA Model Rule 7.3 and analyzes the rule against the commercial-speech case law of the time.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

  • Model Rule 7.3 / former Nev. SCR 197 (direct contact with, and solicitation of, prospective clients)
  • Model Rule 7.4 / former Nev. SCR 198 (communication of fields of practice)

Cases:

  • Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1987) (relied on; later reversed, 486 U.S. 466 (1988))
  • Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (commercial-speech framework)
  • Adams v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986); Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (targeted direct-mail cases)

See also

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